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Zhulali, Turkish Military Discuss Cooperation

AU1901194395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 95

[Report by Pandeli Ristani]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a meeting today with high-ranking Turkish military personnel, Defense Minister Safet Zhulali stressed that bilateral cooperation between Albania and Turkey has increased. Turkey occupies first place among countries, as regards military assistance granted to Albania. Zhulali also pointed out other areas for assistance, particularly military education.

Zhulali then focused on reforming our military academies and improving their courses and equipment. He said it is necessary to formalize cooperation in this direction and to learn from the experiences of Turkish military academies.

In view of the need to sign a joint agreement between the Albanian and Turkish military academies, the Turkish guests promised to assist the Albanian Army.

Kurbin District Has New Independent Weekly

AU1901162895 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Telephone report by Rrok Preci from Lac]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The district of Kurbin now has its own independent weekly newspaper for news, culture, and the arts. The weekly consists of eight pages and is printed at the At Gjergj Fishta printing house in Lezhe.

The weekly reports on local events for the Kurbin area, as well as foreign and domestic news. The district's most prominent intellectuals are involved with this newspaper. The staff of KURBINI, under the leadership of Cezar Risa and Gjergj Arbi, consists of capable associates from all fields. [passage omitted]

Editorial Views Zhelev's Coming U.S. Visit

95BA0087B Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 19 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by 168 CHASA president Petyo Blaskov: "Will Clinton Succeed in Straightening Out Zhelev?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news that Dr. Zhelev will visit Clinton has been confirmed by several independent sources, including the White House, the Presidency, and the DUMA newspaper.

His Excellency, the U.S. ambassador here, Mr. Montgomery, said that he also knew about the event and worked for a long time to prepare for it.

Consequently, there is almost no doubt that President Zhelev will visit President Clinton. What will he do there?

The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, for example, when he needs a certain U.S. President, picks up the phone and invites him to Pale. The U.S. President, even a former one (in this case Carter), takes a plane and leaves, because many things depend upon Karadzic.

For his part, Dr. Zhelev immediately said that NATO planes should bomb Bosnia, and thus gained the reputation of a peacekeeper in the Balkans, but a few days ago he declared that the Serbs were fascists. That will undoubtedly help to develop friendly relations between Belgrade and Sofia.

Comparing the behavior of Karadzic and Zhelev, one can assume that in some very influential U.S. circles, there has been concern about Bulgaria's balancing and nonaggressive role in the Balkans. Those circles probably wanted Dr. Zhelev to go to Washington for a little while.

There are serious grounds to expect that the Bulgarian president will return from his meeting with Clinton full of new views regarding our neighbors.

No one actually doubts that Dr. Zhelev respects the great U.S. democracy, and knows that basic service for it is offensive to it itself.

Shevardnadze Arrives on Official One-Day Visit

AU1901091795 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The airplane of Georgia's head of state, Eduard Shevardnadze, landed at Sofia Airport after a delay of almost one hour. President Shevardnadze is paying an official one-day visit to Bulgaria at the invitation of President Zhelyu Zhelev.

The official ceremony for President Shevardnadze's arrival is scheduled to begin this very moment at the Boyana Residence. Afterward, Presidents Zhelev and Shevardnadze will have a private meeting. The meeting will be followed by talks between the official Bulgarian and Georgian delegations and the signing of documents, including a bilateral treaty on friendly relations between Bulgaria and Georgia.

Signs Treaties With Zhelev

AU1901184095 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Report by Silviya Velikova]

[FBIS Translated Text] At about 1800, at the conclusion of the lengthy working part of the official visit to Bulgaria by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, the two heads of state signed an interstate treaty on friendship and cooperation between Bulgaria and Georgia, and a further 13 intergovernmental treaties and agreements in the fields of finance, trade, agriculture, science, education, and culture.

President Zhelev said the number of documents signed was a record, while President Shevardnadze added that they provide proof that Bulgaria and Georgia share common economic and national interests.

The Balkans and Bulgaria's role as a stabilizing factor in the region was one of the topics discussed during the private talks between the two presidents. A further topic discussed concerned another point of conflict, one located near the Georgian border.

[Begin Zhelev recording] We also discussed events in Chechnya and expressed our common concern about the situation, because both Georgia and Bulgaria regard themselves as friends of Russia, so we cannot remain indifferent to the fact that Russia is involved in this difficult situation at the moment. At the same time, we shared the view that the conflict in Chechnya should be resolved by peaceful means, through talks and negotiations. Although it is an internal matter concerning the Russian Federation, when it is a question of human rights, internal problems are automatically internationalized. [end recording]

[Velikova] Bulgaria and Georgia are prepared to be a connecting link between the West and East and make their own contribution to transforming and modernizing the Balkans and the Caucasus. Thus said President Zhelev in his toast at the official luncheon he gave in honor of his Georgian guest.

Eduard Shevardnadze, who is also chairman of the Georgian Parliament, had a meeting and talks with his Bulgarian counterpart, National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov. The two parliament chairmen briefed each other on the organization of the two parliaments and the legislative intentions of the political forces represented in them.

Meets Business Leaders in Sofia

AU1901194295 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Late in the afternoon, at the end of his official visit to Bulgaria, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze had a meeting with representatives of Bulgarian business circles. At the World Trade Center the Georgian president and the ministers in his delegation described the visit to Bulgaria as a record success in terms both of the number of documents signed and the number of business meetings accompanying the visit. Eduard Shevardnadze described as cornerstones the agreements concluded in the spheres of engineering, construction, transportation, and agriculture, and for providing incentives for investments.

Emphasis was laid on the fundamental advantages of light industry, the raw material base, and the electronics industry for intensifying cooperation, creating mixed enterprises and joint production ventures, and entering international markets.

Zhelev on Foreign Policy, Privatization Lag

AU1901124995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A short while ago, the Bulgarian Television Good Morning program carried an interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev on the third anniversary of his election as president through direct elections.

Asked about the successes and difficulties during his tenure as president Dr. Zhelev pointed out that a comprehensive and harmonious foreign policy has been established. Today, Bulgaria's foreign policy is based on a new style and clear priorities, the most important being our integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Dr. Zhelev said.

The president expressed his bitterness over the fact that, unlike other former communist states, during the past three years Bulgaria has seriously lagged behind in the process of privatization and economic restructuring.

Party Paper Comments on Yeltsin, Chechnya

95BA0087A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Dec 94 p 4

[Article by Konstantin Ivanov: "Yeltsin Is Conspicuous by His Absence Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A while ago in Russia I saw a car whose owner had replaced the factory bumper with a cast-iron one. The purpose was clear: not cushioning the blow, but doing more damage to the other car in any collision. In this specific case, the obvious aggressiveness, no matter how reprehensible it is, would nevertheless have limited consequences. It becomes devastating, however, when it is adopted as a state policy in politics. The case of Chechnya is in front of us.

No one would seriously attempt to deny Moscow's right to protect the state's integrity. Discounting the scale, it is the same as if Sofia did not react if someone, for example Khaskov's Dudaev, decided to announce the district's independence. The question is whether cast iron should replace the original bumper, which does not prevent an incident, but is capable of limiting the damage.

The drama that is being played out these days with regard to Grozny indicates the choice of a painfully familiar approach, relying solely upon force and confrontation. The aggressive reflex is the same one as in Budapest in 1956 or in Prague in 1968, and in more recent times, the massacre of the unarmed demonstrators in Tbilisi, or Gorbachev's tanks in Lithuania. The difference is that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation, but that makes it that much worse. It is that much more terrible and more unforgivable if their own people killed the relative of that woman—a Russian or Chechen, it does not matter—whose grief and curses were shown a few days ago by all the television stations.

Many other elements of the drama are also painfully familiar. Military commanders whose conscience does not allow them to carry out on the scene the commands coming from Moscow are removed, as is the rule in the army. People in Moscow deny it, however: There was no removal, but rather voluntary resignations. Who will believe it? Who will believe the assertions of the Russian Security Council that the Chechens faked air bombardments, and Dudaev's people actually blew up houses in order to incline public opinion against the Russians?

It is painfully familiar, but no longer from the time of his predecessors but rather from the practices of Yeltsin himself, that he is conspicuous again by his absence, and moreover at such a tragic moment. He is supposedly recovering again (it is not clear whether it is from the operation on his nose) and preparing a proposal for a political solution to the conflict. A hood after the rain! Who made the decision then for military operations without the knowledge of the commander in chief, Yeltsin? The painfully familiar scenario can almost certainly be predicted that some minister—why not even the prime minister?—will pay for the damage.

Even though in the quite recent past there is the precedent of a different scenario: A month after the military adventure in Lithuania, Gorbachev left the Kremlin.

ASP Congress Elects Vasil Velinov Party Leader

AU1901131895 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 16 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Stanimir Nenov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vasil Velinov is the new chairman of the Alternative Social Liberal Party [ASP]. He was elected by 84 votes at the fifth regular ASP Congress held on 14 January in Sofia. Velinov's rival for the post, Angel Kondev, received 21 votes. Valentin Karabashev and Nikolay Vuzev were also nominated to run, but they withdrew in favor of Velinov.

Former ASP leader Nikolay Vasilev resigned at the end of his term of office. He remains an ordinary ASP member.

Vasil Velinov was deputy defense minister when Nikolay Vasilev was a minister [deputy prime minister in Nikolay Popov's cabinet in 1990-91].

The congress delegates decided that the ASP will remain in the DAR [Democratic Alternative for the Republic] coalition and will not join the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government. The congress elected a political council of 25, 14 of whom are new party members. This council will elect Velinov's deputies. Asen Michkovski, Filip Lazarov, and Elena Varamezova all left the council because their terms of office have expired.

The ASP delegates decided to extend their chairman's term of office from one to two years, until the party convenes its next regular congress. The new leader said he aims to mark the ASP as a party capable of taking its own place in the National Assembly.

Dogan Praises Kostov, Envisages Early Elections

AU1901171595 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 16 Jan 95 p 18

[Interview with DPS leader Ahmed Dogan by Tatyana Vaksberg; place and date not given: "The BSP Would Not Complete Its Mandate"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Vaksberg] Would you accept personal responsibility for losing the trust of your constituency?

[Dogan] The responsibility is widespread and every party member has assumed it. This also applies to me. The fact that our parliamentary faction has a new face implies something. This was our first step toward clarifying the responsibility issue. We are advancing toward technocracy and professionalism. Now we must look around and replace certain elements of our strategy.

[Vaksberg] For example?

[Dogan] This is an internal problem, not a public issue.

[Vaksberg] Does it not affect our public?

[Dogan] I am not one of those who think that everything politicians do must be a public matter. Professional politics requires specific skills. Only the basic goals and tasks must be clear. Everything else is a matter of responsibility and competence. [passage omitted]

[Vaksberg] At the 1993 national conference of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS], Mehmed Hodja and all the Kurdzhali delegates walked out. He said that the DPS is in the hands of the State Security. Are you going to refute this claim?

[Dogan] Do not bother me with such stupid questions. [passage omitted]

[Vaksberg] Are you pleased with the absolute victory of your former ally?

[Dogan] I cannot be pleased with the absolute victory of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. "Former ally" is a very bad description. We have never been allies. The political situation at the time changed because the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] proved unable to keep power and relinquished it in an almost voluntary manner.

[Vaksberg] Did you not vote against their cabinet?

[Dogan] Yes, but the reason was related to the erroneous policy of the SDS toward the DPS. They began to view us as only a satellite and, therefore, we showed them the red card. This was a very sad and dark period in our country's new history. Whoever thinks we are heading toward a partnership with the Socialists is out of his mind. He obviously does not know what he is talking about.

[Vaksberg] Do you mean that all those who saw you supporting the former government were out of their minds?

[Dogan] This was not our government. It was formed with our mandate. We offered it to the SDS, but without Filip Dimitrov. The SDS's greatest mistake was that it tried to use pressure politics to assert Filip Dimitrov during the negotiations regarding the second cabinet. With his careless policy, Dimitrov turned many of the members of the SDS parliamentary against himself and placed a question mark over our partnership. [passage omitted]

[Vaksberg] What will be the DPS' role in the next four years?

[Dogan] Reviving production and diminishing poverty will be a central issue for us. We will utilize two mechanisms. First, we will support cooperative forms of activity through the legislative and executive branches, and will seek domestic and foreign investment. The second mechanism involves encouraging the private sector and creating a new infrastructure of private enterprises for production, trade, and services. We must secure law-interest credits for our constituency, regardless of whether they come from domestic or foreign sources. [passage omitted]

[Vaksberg] Do you think that Ivan Kostov means a new SDS policy? Would he contribute to a reconciliation between the SDS and the DPS?

[Dogan] With his competence as an economist, tolerance as a man, and fine political sense, Ivan Kostov introduces a new element into the SDS image. I think that he will assert technocracy and professionalism into the SDS policy. This is something of great importance for the entire parliamentary opposition. [passage omitted]

[Vaksberg] What could the opposition do, as nothing depends on it?

[Dogan] On the contrary, you have no idea how much depends on it. If the opposition really unites, the "left" will not be able to do anything. In politics there are consolidated means of political struggle, but there also are certain experimental means. If something cannot happen in parliament it happens on the streets.

[Vaksberg] Does that mean that something will happen on the streets?

[Dogan] I did not say anything. There are many means of achieving specific political goals if the left shows a cloven foot and its muscles and presents unacceptable claims. Let me tell you: I do not think this majority will enjoy a long life. It certainly would not complete its mandate. Regardless of what maneuvers and new models of mutual relations it employs, this majority will not prevail. It can only utilize the temporary situation that exists.

[Vaksberg] Do you envisage early elections?

[Dogan] Yes, this is the only formula. [passage omitted]

BSP Official Views Forming of Coalition Cabinet

AU2001102195 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 16 Jan 95

[Interview with Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, by Lyudmila Zasheva; place not given, on 15 January: "Narrow Coalition Government Is a Classical Solution, But We Are Not in Classical Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zasheva] Mr. Stoilov, it has been said that on Saturday [14 January] at the closed meeting of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, there was a scandal between you and Zhan Videnov on the issue of forming the cabinet.

[Stoilov) This is not true. We had discussions and arguments on how to conduct the negotiations and on the formula for governing.

[Zasheva] You were a supporter of the broad coalition government. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two formulas?

[Stoilov] We have not used the concept of broad coalition because it is not a precise concept. This would not have been a broad coalition because it would not have encompassed most of the influential groups in the rightist spectrum. In addition, without the other parliamentary forces, it also could not claim to be a broad coalition. However, let us return to your question. Not only I but also all our official positions, including those issued after the elections, noted that the BSP and its coalition partners were striving to form a broad and representative government that would also comprise other organizations in addition to our election partners.

[Zasheva] Why, in the final analysis, did the decision not to include such organizations in the cabinet and to restrict its membership to the Democratic Left prevail?

[Stoilov] I think many people preferred this decision, because, today, it appears to be the better decision, and it will in the next few weeks. Its strength lies in the fact that it demonstrates a total conformity with the responsibilities we assumed as a result of the election results. In this sense, this was a classical solution. However, we are not in a classical situation. Therefore, when such an issue is discussed, its positive and negative aspects must not only be assessed against the background of the present moment, but also while considering the situation that would exist after 6 to 12 months. I think that the other variant offers better chances in the long run, and creates possibilities for generating political support, overcoming the resistance to a BSP government, and establishing greater social tranquility. Secondly, this variant would have reflected our political makeup and our adherence to the commitments we assumed before and after the elections. In addition, this variant would have allowed us to conclude the negotiations in a better way, regardless of the attitudes of the various other groups attitudes toward our offers. To a certain extent, I regret the fact that we could not conclude the negotiations in a better way. The foundations for a better outcome were created by the coalition that we formed before the elections with the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] and Ecoglasnost.

[Zasheva] Is it true that the claim of the Patriotic Alliance to four ministries and one deputy prime minister was one of the catalysts of your decision at yesterday's meeting?

[Stoilov] I based my statement in the discussion only on official arguments, i.e. on the positions officially expressed by our eventual partners during the preliminary negotiations. At those negotiations, no group posed specific conditions regarding the kind and number of ministries it would receive. On the contrary, the positions of both the Patriotic Alliance and the Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR] were based both on our program intentions and on the thesis that it is the BSP that must formulate proposals on participation in the executive power.

[Zasheva] Did your proposal generate much support?

[Stoilov] No. The proposal advocated by the chairman of the BSP Supreme Council was accepted with a great majority, because he had already intervened in the role of the designated prime minister.

[Zasheva] So there have been absolutely no quarrels between you and the adherents of Zhan Videnov's formula?

[Stoilov] There have been discussions, because in addition to the common position of the Consultative Political Council, of which I am also a member as a result of my position in our leadership, I also expressed a different opinion, to which I still adhere and which I proposed within the framework of our Executive Bureau.

[Zasheva] Is there currently any confrontation within the BSP?

[Stoilov] One could note various levels of natural contradictions, which exist in the life of every political group in anything related to the political and social characteristics of its membership and to relations between central and municipal party organs. However, I believe your question refers to relations within the BSP leadership itself. I think that such a problem does not exist and that similar cases of tension must be eliminated by successfully resolving relations between the BSP Supreme Council and the government, together with our coalition partners, of course. We must not be concerned by the emergence of discussions and the adherence to different positions, because we would not have the necessary success without this.

[Zasheva] Is there a danger of disrupting the demonstratively monolithic character of the BSP precisely now, when the BSP has assumed power with an absolute majority? Do you see the threat of a split?

[Stoilov] I see no such risk for the time being.

[Zasheva] Do you mean that holding power will bond you even closer?

[Stoilov] I do not want to commit myself to such a claim. This depends on the structures, the people, and, most of all, the policy we will conduct. However, I do not share your opinion that the BSP was monolithic until the elections. Rather, there are certain traditional lines of differences and discussions, and therefore one must not be surprised that different variants and positions could be expressed within the same leadership. In the final analysis, the important thing is to preserve the unity and consistency of action.

[Zasheva] Do you regret the fact that you are not a member of parliament?

[Stoilov] I myself made that decision. I aimed at combining political and professional possibilities and commitments. Perhaps, I could draw the balance after most of this National Assembly mandate is over. The only thing I would regret will be if we miss some of the opportunities we have today.

[Zasheva] How do you assess the first working day of the 37th National Assembly?

[Stoilov] Perhaps it was good that tension immediately emerged. This should make it clear that the opposition will utilize every opportunity and pretext to block the work unless we specify our positions on anything related to contents and procedure.

[Zasheva] Is there a ministerial post for you in the cards?

[Stoilov] I, myself, do not envisage such a post.

Embargo Said Preventing Iraqi Debt Repayment

AU1901143895 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 13 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Petur Petrov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Businessmen with interests in the Middle East have sounded the alarm, because the Bulgarian authorities have been delaying the settlement of our payments and trade and economic relations with Iraq for seven months, while Western firms are taking our place in the Iraqi market.

Iraqi Ambassador Mohammad Amin Ahmad told OTECHESTVEN FRONT that Iraq is ready to make an immediate start on repaying the $2 billion that it owes Bulgaria. The conditions for repaying the debt are the normalization of relations and removal of the embargo. In May 1994 the joint Bulgarian-Iraqi commission signed a protocol on bilateral relations.

The Iraqi ambassador said: So far, we have received no confirmation from the Bulgarian side that the protocol is being implemented.

According to the previous accords. Baghdad was supposed to settle its debts to Bulgaria with oil deliveries by the end of 1994. However, we have received only one shipment of petroleum, to the value of $141 million, delivered at the end of 1989, before the embargo was imposed.

Confiscated Rifles Allegedly Intended for Bosnia

95BA0087C Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by Fani Cholzhumova and Elin Rahnev: "The Military Prosecutor's Office Is Unraveling the Mysterious Scandal of the 50 Sniper Rifles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Forty-nine Dragunov sniper rifles were discovered on Wednesday, according to the Defense Ministry, around Sofia, in joint operations by the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office [PVS], Military Counterintelligence [VKP], and the military police, the top military prosecutor, Nikolaj Kolev, announced yesterday. A search was conducted, after which it was clarified that the rifles were not for the Defense Ministry.

Lieutenant Colonel Kolev hinted that the weapons were illegally imported in order to be transferred to Bosnia. He advised the reporters to draw their own conclusions about where shooting was going on. According to a military expert asked to comment, the rifles are "perfect for the Bosnian conflict."

A high-level military police officer said yesterday afternoon to KONTINENT that he did not have any information about PVS operations. "The military police cooperated in determining the presence of a certain number of sniper rifles, as a result of which an investigation is being conducted," the Defense Ministry clarified several hours later. The VKP does not know about the case, according to a ministry official.

The indication of the illegally imported weapons came from the VKP, according to the PVS. The Prosecutor's Office immediately seized the rifles, which had optical sights. According to the description found in the box where they were kept, there were supposed to be 50. One was missing.

A Dragunov can be used to shoot with very high accuracy at a distance of 1,300 meters. The weapon's caliber is 7.65 millimeters, and particularly powerful cartridges can be used with it, according to specialists. A shot from such a rifle can penetrate armor several centimeters thick.

Russia, the Czech Republic, and Romania produce the Dragunov rifles. The label on the confiscated weapons is in the Roman alphabet, which means, according to the PVS specialists, that they were not imported from a Slavic country.

The rifles were produced in 1971, according to Lieutenant Colonel Emiliyan Kozlovski, an investigator from the Sliven military prosecutor's office, detailed from the capital for this case. He did not confirm it, but he also did not deny the assumption that the rifles were discovered in Gorna Malina, 30 kilometers east of Sofia. The Defense Ministry's warehouse is the temporary lodging for the weapons, according to the initial information.

PVS prosecutor Lieutenant Colonel Tseko Yordanov is observing the investigation. There is still no information about how the rifles got into the warehouse, nor where one of them disappeared to. At this time, a group of suspects is being determined.

"If I tell you the details and names, you understand that it will get dangerous," Lieutenant Colonel Kozlovski answered a question from a KONTINENT reporter about whom a case was being prepared against. He did not use the standard formula "against an unknown perpetrator."

Russia's Gaydar Interviewed About Chechnya

Yeltsin Weaker After Conflict

AU1901144795 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 18 Jan 95 p 7

[Interview with Former Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar by Adam Cerny in Prague; date not given: "Chaos Is Not Inevitable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cerny] Who is currently in charge in Moscow? Is it Boris Yeltsin? Or is it people from the president's circle such as the chief of his bodyguards, Korzhakov, or the secretary of the Security Council, Lobov?

[Gaydar] I think that power is still in the hands of President Yeltsin, that he still has enough ability and authority to control the situation. The president has a chance to radically alter the policy toward Chechnya.

[Cerny] What is the current standing of President Yeltsin?

[Gaydar] Yeltsin is weaker following the military intervention in Chechnya. One thing, of course, is important: No matter what step he takes next, the communist and nationalist forces will not forget his previous stances. He cannot win their support.

[Cerny] Are you alarmed by the current situation in Russia?

[Gaydar] It seems to me that a number of institutions that evolved during the democratization process are now under threat. Many economic problems are now becoming political problems. I am convinced that any attempts to slow down transformation, reform are counterproductive.

[Cerny] Did Russian troops want to fight in Chechnya or not? If yes, then why have they fought so badly?

[Gaydar] Fighting in a devastated city against people who are armed and entrenched would be difficult for any army. The root of the problem was in badly misjudging the solution chosen and its consequences. It had been envisaged that Dudayev was very weak. This was the case last spring and summer, however. Those who issued the order did not understand that the moment Moscow applied force, it would be pitting itself against a completely different, much stronger Dudayev.

[Cerny] Could Chechnya be the juncture that will determine Russia's future?

[Gaydar] Russia's democracy is very weak and has to be fortified every day. The use of force strengthens the military institutions. There is a paradox here: If sending in the Army is effective, this will serve as proof that the Army is capable of dealing with problems, but, if it does not succeed, it can be said that the Army has weakened democratization.

[Cerny] What are the consequences of the Chechen intervention for the Russian economy?

[Gaydar] As far as the economic consequences of the intervention in Chechnya are concerned, it is obvious that costs will go up. Costs will go up in the budget. It is not based on a war economy; there are no reserves in it for such cases. It is necessary to include in the expenditure the costs not only of the military operation, but also of the reconstruction of Chechnya, its replenishment, and so on.

[Cerny] What if the war in Chechnya continues?

[Gaydar] A partisan war or terrorist acts could continue for years. In my opinion, the market and a stable currency are better methods for integrating the country than war.

[Cerny] The issue of restoring Russia's state integrity is, however, serious...

[Gaydar] I am not worried about Russia's integrity; that will be restored. The problem is that this integrity may be restored by brutal means to the detriment of Russian democracy. Economically, the most important thing is whether Russia will be able to achieve convertibility, maintain market instruments, and a market environment.

[Cerny] A few weeks ago, TIME magazine carried the headline "Yeltsin: A Bad Man for Russia" on its front page. Do you agree with this view?

[Gaydar] In August 1991, during the putsch, Yeltsin was the right man in the right place, just as when he made it possible to start economic reform. Now, he has initiated a policy that is dangerous for Russia. We know how fragile Russian democracy is. If those who are pushing for strong-arm solutions were to gain ground, there would not have to be presidential elections in the future.

[Cerny] How do you perceive the dilemma of the choice between Russia's Western and Eastern orientation?

[Gaydar] The most important issue for Russia is not, in my opinion, the choice between its Eastern or Western orientation. Other issues are paramount. For example, how to satisfy the population and how to reform the Army, which is costly and inefficient. These will be the key issues in the next elections.

[Cerny] Where will Russia be in a year or two?

[Gaydar] Chaos in Russia is not inevitable. However, the developments in Chechnya and in the northern Caucasus will be crucial. A prolongation of the partisan war may occur in Ingushetia, in Chechen Dagestan. This could weaken the important institutions in Moscow.

[Cerny] Do you think the attitude of the world toward Russia in the Chechen issue is correct?

[Gaydar] Reaction in the world was slow but correct. Czech reaction—and here I mean the statement by

President Vaclav Havel—was rapid and corresponded to the situation. Democratic governments should indicate that the way the Chechen issue is being dealt with is not Russia's internal affair. Nevertheless, I do not think economic sanctions are a good idea. Experience suggests that they mainly affect the civilian population—that is, ordinary people. On the other hand, they encourage criminal elements, and undemocratic governments could easily abuse them to assert their own aims.

Peacekeeping Operation Unrealistic

AU1901162495 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 18 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with former Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar by Ctirad Svitak in Prague; date not given: "Russia Has Forfeited Its Arguments Against NATO Expansion in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Svitak] You wrote in an article for IZVESTIYA recently that, if the proreform and democratic centrist political forces do not manage to unite before the next elections, there is a real danger that they will "continue their polemics in concentration camps—of course, only if the new election winners do not give preference to mass executions." Do you consider the current domestic political situation in Russia to be so critical?

[Gaydar] I have no reason, even now, to alter anything in my forecast. Our position as the largest democratic faction was always absolutely clear. We always pushed for unity among the democratic forces. Unfortunately, the ability of the various Russian democratic political forces to cooperate has, until now, always been limited to only a short period, during which the very existence of the emerging Russian democracy was in extreme jeopardy. I hope now that our democratic partners realize in time that Russian democracy will again be placed at great risk in the elections. And that they realize that, if we do not reach agreement, we really will be able to continue our polemical arguments only in heaven or in a concentration camp.

[Svitak] By his recent decree, Boris Yeltsin co-opted the finance minister onto the presidential Security Council. Is it possible to perceive this step as signifying that this council is assuming the role of a shadow, or rather of the real government?

[Gaydar] No. There have, in fact, always been two governments in Russia. This was the case during the Czarist government and under communism. It has also been the case in recent years. One cabinet makes economic decisions, and the government fulfills this role. The second one has always decided, and is deciding, on military-political issues. It was always composed, among others, of the defense minister, the police minister, and the foreign minister. In essence, its role is being played today by the Security Council. The presence of representatives from the economic structures among its ranks just makes it easier for the Council members to make decisions that may have an impact on the country's economy.

[Svitak] Looking at the situation "from the outside," it seems that President Yeltsin, compared with Western democracies, has far too wide-ranging powers at his disposal. From this point of view, how do you now assess the Constitution approved at the end of 1993?

[Gaydar] Our new Constitution was formulated with major problems and is, understandably, marked by the various tendencies that accompanied the crisis development of Russian democracy, first and foremost, during the years 1992 and 1993. This is the other aspect of the government schism that existed in the country at that time within the context of the disputes between the president and the Congress of People's Deputies. That is to say, the constitution of 1991 did not provide an answer to the question concerning which branch of power had which powers. Therefore, it created a situation of absolute legal chaos, which led to anarchy and, last but not least, to the development that culminated in the collapse of Russian state structures in September-October 1993. The Russian Government, in which the reformers were in the majority at that time, tried to find a way out of this crisis by, among other things, offering its resignation in exchange for the opposition's agreement to hold a referendum on the Constitution. This, however, took place after the well-known events in December 1994 [year as published]. If it had taken place somewhat sooner, the Russian Constitution would now be different. First and foremost, it would be far more balanced. The current Constitution, without a doubt, reflects the contradictions inherent in the government schism before the fall. And it significantly increases executive power to the detriment of its symmetry with legislative power. It was obvious then, and it is especially obvious today. Therefore, we will try to push for changes in its text that would lead to greater symmetry between the jurisdictions of the two branches of power. At the same time, however, we intend to maintain the presidential system that this Constitution codifies.

[Svitak] Chechnya is currently only one of the explosive areas on the territory of the former USSR. A conflict similar to the Chechen one may easily erupt, for example, in Dagestan. There has been fighting, or there is fighting, in a number of other places. In these circumstances, what do you think of the possibility that the West could play a role in regulating these conflicts?

[Gaydar] Unfortunately, I have to state that, so far, the West has demonstrated its extreme unreadiness to take part in peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former USSR. At the same time, the West is approaching this entire issue from a position of "double standards." As long as, on the one hand, it accuses us, as it has done until now, of endangering the sovereignty of the surrounding postsoviet republics by our peacekeeping operations and, on the other, is incapable of sending even one soldier to this region, its position will be indefensible. The postsoviet region is indeed very explosive, and there is a real need for such operations in it. However, the idea that such an operation would be possible in Chechnya is unrealistic. [passage omitted]

Havel Describes BIS Allegations as 'Grave'

AU1901200495 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by "(il, toh)": "Havel: The Suspicions Are Grave"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Jan Kalvoda, deputy prime minister and Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] chairman, and Josef Lux, deputy prime minister and Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] chairman, visited President Vaclav Havel on the evening of 16 January. During the course of the almost three-hour meeting, they informed him of the reasons that led to the convening of the 16 January coalition meeting and of the facts that led Jan Kalvoda to issue his statement at the ODA press briefing on 13 January. This was confirmed by the president's spokesman, Ladislav Spacek.

Kalvoda said on 13 January that he has reason to su[illegible] that the Security and Information Service (BIS) is [illegible]itoring the political parties outside the framework of the law. The president considers the interpretation by the chairmen of the two coalition parties to be convincing. He found the suspicions expressed to be grave and believes that the appropriate bodies will investigate everything properly and, as the case may be, draw conclusions from the investigation. "Nevertheless, even if the suspicions were to be confirmed, V. Havel does not think these issues would destabilize our political system or endanger democracy in our country," said Spacek.

The ODA chairman will probably submit the evidence that aroused his suspicions to the parliamentary commission for supervising BIS this morning. According to Kalvoda, the documents are classified, but, if the parliamentary commission does not confirm the suspicions of his party, the deputy prime minister is prepared to make the material public. Kalvoda told LIDOVE NOVINY that he will do everything to ensure that the case does not disappear into thin air. The chairmen of ODA and the KDU-CSL are also asking the commission for a hearing.

Kalvoda said on a Czech television program yesterday that BIS Director Devaty was not telling the truth when he assured J. Lux that his office was not monitoring political parties. "We are not keeping the political parties under surveillance. We conduct ourselves strictly in accordance with the law," declared Devaty on Czech Television 1, however.

Bisak Admits to 'Political' Aim of Privatization

AU2001102695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 18 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Peter Bisak, minister for the administration and privatization of national property, by Ivan Stulajter; place and date not given: "P. Bisak: Privatization 'Troikas' Will Be Just the Minister's Consultative Body"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In its policy statement, the government declares its intention to accelerate privatization. On the other hand, it declares that only minority stakes in individual shareholding companies would be earmarked for coupon privatization and that, with regard to standard privatization methods, it will make use of payment in installments.

[Stulajter] Do you not see a discrepancy between the intention to accelerate privatization and payment in installments? Those who acquire privatized property will not become owners until they have paid a substantial part of the installments—that is, after a few years.

[Bisak] I see therein no discrepancy because, in privatizing, it is necessary to pursue two aims. An economic and a political one. It is important from this viewpoint that individual forms of privatization be balanced, in a way.

[Stulajter] Do you see no risk, as minister of privatization, in the prolongation of the privatization process? Would it not be better to concentrate on its speed so that owners are clearly identified as soon as possible and companies can be effectively consolidated? The state would also gain more in taxes, for example....

[Bisak] This is a sensible question for discussion. The question is which price is right. Is a high price right if the owner is unable to pay, the company goes bankrupt, and the people lose their jobs? The price must be balanced for privatization to serve as a means of companies' recovery, so that people have jobs and decent wages and can lead decent lives. That is certain.

[Stulajter] Could you define the powers of the so-called privatization troikas, about which the prime minister spoke recently? They should consist of the minister and representatives of trade unions and the Union of Employers' Associations (AZZZ).

[Bisak] The philosophy behind this idea is to involve the widest possible range of people in privatization. Of course, the privatization decision will be made by the executive body, by the government.

[Stulajter] These will be the minister's consultative bodies, then?

[Bisak] It can also be put that way.

[Stulajter] Do you not think that the "troikas" are to be set up, rather, so that the interests of various lobbies operating within the framework of the AZZZ can be reflected in privatization through them?

[Bisak] I do not think so.

Mochovce Building To Continue Even Without Loan

AU1901132195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Roundup by "CTK, TASR, Ir": "Our Power Industry Representatives Want a Public Assessment, Even Though They Will Not Participate in the Vienna Event"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vienna/Bratislava—[Passage omitted] The completion of the half-finished nuclear power plant in Mochovce is economically advantageous for Slovakia. This is a conclusion from project studies worked out by the authors of the documentation as well as by independent consultants—the British-American Putnan Hayes and Bartlett (PHB) company, which evaluated the means of achieving the lowest costs; the British AEA Technology firm, which assessed the environmental impact; and Riskaudit, a German-French joint venture to monitor nuclear safety. Representatives of Slovenske Elektrarne [Slovak Energy Company, SE] Bratislava and Electricite de France [EDF] briefed reporters on these studies at a news conference in Bratislava yesterday.

The completion of the nuclear power plant in Mochovce is a solution that is 30 percent cheaper than any other alternative. PHB representative Mike Egan said that the project of the Mochovce power plant is fully in compliance with international and European standards.

Level of Safety Will Not Be Reduced

Rudolf Kvetan, vice chairman of the SE Board and director for the company's property holdings and joint ventures, cannot envisage a balance between the production and consumption of electricity in Slovakia without Mochovce. Even if the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Union (Euroatom Fund), and French and German institutions that finance exports refused to provide the expected credit of 1.1 billion German marks, which is at present only a theoretical possibility, Slovakia would have to complete the nuclear power plant in Mochovce. But, even in such a case, its completion would not be at the expense of raising its operational safety. And, if Slovakia did not obtain the expected credit, it would have to operate the units of the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant, at the very least, up to the end of their service life. [passage omitted]

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 18 January on page 2 carries an 800-word "asa, CTK"-signed report entitled "Submitters of the Mochovce Project Say They Want To Participate in a Public Debate, Not in an Event." SE executive Karol Bodorik is reported as having said at the above Bratislava news conference: "Karol Bodorik repeatedly declared that the two concerned parties, SE and EDF, are ready to participate in a public debate on the project with the Austrian public in the presence of about 200 people—representatives of the Austrian public, Austrian nongovernmental organizations, and regional bodies. They leave the selection criteria up to the Austrian side. Should the Austrian side insist on a debate among experts, the Slovak side even agrees to such a debate being held, but not within the framework of the meeting with the public. The Slovak side proposes that the meeting take place at any time in February—that is, before 17 February, when the public debate on the project ends. Both SE and the EDF refuse to participate in an event involving 3,000 people and representatives of worldwide international environmentalist organizations, when a discussion with the Austrian public is supposed to be involved."]

Protection Tightened at Arms Depots After Theft

AU1901131795 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 18 Jan 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Regime Rendered Stricter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—On the basis of an exceptionally grievous case, the detention on 11 January 1995 of people transporting 50 stolen tank machine guns, growing interest in weapons and ammunition among criminal elements and middlemen, the danger of their misuse, and a possible discreditation of the Slovak Republic, Defense Minister Jan Sitek had ordered the realization of some measures in his department aimed at preventing losses of weapons and ammunition. Colonel General Jozef Tuchyna, chief of the Slovak Army General Staff, yesterday reported to the defense minister the fulfillment of these tasks. His report states that all registered and actual movements of small arms since the last stocktaking have been verified, and no discrepancies or inconsistencies have been detected. Measures have been adopted, in cooperation with the commanders of units and military facilities, to increase vigilance and render stricter the regime governing the movement of people in arms and ammunition depots.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 18 January on page 3 carries a 350-word report by Juraj Handzo on investigations of the case involving the theft of 50 tank machine guns. Investigator Captain Igor Nagy is quoted as saying that charges have been made against six persons, two career soldiers and four civilians. According to Nagy, the suspects "took possession of originally properly registered weapons by removing them 'on paper' from the records. They had divided tasks among themselves in a way that allowed them to bypass the existing control system. It would have been impossible to realize their plan without mutual cooperation, which is why it can be said unequivocally that they had committed the crime as an organized group."]

Official Views Chechnya Crisis, NATO Expansion

AU1901144195 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with Ferenc Somogyi, state secretary for foreign affairs, by Miklos Ujvari; place and date not given: "The Chechen Crisis Speeds up Accession to NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ujvari] In the past three days, you have been meeting leaders of NATO and other European organizations in Brussels. At what stage is the matter of Hungary's accession to NATO?

[Somogyi] The study that is to formulate the criteria for membership is still being prepared in Brussels. In principle, NATO's East European expansion has already been decided on. The goal of my visit was to try to influence the process of gaining membership by setting forth the Hungarian viewpoints. In addition to this, I prepared Prime Minister Gyula Horn's forthcoming February visit to the three organizations of integration (European Union, NATO, and the Western European Union) in Brussels.

[Ujvari] In view of the Russian intervention in Chechnya, many people believe that we must accelerate our accession to NATO. What are your views on this after your talks?

[Somogyi] In my view, the Chechen crisis does not mean a decisive change in Russian politics. However, the developments in Chechnya do not exclude the possibility of a far-reaching negative effect. This kind of turn of events could also affect the process of expanding NATO. At the moment, the debate on NATO's epansion is being conducted in the interest of European security. However, in a serious crisis situation it might be possible that, rather than NATO's new function—namely: the representation of democratic values—its concepts conceived during the Cold War, which consider the defense of the member-states from foreign enemies to be the most important goal, would come to the forefront. In a crisis situation, the expansion might be speeded up, but only under circumstances that are not in anyone's interests. In the present sitaution, however, fear of Russia only arises in this kind of hypothetical context.

[Ujvari] Does the fact that Hungary does not border on any NATO member-states cause any problems?

[Somogyi] This factor has not yet been raised as something important in assessing the accession. In my view, we could even become a NATO member as an "island."

[Ujvari] Since Hungary is the current chairman of the OCSE, Hungarian diplomacy is having a busy time. Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati is travelling to Chechnya and Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs is expected in Sarajevo. For the OCSE, Gyarmati recently warned Russia, and Kovacs warned Serbia, about respecting human rights. Can these steps harm our bilateral relations?

[Somogyi] When we accepted the role of OSCE chairman, we knew that this would involve much extra work and that we would have to act objectively, without misusing our possibilities. We also form our bilateral relations on the basis of European norms and we believe that, as current chairman, it is our obligation to issue a warning when even the suspicion of violating these norms arises.

Poll Gives Government Performance Mediocre Marks

AU2001111295 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Jan 95 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Szonda Ipsos Public Opinion Survey on the Government's Image—Low Medium Performance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The public opinion survey prepared for MAGYAR HIRLAP by the company Szonda Ipsos shows that assessments of the government's performance have deteriorated each month. The results of the surveys that have been conducted each month since the end of the summer show that people see the government elected six months ago to be better in issues that they do not consider very important while giving it a worse mark on more important—for example, economic—issues.

To obtain more detailed information on the opinions, we asked the interviewees to assess various aspects of the government's performance. The interviewees could give marks between one and five. We changed the averages gained from the answers to points bewteen 0 and 100, in accordance with the practice of public opinion polls.

According to our December survey, public satisfaction with the government's performance was lower than average. The average satisfaction indicator was 44.9 points in December, which is a 0.8-point decrease compared to November. The changes registered since the end of the summer do not reach the statistical error margin. However, as a result of the small but consistently downward changes, a noticeable decline can be seen at the end of the year. In September, the indicator stood at 49.2. It was 47.3 in October and 45.8 in November.

We can see the smallest decrease—only one or two points—in the assessment of areas that were considered to be the strengths of the government from the beginning (relations with neighboring countries, ensuring freedom of the press). On the other hand, the assessment of areas connected with communication between the government and the population decreased by six points (how trustworthy the government is, how much attention it pays to public opinion, and to what extent it is able to create a good atmosphere in the country). Governmental activity in connection with culture and education suffered the biggest loss: seven points.

When assessing the government's activities, for months people have clearly attributed the biggest importance to the matter of whether or not the country's economy is progressing in the right direction. This is followed in importance by the alleviation of the welfare problems and by the need to maintain public law and order. These three factors occupy a major place in people's expectations, and the other areas are far behind them.

The views of various social groups living in different circumstances differ visibly in assessing the importance of various areas. For example, remedying the problems of agriculture was listed among the most important tasks by 20 percent of people in Budapest and 46 percent of those living in villages. The differing preferences of the voters of various parties also appear markedly: Only a quarter of the supporters of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Federation of Young Democrats, but 59 percent of the Smallholders' voters, consider the problems of the provinces to be very important.

On the basis of the past few months' surveys, it can be seen that people do not consider those areas most important where they find the government's work to be successful—for example, relations with neighboring countries. People are less satisfied with the fulfillment of the governmental tasks that they consider most important: putting the economy in order, alleviating welfare problems, and ensuring public order.

The government's scores are even worse if we calculate an overall average by weighting the values of the various areas with the importance attributed to them, because the "corrected" satisfaction indicator that we arrive at in this way is only 42.9 points.

Views on the government's activities are very different in different strata of society—as regards both the actual marks given and selecting the most important areas. For example, pension-age people are more satisfied with almost all aspects of the government's work than the average, as opposed to unemployed people, who expressed a worse than average opinion in almost all areas. Certain groups formed a better-than-average opinion in certain areas and a worse one in others. Such a group, for example, is the intelligentsia, who are more satisfied than average with the government's efforts to maintain law and order and reduce the problems of agriculture—while it has an explicitly negative view of the government's activities in the area of culture.

The biggest differences of opinions can of course be seen in connection with the voters' party preferences. The Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] voters tended to form a much better than average opinion, while the electorate of the opposition parties—especially the Independent Smallholders Party and the Hungarian Democratic Forum—formed a more negative than average opinion. Supporters of the SZDSZ occupied a middle position in this respect: Their views are between the opinions of the other two major groups, usually a little closer to the opinion of the MSZP's voters.

Party Official Discusses Need for 'Renewal'

AU2001102895 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 19 Jan 95 pp 1,5

[Interview with Peter Harrach, former district chairman and current official of the Christian Democratic People's Party, by Akos Jezso; place and date not given: "Changing Christian Democracy—Peter Harrach Does Not Support Surjan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On the last weekend in January, 1995, the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] will hold what will perhaps be its most important national meeting since it was reborn in 1989. The members will have to decide whether they will continue to stick with their current chairman despite losing the parliamentary elections or place their confidence in a new chairman in the spirit of renewal that was also recently represented by current chairman Laszlo Surjan. Therefore, it is clear to everyone that the KDNP will have to effect a strong change in its image. However, the members do not know what direction the party should take and who should lead them on this road. We spoke about this with Peter Harrach, who was the party chairman in charge of coordinating the Budapest organization's activity until the end of last summer and who has continued to be an active party official.*

[Jezso] What are the important issues that must be clarified in the course of the party's renewal?

[Harrach] In my opinion, a party can only show a clear and firm image if its members emerged from a similar cultural milieu. This milieu determines the values represented by the given political organization.

The other decisive element is the professional training and political expertise of our leading politicians. This issue must not be avoided in the course of our renewal. The need to belong to a similar cultural milieu is important here: We must not change our basic principles, because both our members and sympathizers are "products" of the Christian culture, and this is a given element.

This also determines our relations with the other parliamentary parties. The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] has its roots in a cosmopolitan culture and represents a consumer ideology. Therefore, the SZDSZ is far from us. We think they are fighting for last place with the pseudo-proletarian Workers' Party and the Communist fossils that burden the Socialists. With this, I also declared that, in my opinion, we cannot regard the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] as a uniform party. There are persons and even groups in the MSZP with whom we can talk, but we can only talk with the party as a whole if these people or groups dominate the party. The parties in the Civil Alliance are very important to us. However, this political group requires the integrating power of a secure party that carries stable values. I think the KDNP must now go beyond its role of "desirable bride" and must turn into a bridegroom with initiatives.

[Jezso] Do you regard the current leadership, and Chairman Laszlo Surjan, as suitable for this task?

[Harrach] For me, the question is whether the party as a whole is suitable for this. Adequate leadership is only one factor. The present situation is a complex one. The issue is not only who has better endowments and who belongs to what trend. The national committee is in a difficult position because it must make a strategic decision. And the main decision is whether it will choose the boring but well-known dish from the menu or whether it will choose the unknown dish with a nice name. In my opinion, the party will accept the adventure and will choose the new things. I am also sure the party will choose individuals, and not groups. I hope nether side will take the risk of "either together or not at all." Gyorgy Giczy and Janos Latorcai will probably make it to the first two positions.

Opposition Leaders Assess Talks With Slovak PM

AU2001100995 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 16 Jan 95 p 6

[Report by TASR Budapest correspondent: "Fur, Orban, and Surjan Assess Meeting With Vladimir Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest—In an interview with the TASR correspondent in Budapest on 14 January, Lajos Fur, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), described as extraordinarily positive the course and results of a two-day visit to Slovakia by the chiefs of three Hungarian opposition parties. He said the visit was useful for both sides, as well as for members of minorities, and he did not rule out similar future missions in connection with Hungarian-Slovak relations.

One of the significant topics that the Hungarian party leaders discussed at their meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, which lasted over an hour, was the issue of Slovak-Hungarian relations.

"If I were to briefly sum up the meeting, I would say that Mr. Meciar placed emphasis on the importance of historic reconciliation and cited the analogy and example of Franco-German reconciliation. Another area that, in his words, could and should become an important element in improving our relations is the area of Slovak-Hungarian economic relations, which in both his view and ours are not adequately used," the MDF chairman said.

Lajos Fur reported that as far as the ethnic minority issue is concerned, Meciar expressed the readiness of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak Government to accept the standards of the Council of Europe as binding for the Slovak Republic's minority policy, and to even incorporate them into Slovak legislation, for them to become legal guarantees. According to his words, Vladimir Meciar stressed that he is also prepared to accept supervision by the Council of Europe of the practical application of these standards.

Regarding the situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the Slovak prime minister said he sees no serious issues that needed to be settled, and that there exist areas in which the situation of the Hungarian minority was very good.

In the words of Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), a substantially wider range of issues was discussed in the course of the meeting than the Hungarian politicians had expected, among them the issue of European integration. He added that in the program of the Slovak Government, special emphasis was being placed on acceptance of the standards of European integration.

Viktor Orban said: Slovakia is preparing its great opening in the direction of Europe and also our visit can be understood in this context. Orban said Meciar stressed that Europe wants both of us but that it is ready to accept only countries with settled relations, from which it follows that the conclusion of the interstate treaty and the settlement of the minority issue are in the interest of both sides. "In our opinion, we really have a chance to become integrated into Europe only once our relations are settled and balanced. However, we do not peg this to the interstate treaty.

"The priority for us are good relations and the interstate treaty as a means toward this aim, and not the other way round," the FIDESZ chairman stressed, adding that the Hungarian side failed to agree on this point not only with the HZDS chairman and Slovak prime minister, but also with leading representatives of Slovak opposition parties. According to Viktor Orban, Vladimir Meciar also mentioned that he would welcome a solution to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Danube dam issue by means of a bilateral agreement.

Laszlo Surjan, chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), stressed the significance of the fact that talks were held not just with Hungarian political parties in the Slovak Republic but with representatives of Slovak parties as well. "We were somewhat surprised by Vladimir Meciar's proposal to build inter-party relations (between the HZDS on the one hand and the MDF, KDNP, and FIDESZ)," Surjan said. The KDNP chairman said: We did not intend to either accept or reject this proposal without authorization from our party bodies and without consultations with political parties in the Slovak Republic with which we already maintain inter-party contacts. The expansion of inter-party relations will be conditional on the policies of Vladimir Meciar's party.

Walesa Speaks on Defense Issues

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[Address by President Lech Walesa to the Sejm in Warsaw—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mrs. Deputy Speaker, lady and gentlemen deputies. The historic changes that have taken place in Poland and in its international surroundings require a reevaluation of the approach of the state to defense system issues. The new geostrategic situation creates enormous opportunites but also poses challenges. As a sovereign state, we have regained the freedom of deciding about our security. Simultaneously, we bear full responsibility for guaranteeing it.

Today, we have no declared enemies. We wish to maintain relations based upon principles of partnership and mutual, beneficial cooperation with all of our neighbors. Nonetheless, the political situation around Poland cannot be acknowledged as being stable. It is difficult, indeed, to make prognoses about the direction and scale of possible threats. But, equally, they may not be completely precluded. It is necessary to remember that each of the neighboring states maintains, and in the foreseeable future will maintain, armed forces that are not at all small. We do not demonize these problems, but, nonetheless, they cannot be ignored.

Poland has no agressive intentions toward anybody. It sets itself as an aim solely the defense of its own sovereignty and independence. That is why the size of the military potential in its surroundings is one of the main factors determining the necessity of possessing armed forces, their numbers, and the tasks for the implementation of which they may and ought to be prepared. We are nonetheless realists. Hence, our consistent desire to join the Western system of security and to attain permanent membership in NATO. In this sphere, we are noting constant progress. The manifestation of this is the ever closer cooperation with the states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Partnership for Peace program. This is, however, not associated with the granting today of any kind of security guarantees for Poland. Hence, the conclusion that, in the case of the threat of war, we may have to rely solely upon ourselves.

Today, the strength of the Republic and its security depend in great measure on the strength of the Polish Army. For these reasons, the reconstruction of our defense and its adaptation to the needs of a sovereign, democratic European state is a task of especial weight. It requires great responsibility in the making of decisions. It is necessary to accelerate [words indistinct]. So far, not too many funadamental matters of defense have been resolved, starting with the legislative sphere and the specificaton of budget outlays in the longer term, and ending with the equipment of the armed forces and other components of the defense system.

I have already drawn attention to this many times, that history is creating for us favorable conditions for such activities. We ought to take maximum advantage of this opportunity. The defense system of the state may not be reformed when the forces ought to be occupying defensive positions at the borders. It is necessary to state, with shame, that in none of the previous terms of office has the Sejm of the Polish Republic found time for a comprehensive debate on the state of the defense system of the country. This (?practice) has been considered by the estemmed chamber only in passing, on the occasion of discussions on other subjects. On the other hand, significant issues have been deferred. They still await resolution. It has also been the case that matters of defense have been looked at only in the perspective of the forthcoming elections. As president, I bear responsibility for the security of the state. I will not allow destabilization and political play in this sphere. Where the foundations of national existence are at issue, the defense system of the state, my actions will be firm and effective.

I thus demand the resolution of the problems that long ago should have been unambiguously resolved. I hope that the debate today will bring a reply to the questions that are strategic to the defense of Poland, that it will become a significant step upon the road of reconstruction of the defense system of the state and will also specify the aims and directions for indispensible activities. They must have a systemic character. We cannot allow ourselves cosmetic, and all the more arbitrary, corrections.

One of the fundamental components of the defense system of the state is the armed forces. Relative to the present political and military situation, they must maintain the readiness to counteract a possible threat at a level appropriate to its scale, in accordance with the principles of the national defense strategy. The appropriate fulfillment of this task depends in great degree on the atmosphere around the Army. Meanwhile, the Army is often becoming the object of attacks and political undermining, which are continued under the slogan of the defense of democracy and the assurance of civilian control over the Army.

It is in the interest of Poland that the armed forces be isolated from party plays. Those playing with the armed forces are concerned not so much with the resolution of the acccumulated problems of defense as with the exploitation of the Army for the implementation of [words indistinct]. Let everyone do that which he ought to and which he knows best. [applause]

Ha, ha, ha. You have done that for 50 years, very effectively and well. We will do it better.

For these reasons it is necessary to guarantee such a place for the Army in the structures of the democratic state that will make it impossible for it to be dragged into plays of a political character. This requires the appropriate legal regulations in the constitution that is being prepared and also on defense-related problems created in the laws hitherto. There is also associated with this the necessity to unambiguously specify the prerogatives of particular bodies amid the state authorities in relation to the Army. It is necessary to remember that the source of conflicts in this sphere is the lack of appropriate legal regulation and, in fact, their excessive number [as heard]. They are still those born a quarter of a century ago. It is high time that these regulations that completely fail to match the new reality be changed. Currently, it is the case that even the realization of the constitutional supreme power over the Army by the president of the Republic is the object of slander, political speculation, suspicion of extrademocratic activity. Some would wish to give this post a solely ceremonial character. What, in the light of that, happens with the constitutional responsibility of the president for the security of the state?

The command system of the Army must be transparent and clear. The legal provisions must preclude their own arbitrary interpretation. At every level there must exist only one center of decision. No one has so far thought up a more effective method of directing the Army. A soldier cannot consider who his superior is. He ought not to have doubts about whose will is more important in a given situation.

Above all, it is necessary to unambiguously specify the prerogatives of the minister of national defense and the General Staff of the Polish Army, the division of the functions of political and administrative direction of the ministry from the command of the armed forces. The ministry is to build the defense system of the state and assure its efficient functioning and not replace the General Staff in command. The Army ought to be commanded, ought to be commanded by the military. They have been taught this, and they are expert at it.

The deputies' draft of the law on the office of the minister of national defense does not assure such a division of prerogatives. It sanctions solutions that applied in the past era. It envisages the functioning of the General Staff of the Polish Army in the structure of the ministry and the command of the Army by a civilian minister. Will this be a competent person, prepared in professional terms to carry out such tasks and guaranteeing their appropriate implementation? Having responsibility, thinking about responsibility for Poland, it is not possible to accept such principles. The minister ought to fulfill all political and administrative functions associated with the assurance of the conditions of the activity of the armed forces in time of peace, and with their supervision.

A military man, on the other hand, must be answerable for the command of the armed forces, their training and preparation for war. That means the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army. To effectively command the Army, to prepare it for the implementation of combat tasks, he ought to have at his disposal the tools that will facilitate such actions for him. One of them, a very important one, is the Military Information Services. The draft law presented by the Ministry of National defense wishes to subordinate them to the minister of national defense. Are the authors of the draft seeking to have the special services, just as in the past, as an organ of political influence upon the Army? After all, they are to fulfill the statutory tasks indispensible for the military (?modeling) and planning that is implemented by the General Staff of the Polish Army.

It is possible to read the proposed solution as a lack of trust in the armed forces. Does our Polish national Army, possessing social recognition, have to be kept under surveillance?

Much controversy is called forth by problems associated with the necessity of assuring civilian control over the Army. Those speaking these words probably often do not understand to the end the purpose of this function. They dream of the functioning of political commissars who could, without preparation, without knowledge, without resistance, manipulate things at the side of one of the most important pillars of the state, which is what the armed forces are. Civilian control cannot be reduced to the creation of civilian, sometimes typically political, posts in the Ministry of National Defense. It currently has about 1,500 posts. Perhaps it is worthwhile comparing this number with the achievement of the ministry in the past period, the number of legislative initiatives put forward, or its independent solutions for many problems.

The essence and sense of civilian control over the Army arises from the concept of a democratic state. This is the fundamental principle that is in force in all of the member countries of the North Atlantic Pact, and we cannot forsake this if we do not wish to depart from the chosen road. It is, however, necessary to precisely define its extent and principles. The appropriate and efficient implementation of civilian control depends, above all, on the creation of the appropriate legal basis. No one, however, is in a hurry to normalize these problems. It is easy to catch fish in muddy waters. With a lack of precise provisions, under the pretext of civilian control, it is possible to interfere in every, even most detailed and specialist area of the functioning of the Army.

The Army may not be a political object. The limit to political interference in its structures must be determined; concrete solutions regarding the combat composition, the organizational structure, the principles of the functioning, and the efficient technical use [as said] of the armed forces—these are obviously tasks for military men. Nonetheless, the reply to the most important question, what the character of the Army is to be, and its numbers ought to be contained, built in, for parliament [as heard].

Is the Army to be based on conscription, or is it to be a professional one? What size armed forces ought to be maintained in times of peace? And, above all, what ought to be the consequences of such solutions? These are problems for consideration during parliamentary debate. That said, the numbers of the Army, its combat composition and equipment, cannot come out of the proverbial hat but must be derived from a strategic analysis of the defense needs of the state. An amateur and dilettante approach to these issues will surely not contribute to an effective resolution of the problems of the security of Poland.

Voices are already being heard about a successive reduction of our Army, despite the fact that we have not yet completed the process of reduction consequent upon disarmament talks. The undertaking of issues associated with outlays on defense is becoming indispensible. The drastic reduction of the size of the budget of the Ministry of National Defense has brought the Army to a state of technical collapse. The extent of combat potential is decreasing. The weak and poorly armed forces of the Republic will not be capable of fulfilling the tasks for which they are intended. They will also not be an appropriately attractive partner for the North Atlantic Alliance, a place we are so strongly seeking.

A Sejm resolution is necessary that will specify the percentage size of outlays on defense, including the armed forces, in the perspective of the next 10-15 years. Without it, optimal planning is impossible.

The lack of a prognosis for defense expenditures is also a straight road to the destabilization of the domestic defense industry. The Army does not know what it will be able to order and when, and enterprises do not know whether or not they will succeed in selling what they will produce. The state of the defense industry is a matter that cannot be forgotten while debating the security of Poland.

Problems associated with the universality of the implementation of the defense obligation require consideration. On the basis of the regulations that have been in force hitherto, this was associated with the universality of recruitment into the Army. It is however clear that not everyone is included under this obligation. Is this just? It is thus appropriate to seriously consider the introduction of a defense tax. It would be paid by those who cannot or, for various reasons, do not want to carry out their military service.

Lady and gentlemen deputies. The security of Poland is an issue for the entire nation, all social and political forces, an issue outside time and above all political bitterness and divisions. History, and not only that of our nation, teaches that only long-lasting and unified activity in the sphere of defense guarantees the maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of the state. The failure to perceive issues of defense, even with the greatest sacrifice by society in the face of threat, may lead to catastrophe.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is not a matter of practice for the president to speak out straightforwardly in response to matters he has heard. But, well, I would also wish to make good use of my six hours of sitting [as heard] and draw attention to at least three matters.

Very often, here and there I hear about Drawsko [Pomorskie]. I am convinced, and entirely, I confirm and I will confirm, that but for Drawsko this discussion would not have taken place for a long time.

And the proof of this? There are here, there are a few people here with whom I tried to get these topics going. Seeing what is going on in the Army, that this is even dangerous. Without a single move, only I did not sack them or try to sack them. The debates did not take place. I exist so as to model, I exist so as to lead the country, and that is why, if something does not come out and is not undertaken and becomes dangerous, I will try out solutions of the sort I have proposed here [passage as heard].

In addition, problems in the Army were mounting. They were mounting because there were no regulations. They were mounting because there was no division of prerogatives. They were mounting because there was no serious discussion. And I was unable to force such a discussion.

Somebody here has already heard this and will reply: Ah, where is the legislative initiative of the president? Of course, a very straightforward and accurate question. Only, it is necessary to (?look at it]) differently, which I have done since the start of my term of office.

Every government implements policy, and it is very bad to snipe at it from the side, irrespective of whether this is even the best of ideas. It is necessary to try to arrange this differently. [applause] And I did this. And I did this in relation to this government as well.

But, in relation to the previous government, I had already had enough of waiting for this topic. I strongly attacked the minister. I did not sack anyone. Nothing shifted forward. And that too is why, as a practician, I would wish that the deputies in particular undertand me, that such things will take place. For we are modeling, we are building the constitution. We cannot commit errors, we cannot be too relaxed because many topics will dissolve altogether and will not be raised. I as a practician will do this. That is one subject I wished to raise in addition.

A second topic is the evaluation of the lack of preparation of the Army or the mess in the Army. Ladies and gentlemen, I have spent much time, even changing into military uniform so as to see certain topics more closely. [laughter]

I wish to say that it is not true, it is not true, just as we, just as every parliament, like the office of president—it does something, that which belongs to it. Just like the Army, that Army that is in uniform. It has implemented, it is implementing, and even implements very well the tasks, just so far as there are enough resources for them. On the other hand, it is looking on, it is looking on at these 1,500 posts, at these unresolved problems, and is wondering whether to stand here, at the sometimes unproductive utilization of money, unproductive, then why cannot a tank and other things be afforded [sentence as heard]. Let us be practical. I am not saying anything here against the ministry. I am only speaking out in favor of better work and for examples that function, and that, and that bring [words indistinct]. If there were regulations, the situations that caused Drawsko would not have come about.

For this to be clear, I knew that this was going to be costly, that this would be played off politically. I knew this very well. But I could not wait any longer.

To end, I wish to say that as president I am very pleased, I am pleased by this discussion. And I am pleased by still one more thing, in this discussion particularly. That the diagnosis of issues, the diagnosis of complaints, the diagnosis of necessity, the diagnosis of burdens, that this, in fact, almost with everyone, was the same. On the other hand, the difference is in the method of resolution. The difference is in subordination, the difference is even in quotas [as heard]. But I think that, if the diagnosis is correct, this medicine that will allow a rescue will also be correct if we will really strive to do something, having a certain amount of time.

To end, Mrs. Deputy Speaker, lady and gentlemen deputies, Deputy Pastusiak, I wish to say that I count on the fact that serious problems, despite our great differences and complaints—and the defense system of the state belongs to these—that these serious problems will be seriously treated and that the causes and responsibility will force on us a solution, irrespective of who these solutions will serve. They will serve Poland, and they must be resolved, because otherwise, in historical terms, we will long bear responsibility for problems and difficulties and for the danger we may prepare for the fatherland.

Thank you for listening.

Pawlak Address to Sejm on Defense Policy

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[Speech by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak in the Sejm in Warsaw on 19 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mr. Speaker: May it please the house. I shall concentrate on some fundamental issues, starting with the general conditions, to be followed by an assessment of the external conditions of the country's security, guidelines for defense strategy, basic directions for transformations in the Armed Forces, conditions outside the military establishment, and the issue of defense supervision. I shall start with general issues. [passage omitted]

It is quite clear that the processes of integration with the European Union [EU] and regional cooperation have an impact also on our security. Vice versa, cooperation with the security structures of NATO, the Western European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have great significance with regard to the prospects of our social and economic development.

Over many centuries, our possibilities were determined by our location between the great economic and military powers Germany and Russia and, more broadly, by our location on the line between West and East Europe. Now the situation has changed. First, a pluralistic structure composed of many states is emerging east of our borders. It is similar to the one in West Europe. Second, in an era of rapid development of transport and communications, the world is open in various directions. For this reason, Poland, which is located in the center of Europe, has been presented with an opportunity to become a link between West Europe and many countries that are being transformed in the direction of the free market and democracy in Central and East Europe. I would like to be understood well. The idea is for us not just to become middlemen but for us also to be useful.

Poland, by developing its infrastructure to link our economy to the whole of Europe, has been given an opportunity, because of its location, to create its economic and military security. This security should not only be based on treaties and friendship pacts. We remember how misleading agreements can be when the interests of allies are threatened more elsewhere than on our territory.

Security would result from the EU, Russia, and our neighboring countries being equally interested in Poland's development and proper functioning because their economic development and affluence depend on that as well.

The development of our infrastructure, particularly of transport, communications, power, and food industries, is our main need at the moment. This is also because we must defend our current interests.

We do not have to agree to a situation where the main transshipment ports for Polish goods are neither Gdansk nor Szczecin but Rotterdam or Hamburg, only because the transport of goods to these ports is cheaper and more convenient. Nor should we agree on a situation where European transit and transport roads, which would lead through Poland, because this is the shortest route, would lead through the territory of our neighbors, only because our relations with some countries that are constructing these roads now are merely correct.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the house: The transport and communications infrastructure, as presented in this way, is creating new needs and new opportunities for education, health protection, the economy, agriculture, crafts, and services. We have been attaching our hopes for the future of our villages and cities to the development of these areas, fruitlessly so far.

The most modern technology can now cover all places in Poland and create opportunities for the development of the information technology market and new telephone and computer installations, which are so indispensable if we are to keep up with world competition. These systems, although linked to world systems, should be Polish property on Poland's territory.

May it please the house: The government has already embarked on a program of modernization of our infrastructure. The public is sometimes informed about this mainly by sensational reports about orders that have materialized or that are only about to happen. Some time in the future we shall look at our attitude to the information technology revolution in Poland in the same light as we now see those who were destroying power engines.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the house: Our power supply system constitutes an important area in life, and both our place in Europe and our defense ability depend on it. The fact that the system is based on coal and two independent supply sources of petroleum—by sea and by pipeline—makes our power industry relatively independent.

This example shows how important the overcoming of the crisis in the mining industry was. This allowed us to turn problems and troubles into strength. The discussion of other directions of economic development particularly important to the country's defense ability and the search for possibilities for their implementation exceed the framework of my report today. To finish this part of the deliberations, I want to emphasize that we feel that our opportunities and objectives in this area have not been sufficiently recognized. Hence, the expectations addressed to the economic ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation.

I will now proceed to discuss external conditions that determine our country's security. We live in a period of great hope for lasting relaxation of traditional war threats. The process of eliminating various barriers and divisions is continuing successfully in Europe. One can expect that in the future this will bear fruit in the creation of a new system of common security, parallel to the development of political and economic integration as part of the European Union.

Despite these positive trends, in the foreseeable future there will still be in Europe potential sources of political tension, which could result in crises and turn into conflicts. We have been observing such sources of tension in the resurfacing, from time to time, of nationalistic attitudes, in national minority disputes, and in voices questioning the current state borders. Difficulties connected with the transformation of political systems, which are often accompanied by serious economic difficulties, resulting in discontent among entire communities, are also potential sources of tension.

Poland, we must strongly emphasize, does not regard anyone as an enemy. According to the principles of Poland's defense policy, we have no territorial claims. We respect the sovereignty of countries and have renounced the use of force against them. We have signed state treaties with all of our neighbors. With the majority of them we have also signed military agreements and are implementing specific cooperation plans.

Relative stabilization in our region does not mean that that we do not have the duty to be concerned about the safety of our country because the lack of enemies does not protect us from possible consequences of the threats I have pointed out. Their characteristic trait is the fact that they sometimes occur and develop against the will and intentions of political leaderships of individual states.

Another matter is the principles of defense strategy. The fundamental principle of our strategy, which comprises the rules and ways of how to oppose war threats, is the prevention of conflicts and the solving of crises that may occur in a political way.

We regard organized military opposition to aggression as an extreme measure in cases where all political activities fail. We regard the participation of our military forces in the Partnership for Peace program as a road to Poland's full NATO membership. We think NATO today is a basic element of political stability and peace in Europe. We do not subject our NATO membership to the development of the situation abroad. We want to bring to NATO our own defense potential, which is that of a democratic state, economically developed and politically stable, a state that has an efficient and quite modern army. We expect that we will become an equal partner among our Euroatlantic partners. We want the financial resources earmarked for the implementation of the Partnership for Peace program to become a good investment, leading to international guarantees of our security and, consequently, a decrease in defense costs in the long run.

The military factor still has and will have a great role in preventing conflicts. Its basic functions in this area are, on the one hand, to act as a deterrent to potential aggressors and, on the other, to present a defense potential on the international scene. The maintaining of a credible military potential on an international scale is a necessary condition for our security.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the House! Regardless of the types of conflicts and threats, safeguarding the nation's survival and state structures if war is threatened remains our basic defense aim and defense strategy. This requires forces and resources that form part of the state defense system to be selected and prepared during peacetime. Its basic elements are the armed forces, the structure outside the military, and the system of supervising the defense developed at a time of war—the wartime system of governing the state.

I will now move on and present basic directions of changes in the armed forces.

May it please the House! The restructuring of the armed forces covers all aspects of their operations. This includes the building of the Army according to the standards of democratic states, insuring the national character of the Polish Army once and forever, the guarantees of its apolitical character, the change of its internal structures, and the subordination of the Army to a civilian, political management.

The gradual process of implementation of standards has enhanced the Army's prestige in society, as has been confirmed by opinion poll results. The Polish Army is been perceived as a partner for the Western armies. The armed forces are going through the process of implementing basic organizational and technical changes, dislocation, and operational changes. This results from the accepted principles of Poland's security policy and the practical reduction of the Army and the Air Force to the level below 234,000 that was allocated to Poland in the Vienna document. Closures of some of the bases, sometimes painful, about which the deputies learn is the result of this reduction and the process of a balanced distribution of the armed forces in Poland. Until recently, 60 percent of the combat potential of our military forces was concentrated on Poland's western borders, 30 percent in the central part of the country, and only 10 percent on the eastern border. A more even distribution of armed forces in Poland would mean the closure of bases in Silesian and Pomeranian military districts and the strengthening of Krakow and Warsaw military districts. It must be said here that those operations are very expensive, that they require time and appropriate and good preparations.

The organizational system in the Army is also changing. Its composition should take into account the new, defensive nature of operational activities and future cooperation within Euroatlantic defense structures. The armed forces must be prepared to be available for various uses, depending on the direction, force, and intensity of a threat. It will be arranged in tactical, more mobile units, which will have more combat, logistic, and fire-power independence. Also needed are military units of great maneuverability, which should be well trained and able to rapidly join in military operations in any special area and also rapidly move anywhere.

May it please the House! The fundamental indicators of the opportunity for the implementation of the transformations that I have signaled here, many of them and others associated with them, are the economic possibilities of the country and the financial resources allocated to the armed forces. For five years they systematically fell, which was reflected in the combat condition of the Army. The technical degradation of the Army was becoming visible. It is here appropriate to express acknowledgement of the social and civic stance of the military, which understood the hard budget limitations. It is absolutely necessary to slow down this tendency and for parliament to determine clear principles for the specification of defense expenditures. This is the natural price the state may pay and wishes to pay for security. I spoke of this in the Sejm in inaugurating the work of the Council of Ministers headed by me. These costs ought to be specified for at least several years. A model here might be the practice in other states with established democracies, where these expenditures are planned over three periods, over 10- and 15-year time spans, in the shorter term for a period of three to five years, and precisely also for a period of one year. For Army planners, this would be a sound starting basis for the preparation of a rational program of reconstruction and for the maintenance of the armed forces. I think that, on the part of the government, such perspectives will be specified in the progam for the strategic socioeconomic development of the country to the year 2010 that is under preparation.

I now move to the discussion of the next factor that constitutes the defense system, the extramilitary contribution. After the armed forces, it is the second fundamental component of the defense system of the state. It includes various links intended to assure the possibility of the appropriate functioning of state structures and also the support of the armed forces and the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the populace in times of threat and war. This is an entire infrastructure in the form of the defense industry, international cooperation, and research on the development of arms production. This includes civil defense, the rescue services, institutions burdened with protection, and defense tasks.

The extramilitary arrangement has also been disordered in serious degree. The legal bases for its functioning have not matched and do not match the current economic conditions, and state budget outlays have been drastically reduced. The Council of Ministers and especially the Defense Affairs Committee functioning within its framework have adopted a series of legislative initiatives in this respect in the plans for 1995. There also exists a need for a systemic approach to the problem of defense training. In this respect, we are expecting an appropriate report from the Defense Ministry with proposals for solutions.

I wish to inform the esteemed chamber that this week, at the National Defense Academy, a higher level defense course for the leading cadres of the state administration was inaugurated. An appropriate offer for this kind of training has also been presented to the chancelleries of the Sejm and Senate and also the leaderships of political parties and self-management bodies.

An important extramilitary link in the defense system is civil defense. In accordance with international conventions, it may not have anything to do with the continuance of armed actions, their support, assurance, and so on. It ought to serve solely for the defense of the populace, cultural treasures, and the national wealth against the effects of threats or actions of war. For this reason, it is appropriate to place civil defense in the Internal Affairs Ministry, which would assure the appropriate conditions for cooperation with other institutions constituting the national rescue and fire-fighting system, especially the fire brigade.

The problem of the use of armed forces from the Nadwislanskie units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also requires norm-giving specifications. In the case of extramilitary threats, the point here would be the preparation of a specific strategic reserve, ready for action in a situation of growing threat, when the forces of the police, the fire brigade, and the Border Guard would turn out to be inadequate.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the House! I move to matters associated with the discussion of problems of the direction of the defense system. One of the fundamental conditions of the assurance of the defense capability of the country is an efficient system of direction of the defense system of the state. In cases of threat or war, this is developed into the wartime system of direction of the state [as heard]. It is difficult not to notice that in Poland it is partly outdated and incomplete.

In this respect, we have very general constitutional clauses, regulations of the law on the universal defense obligation that do not match this and the actual systemic and economic conditions. There was also a lack of a law on the minister of national defense. Superimposed upon this are the various jurisdictional solutions, not always consistent with each other, that have been adopted, in practice, and that taken together may and do cause misunderstandings and conflicts. For this reason, the adoption by the esteemed chamber of fundamental legal norms regulating the principles and methods of direction of defense matters in the state is exceptionally significant and urgent. Among these is the law on the minister of national defense that has been included in the deliberations today.

Here it is worthwhile addressing the principle of civilian control over the armed forces, so often referred to in recent times, although more than once interpreted in different ways. Its essence and purpose arise from the concept of a civil state. It ought not, it may not, be reduced solely to the superimposition on the organizational structure of the Army of a civilian leadership and of external parliamentary supervision. The armed forces ought to be the main instrument, although not the only one, of state security policy. They surely ought not to be an independent sovereign entity implementing this policy. From a review of the institutions of the Polish system and from decisions on defense matters functioning in it, it is possible to conclude that the mechanisms of civilian control over the armed forces are close to Western solutions. The discussions in progress today do not in practice apply to institutional matters. Rather, they are jurisdictional disputes, relating to the range of prerogatives of parliament, the president, the government, or of the minister of national defense, in relation to the Army. They also relate to the justification of the regulations of the law that relate to the command of the armed forces by the civilian minister of national defense and the civilian-military structure of the ministry.

In the discussions, it is possible to see the influence of many factors setting the context of the civilian control of the Army. Historical resentment, especially from the prewar period, shows these old cultural traditions, but also those from recent times [as heard]. A far from insignificant factor is the still very high position of the Army in society and also the respect and trust there is for the military structures.

Multilateral, international military contacts have played an important part in shaping the Polish model of managing defense matters. The opening up after 1989 allowed us to get to know the best solutions, to exchange views and experiences, to participate in scientific conferences and seminars on this subject. The will to promote cooperation with partners who are of similar opinions obliges us to accept standards that have been tested and are widely respected. We will have to wait for a new constitution to decide on the final regulation on subordination of the armed forces to state bodies. We cannot afford to use military and defense issues as a bargaining counter in political and personal games. These are areas that cannot be used as a field for political struggle.

Mr. Speaker. May it please the House! Jerzy Milewski, the under secretary of state in the Ministry of Defense, will present the matters in detail.

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, besides the present state of the economy and defense potential and in addition to making use of development opportunities and undertaking matters connected with changes in military and defense issues, the morale of soldiers and the backup, as military men say, are very important and sometimes determine the final result.

The state of social awareness and the ability to solve difficult social problems are often equally important to our defense strategy. It is not an accident that historians who specialize in the fall of the First Republic pay so much attention to description of the state of awareness of noblemen and aristocrats, not to mention the king.

We think Polish society has made the most progress in the past few years in this field. The patience with which it tolerated and still tolerates the costs of our changes; the common knowledge that emergence from problems cannot happen immediately as if by magic; the readiness, despite opposition from some circles, to hold dialogue—for example, on the system of negotiating on renumeration; and the endeavoir to promote closer links between personal life and a company's future—these are just some of the positive phenomena and social processes that describe cultural changes in our society. If we also add the traditional love for the land and the initiative of Poles in difficult situations, tested through the ages, we can look with optimism to taking advantage of our chances in Europe and the world.

The only weak point of ours, at present, is the difficulties in communicating at the very top. They stem not only from our nature. They express various ways of viewing our opportunities and various preferences in organizing ourselves to take advantage of them.

Poland at present finds itself in a phase of political development in which the maintenance of the road of democratic development or the seeking of solutions by force is the subject of much discussion and practical aspiration. Considering the defense strategy without reference to this dilemma would only be strictly academic and not practical. Comparing the functions that are fulfilled in the west of our continent by small, independent state organisms with the events of recent weeks on the eastern side of our continent shows clearly that the lack of democratic structures leads to war. The Europe to which we aspire to belong is concerned not so much with structures that win wars as with structures that make war unprofitable.

That is why, thinking about the defense system, we ought also to think as much about the perfection of the democratic structures of the state as about defense. We ought to think about our interests and our culture. Interests alone, even when they are mutual ones, as the example of the nations of the former Yugoslavia has shown, unfortunately are not enough. A feeling of community is required, and also one of coresponsibility. Then it is easier to bear even difficult moments. History has given us many painful experiences. Our geographical situation has many times caused us difficulties. But, as I have tried to demonstrate, it is now creating opportunities for us. I believe that, through our joint efforts, they will be noticed and realized. Thank you.

POLITYKA Interviews Prime Minister Pawlak

WS1901120095 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 21 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski; place and date not given: "Making the Atmosphere Strained"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [POLITYKA] Mr. Prime Minister, in his interview for POLITYKA, President Lech Walesa said that the situation had become too difficult for you to handle and that you should go on some kind of leave. Are you going to take his advice?

[Pawlak] It is not I who should evaluate for whom the situation has become too difficult to handle. This is most often knowledgeably evaluated by voters and then by history. This is how I personally perceive the situation I have had to handle so far: We were forming the coalition government in a situation of economic uncertainty (the first harbingers of a rise in industrial production in a situation characterized by a growing foreign trade deficit, growing indebtedness of enterprises, etc.) and in a situation in which there was a lot of acute tension in social milieus. This tension continued throughout the entire first half of 1994.

As for the economy, in 1994 we managed to strengthen development trends—we practically restored a balance in foreign trade, curbed the degradation of enterprises... In the area of social affairs, we managed to secure peace in large social groups at least for some time. Now that we have stopped unemployment growth and the degradation of pensions, in 1995 we are improving the situation of the public sector. We will also start implementing reforms in the so-called social ministries... We certainly made some mistakes. All in all, however, our activities are methodical and consistent; there are no shocks and jumps. If, in hindsight, we take a closer look at 1994 from the perspective of the most recent social protests, for instance, we must admit that these protests are staged not because the situation is deteriorating but because the improvement is taking place too slowly. In politics, however, impatience is a bad adviser. We are going to calmly focus on social issues: the changing of the system of retirement and disability pensions, reform of the health service, implementation of mechanisms of active combating of unemployment... Thus, there will be a lot of work. It stands to reason, therefore, that I cannot really afford to take leave at the moment, even though vacation as such is not a bad thing at all. The thing is, however, that I usually decide myself when I want to take my leave.

[POLITYKA] This is your reply to the suggestions... However, we are also interested in your evaluation of yourself, now that you have been prime minister for more than a year.

[Pawlak] A year ago I certainly had a more obscure idea of the difficulties that being in charge of a coalition government involves. However, in politics, self-evaluations do not mean much. We are assessed by those for whom we are working. It so happens that, in line with the Constitution, we experience those moments of frankness every four years, in elections, or even more frequently. Now the day of the presidential elections is drawing near. It is also a moment of genuine social frankness. Some people run in those elections, others send other people on leave, still others work...

[POLITYKA] Evaluations are also made as things are still going on. Let us, then, quote evaluations other than those made by President Walesa. Now, recently there have been quite a lot of current evaluations concerning you, Mr. Prime Minister. A few days ago, Ryszard Bugaj, head of a party [Union of Labor] whose program is very close to the program of your grouping, said in an interview for RZECZPOSPOLITA that "today there is the problem of the prime minister, whose actions as well as involvement in various issues have accumulated quite considerably recently." He provided a whole list of specific charges, which partially overlap with those presented by the president. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is also quite liberal in criticizing you for delaying decisions, prolonging certain issues, abandoning decisions, or making sudden decisions that are different from the ones that were agreed upon. Could you comment on these criticisms?

[Pawlak] I have been evaluated quite often lately. This is just the way it is—some people work while others make evaluations. The best evaluation for the government—and probably for all of us—is one that is accompanied by suggestions as to what could done. Such suggestions are an inspiration to people. For example, the preparations for lessening the debt burden of the health service and then implementation of this program began as early as September 1994, which was a reply to many critical opinions and many suggestions made by various milieus. There is also personnel criticism. It is quite painful for those who are criticized. For those who hear such criticism, it is often more attractive than trying to dig deeper into the substance of a given matter. However, it is impossible to reply to these accusations without analyzing individual cases. Only such analyses can show whether a given decision was made too quickly or too late, or whether it was well timed and was made when the situation demanded it.

[POLITYKA] Let me give you a specific example: the affair of the police chief. As a result of intricate personnel moves and an inexplicable delay, all of which lasted weeks, you have created a situation in which this high office is held by Mr. Smolarek, who has already become the permanent target of jokes. It would be difficult to say that all of this actually improved the security of the state.

[Pawlak] The decisionmaking process in this case turned out to be quite a complex procedure because what was needed was the approval of both the internal affairs minister and the prime minister. This is a new quality in our democracy—the prime minister cannot impose his own candidate on the minister. As a consequence, a compromise had to be reached and it was actually reached: the mandate of Police Chief Zenon Smolarek was confirmed. This was our joint decision. Because it is necessary to protect democratic principles, the decision in this sphere is of tremendous importance.

[POLITYKA] Nonetheless, let us just agree to differ on this specific issue. Another concrete charge, which was leveled at you by the president as well, is privatization and reprivatization. Could you make a clear declaration on these issues, one that would allow us to see the actual intentions of the government?

[Pawlak] As for privatization, the lack of understanding of the changes that have taken place over the past five years is quite common. In 1990, when the state-owned sector still dominated the economy, the rapid privatization-spurred development of the privately owned sector was critical to the political and economic transformations. In 1994 and now, when half of the economy is already privately owned, it is not the pace of privatization but its quality, that is most important. The quality of privatization, in turn, under the overpowering pressure of public debt, is proved not by emotions, press discussions, or the criticism of the disillusioned, but by the total revenues that the state receives in this process. The results achieved in 1994 leave no room for doubts—privatization is being implemented more efficiently and rapidly than in the previous years. One cannot question the facts.

Objections concern individual cases, and, therefore, one should avoid criticizing the privatization process as a whole. Please bear in mind that privatization is being put into effect by various methods—the capital method, purchase of shares, registration of companies at the stock exchange, leasing, liquidation of enterprises, and establishment of new, privately owned companies. Mass privatization is only one element that accounts for less than 10 percent of the whole. The rationality of the choice of one or another method should be decided by the following: efficiency and social acceptance, useful in the given branch and the strategic function in this branch, as well as the existing links of cooperation. We look upon privatization not as an ideological problem but as a tool with which to improve the functioning of the economy. It is a tool that should be used skillfully.

The problem of reprivatization is more complex. Even though many discussions have been held, the government does not have an unequivocal stand on it. There are supporters of almost complete reprivatization, people who would like to close this process entirely; finally, there are also supporters of intermediate solutions. This is why we have turned this issue over to the Sejm. We are hoping that it will be easier to reach a consensus there. In the government, we are unanimous regarding three issues: that reprivatization should allow for the budget situation; that it should not shift the burdens to future generations; and that it should not result in further injustices. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to meet all three conditions.

[POLITYKA] The atmosphere over your Cabinet is becoming increasingly strained—some of its members are suspected of being involved in some fraudulent dealings. You yourself seem to be overly liberal in this respect, or you seem to be too silent. Why did you not immediately turn over the issue of the computerization of the Office of the Council of Ministers by InterAms, for instance, to the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK]?

[Pawlak] I have already said on numerous occasions that the contracts were concluded with IBM, which happens to have many subcontractors. One of them was InterAms. It rendered its services to various establishments, including, as far as I know, NIK...

[POLITYKA] Many declarations have been made. However, it would be difficult to consider the whole issue explained, let alone closed. There are also some suspicions concerning some of your ministers: Podkanski, Baszniak, Sekula.

[Pawlak] There are special establishments whose task it is to investigate cases of fraudulent dealings or scandals and administer justice in the Republic. They are prosecutors' offices and independent courts of law, which evaluate whether the law has been violated and then administer justice. As prime minister, I focus on the substantive work of ministers and of other people who are subordinate to them. My evaluation is that both Minister Leslaw Podkanski and Director Ireneusz Sekula are performing their duties well. I cannot say that much about the work of Baszniak, under secretary of state in the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, who has been appointed to that post at the initiative of Minister Miller. His work should be evaluated by Minister Miller, and, if he has any comments, he can make them. If a court of law decides that any of my direct subordinates has committed an offense, or if a prosecutor informs me that he is investigating a case in which my subordinate is involved, I will draw appropriate conclusions.

However, does it not seem strange to you that Minister Podkanski, for instance, was accused of intending to assign the contract to InterAms (as if this were an offense)? Another strange accusation was that the agency set up by the minister could have made losses. Leveling charges at politicians has become a form of political fight in our country. I think that this often fulfills the function of protection. Unfortunately, there are many real fraudulent dealings that, if they ended up in courts of law, would purify the social atmosphere. In this area, we should expect far more activity from prosecutors. The same mechanism should also function with politicians.

[POLITYKA] Apart from justice administration establishments, there are some practices in the democratic system that have a moral dimension. In line with this practice, if a public person is suspected of committing an offense, the first to respond is that person's superior.

[Pawlak] I guess we present different approaches to this. It is not the superior but the interested person himself who should be the first to respond because he knows best what the real situation is like. He can either defend himself or resign. Every person in charge should take care of the good reputation of his firm; however, he should also avoid harming his employee, who has been working in the firm loyally and efficiently so far. As long as we have only general accusations, including "the atmosphere becoming strained" over some specific persons or configurations, the feeling of responsibility tells me to act with caution.

[POLITYKA] NIK has submitted a motion requesting that Minister Podkanski be brought before the State Tribunal; the issue concerns the Agency for Economic Development. Apart from that, there are accusations related to the InterAms affair.

[Pawlak] As for the agency in question, there is also an opinion issued by a commission that I set up immediately after NIK submitted its charges. The commission consists of people who are the highest authorities on legal issues. This opinion is unequivocal—the law was not violated. I sent this opinion to the Presidium of the Sejm, which is now considering the justification of the motion submitted by the NIK collegium. However, the media did not mention this unbelievable opinion. As for the other issue, I believe that Minister Podkanski has already provided sufficient explanation.

[POLITYKA] And he did not explain much... Nonetheless, let us not discuss Minister Podkanski any longer. Recently, more and more has been said about the necessity to make personnel changes in the government. This was first proposed by the SLD. What do you think of it?

[Pawlak] This proposal has had a long tradition in recent years. I would even go one better and say that it is already a historical pattern. More or less after a few months, after a year of the functioning of a cabinet at the most, it was always either overthrown or a proposal appeared that personnel changes should be made, which would remedy the situation. We have wise folk adages that originated in the previous times ("If you do not know what to do, order a reorganization"). A similar situation can be observed in Italy, for instance. Recently, at the summit meeting in Essen, Chancellor Kohl was glad that he met the same Polish prime minister for the second time. He said jokingly: "Why, I can see that you are giving up the Italian model." My practical attitude to such suggestions is the following: First, I ask, "What do we want to change?" and then, "What goal are we going to achieve?, and, finally, "What consequences does this entail, also concerning the structure and the personnel?" I suspect that some of the reorganization-related proposals are aimed at people not things. Now, the real problem is what actions should be taken in order to resolve concrete problems. For example, an insurance system should be introduced in the health service, whereas we are only generally called upon to implement reform there. When we start implementing the reform there, it may turn out that this is not the reform that should be implemented. The same holds true of the commercialization of enterprises...

[POLITYKA] Does this mean that the weak points of the government are the ministers of health and privatization?

[Pawlak] No, it does not. I wish to repeat that only accurate assessments can provide grounds for evaluating individuals implementing particular projects. The government also requires some stabilization. A government that has just had enough time to look around and identify objectives should not be forced to reorganize.

[POLITYKA] Calls for reorganization cause additional problems related to the so-called Cimoszewicz list. How do you intend to solve the problems that surfaced after the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal? Apart from Minister Olechowski, who has already resigned, there were nearly 100 names on that list. Deputy Prime Minister Cimoszewicz clearly seems to be suggesting that others should follow suit.

[Pawlak] The well-being of every society demands that politicians have both "clean hands" and "clean intentions." Becaise we have inadequate legislation dating back to 1982 (I do not have to remind anyone what times those were), completely incompatible with the current economic reality, we had to either think how to change it or develop new solutions. Before taking the first step in that direction, we should have informed the public that the law was to be changed and that, until it was, they should have refrained from taking salaries. It was wrong to pillory them at once. In a legitimate state, the passing of judgments is the exclusive competence of independent courts and not of any specific individual, even if it is the prosecutor general. A prosecutor carries out investigations and does not have the authority to pass sentences. When the so-called Cimoszewicz list was published, I turned to the Legislative Council and the minister of justice for suggestions of positive solutions. I hope I will be presented with some suggestions soon and that we will be able to implement them immediately. I find it astonishing that people who represented the State Treasury at the instructions of their superiors and had the responsibility of seeing that the law was observed can be charged with violating that law themselves. This upsets the functioning of the whole economic system. We ask ourselves a simple question: Who is to represent the State Treasury in supervisory councils and how, and why should they fulfill their duties conscientiously, honestly, and solidly? It is a pity the financial implications of membership on a company supervisory council or management board are not clearly defined. After all, we did have the alcohol affair, which the current prosecutor general also dealt with. Council and board members of companies that suddenly dissolved or transformed were never held responsible... I wish to emphasize that people who perform their duties responsibly deserve respect, and the government and ministers should feel obliged to clearly state their duties. This was explicit in the verdict announced by the Constitutional Tribunal.

[POLITYKA] Did Deputy Prime Minister Cimoszewicz consult you before his public appearance (after the Tribunal had passed its judgment), at which he spoke of violating the law and taking punitive action?

[Pawlak] No, he did not consult me.

[POLITYKA] Minister Olechowski is a special case on the Cimoszewicz list.

[Pawlak] I think Minister Olechowski should have been more patient. Perhaps we could have thus avoided the current predicament, from which there is no proper way out.

[POLITYKA] Perhaps it would be easier to find a way out were it not for the letter in which you took the discussion to the plane of foreign policy.

[Pawlak] On 29 December, I spoke with Minister Olechowski, and we agreed to discuss the search for new solutions after my meeting with the president, scheduled for 2 January. Meanwhile, as early as 30 December, the minister informed me that he was adhering to his decision and took leave. There was no will to reach an agreement and seek joint solutions.

[POLITYKA] That is probably not a sufficient reason for the head of the government to disavow the foreign minister and his policies in public?

[Pawlak] Some say Poland is a strange country. It truly is. It is all right to criticize the president and the prime minister. You can even pinch the speaker of the Sejm from time to time but do not dare touch Olechowski or the country will fall apart! We hoped he would cause the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to play a more active role in foreign economic cooperation, but he fell short of those expectations. If, in the discussion of his resignation, Mr. Olechowski's achievements are being listed, it is also worth mentioning things that still remain to be done. The circumstances of Mr. Olechowski's resignation have a tradition of their own.

[POLITYKA] The foreign minister, handing in his resignation, accused your government and you personally of hostility toward the implementation of such basic foreign policy objectives as membership in the European Union [EU] and joining NATO. How will you reply to that?

[Pawlak] Resigning ministers make various statements. Our will to become a member of the EU and join NATO does not raise any doubts and never did. We believe that these issues have practically been settled in the international arena.

[POLITYKA] How do you assess your cooperation with the president thus far? Why did your mutual relations deteriorate so suddenly?

[Pawlak] The main problem is that we are approaching the day on which the speaker of the Sejm is to announce the launching of the presidential elections. Until October, cooperation with the president ran relatively smoothly. When preelection forecasts began appearing, problems arose...

[POLITYKA] Does the president see you as a serious rival? Do you believe his top priority is the dissolution of the parliament?

[Pawlak] I am one of the sides in this debate—it is difficult for me to say. I believe, contrary to appearances, that this is not a personal issue. To win the elections, one must have a vehicle. In 1990, that vehicle for Mr. Walesa was the fight with communism, with drawing a heavy dividing line [from the past]. Currently, such slogans do not suffice. In my view, Mr. Lech Walesa is fervently seeking a focal point for his campaign. Various slogans keep cropping up: At the recent meeting with the coalition, the issue of fighting communism and counterrevolution was brought up. The presence of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and I in the coalition undermines campaign tactics of this type. That is the first reason for the change of attitude toward me... The second, traditionally, is fighting the government. Frequent changes of government contribute to a strengthening of the president's position. Convincing the nation of this government's inefficiency this time around would be an excellent argument for strong presidential rule. Meanwhile, the government is doing quite well. Because the prime minister also has rivals, it is most convenient to attack the prime minister...

The interest of state, which requires cooperation between all of the centers of power, contradicts such reasoning.

[POLITYKA] We understand that within the framework of such cooperation you dismissed the defense minister. You did not gain anything by that, except for one more war front.

[Pawlak] Every difficult decision, particularly one pertaining to personnel issues, solves certain problems but has a price. The dismissal of Minister Kolodziejczyk following the "Drawsko dinner" took one and a half months. I expected that the defense minister, who had huge statutory capacity to take action to sort things out in the ministry, would do so within his authority. Meanwhile, he complained to journalists about his fate and nearly became a publicist himself. I came to the conclusion that it no longer made sense to tolerate the situation in which the minister did not take any deliberate action and in which his position was questioned by the very president who had delegated him to the government.

I also hoped that my decision would prevent a domination of political issues over the economy in the budget bill debate. I had the possibility of changing that situation. I was not totally successful. Dismissing the minister made it necessary for me to inspect state defense more closely. I do not regret that.

[POLITYKA] What do you see to be the way out of the current stalemate in the so-called presidential ministries? The president says the government should develop statutes for those ministries.

[Pawlak] For four years the president did not mind that there were no such statutes. These ministries do have statutes defining their internal structures. The coalition deputy ministers at the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are responsible for contacts with the parliament. Thus, their attitudes are political. The situation is, generally speaking, quite clear, although I must admit there is a problem. There is a law on the office of the foreign minister and the interior minister, but there is none on the defense minister. This could have been taken care of in 1994 had the minister been more active.

[POLITYKA] Mr. Prime Minister, you have two vacancies in the Council of Ministers. How do you intend to solve that problem? Will you appoint acting heads at the ministries?

[Pawlak] These problems could have been predicted last year. I was aware that the so-called presidential ministers could be used in the game aimed at bringing about a government crisis.

[POLITYKA] In other words, they will be the president's "Trojan horses"?

[Pawlak] Exactly. So far, Minister Milczanowski has been the most responsible—he simply focuses on his job. After last year's experience of appointing the finance minister, we know how the president interprets the constitutional provision allowing him to appoint a new minister at the motion of the prime minister. In the coalition and in the government, we wonder how we can solve this problem. When I inquired of the Belgian prime minister about this during his visit to Poland, he replied: "Do you know the saying about how makeshifts tend to last longest..." I think, however, that, in democratic systems—even if the Constitution does not outrightly state so—the principle of goodwill and cooperation between state authorities is obligatory. Only when goodwill is not there does one have to manage on one's own.

[POLITYKA] So we are back to the acting heads of ministries?

[Pawlak] Before the small constitution was passed, it was quite simple: I wish to remind you that, during my first term as prime minister, Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz and Minister of Internal Affairs Milczanowski were appointed in this way.

[POLITYKA] Which gave grounds for attempts at putting you before the State Tribunal?

[Pawlak] I assure you that the very instigation of the procedure is unpleasant. Currently, the situation is much more complicated because secretaries and under secretaries of state are appointed at the motion of relevant ministers, and we do not have two ministers. This restricts candidate selection. We must not act in haste, especially because soon, in the first days of February at the latest, complications may arise due to the signing of the budget bill.

[POLITYKA] Considering the current circumstances, the signing of the budget bill seems rather dubious. The president says, however, that there are various scenarios. What is your prediction of events for this year?

[Pawlak] I believe the first significant period will be the beginning of February because that is the time of the three-month deadline since presenting the budget bill to the Sejm. The bill has already been passed, but we do not know how the president's legal advisers will interpret it. If the president signs the budget, we will have a more stable state. The second important period will be appointing candidates for presidential office. We must brace ourselves for very fierce rivalry both within the particular political parties and between them. That will be a time of numerous political clashes. Once it is known who will run in the elections, the storm will slightly subside, and we will return to a traditional election battle. I think it will be very difficult for politicians without substantial support from political parties to win. An election campaign these days is a team game. The president himself is aware of that and is trying to gain some backing. Will we not lose sight of the Polish state interests in the election game? Are we capable of passing a proper constitution? I hope we will at least try.

[POLITYKA] What do you think of the idea that the PSL and the SLD put forth a joint candidate?

[Pawlak] We are considering the possibility. Given the circumstances, perhaps it is a solution. The experience of parliamentary elections shows that one may lose everything due to a lack of agreement. Yet we must seriously consider reinforcing democracy in Poland, and that requires the political forces aspiring at independence to succumb to public judgment throughout the campaign. From this point of view, it is somewhat more honest to put forth our own candidates in the first round.

To conclude, I have not arrived at an opinion on this issue. The final decision will be made by the statutory party authorities, who will account for the preferences of our party members.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

Walesa: More Dynamic PM Than Pawlak Needed

AU2001114595 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 16 Jan 95 p 7

[Interview with President Lech Walesa by Lubos Palata; place and date not given: "Lech Walesa: Warsaw Lies Nearer to Prague Than Washington"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw (from our special correspondent)—In an interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES and the weekly RESPEKT, Polish President Lech Walesa, who is arriving for an official visit to the Czech Republic tomorrow, criticized the approach of Klaus's Cabinet toward cooperation among the Visegrad Four. He once again called Czech coupon privatization "a higher form of socialism" and advocated the replacement of Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and the introduction of the presidential system in his country.

[Palata] Why is cooperation within the Weimar triangle, consisting of Poland, France, and Germany, progressing better than cooperation within the Visegrad Group?

[Walesa] All postcommunist countries are grappling with a great number of internal problems, and it is thus natural that they turn to better organized and arranged countries. We are turning to states standing at a higher level to be able to gain more and to learn from them. However, I will disclose nothing new when I say that we are dependent on each other. One day, when physical borders cease to exist, it will always be nearer to Prague for us Poles than to Washington. Now, many Poles are heading for Washington because it seems to be closer to them. Only there do they find out that better deals can be struck with one's neighbors, and they are coming back. However, this process will continue for some time.

[Palata] Within the framework of the Visegrad Group, Klaus's government is boycotting any cooperation going beyond economic cooperation. How do you assess this approach?

[Walesa] Well, such is the situation. I even understand this approach. With the best prepared and richest [postcommunist] nation, he wants to be the first to gain membership in European structures. But even Klaus cannot deny that Warsaw lies nearer to Prague than Washington.

[Palata] But is the main reason for Prague's resistance not the fact that postcommunists are in power in Poland, Hungary, and, in fact, also in Slovakia, while in the Czech Republic they are not?

[Walesa] I doubt it. I believe that communists are not as visible on the Czech political scene as in Poland, which, however, does not mean that they have faded away. They have occupied other, even more neuralgic, points in the state organism, mainly in the economic sphere.

[Palata] In an interview for the GENERAL-ANZEIGER, you said that Czech coupon privatization was just "a higher form of socialism." Could you explain that?

[Walesa] Both in our country and in yours, everything used to belong to everyone. We could have redistributed the former collective ownership again to everyone, through coupons. We have not done so because we intend to switch to a more evident change of ownership. If the situation in the Czech Republic is such now that everything has been privatized because everyone owns coupons, this really is a "higher form of socialism." Privatization is carried out by various methods, and yours may turn out to be the best of all. But only the future will show.

[Palata] Why do you want to remove Pawlak's government?

[Walesa] Poland needs a much more dynamic prime minister than Waldemar Pawlak. He is a capable politician, as I have repeatedly stressed, but he lacks experience and is slow in making decisions. At the very moment the present government was formed, I warned that it would be very difficult for Pawlak to be a good prime minister under this constellation. And this turned out to be the case. I do not understand, however, why many people maliciously interpret my negative assessment of Pawlak as a tendency to wage a struggle with the present government. That is not true. I must say, however, that, by dodging decisions, the prime minister is devaluing the work of the Cabinet. At the same time, there are people in the present coalition who avail themselves of the necessary experience and who would be able to adopt such decisions.

[Palata] Your Czech counterpart, Vaclav Havel, has effectively become reconciled to being a president without powers. Why do you not want to accept that position?

[Walesa] I am of a different nature, and I have headed the reforms in the country for many years, from the beginning. I will be able to come to terms with such a position only if it is decided by the voters. They have not decided so, for the time being, and, therefore, I have no reason to come to terms with it. The ceaseless attacks against my person testify to my not being helpless. One does not attack a helpless president.

[Palata] You want to enforce a presidential system in Poland. Why do you think is it better for your country than a parliamentary one?

[Walesa] Both the presidential and the parliamentary systems of democracy have their advantages. I believe, however, that, in the period of transition, when some parts of our life are, by necessity, still arranged according to the old communist law, it is necessary to select a few areas that can be regulated by the president by means of decrees. It is self-evident that those decrees would be submitted to parliament for approval. Parliament acts slowly, which is rooted in its nature, while we are still in the midst of a period of big changes. The president would be more effective, more flexible, and would not disrupt democracy in any way. I am only speaking about the advantages of the presidential system. This definitely does not have anything to do with a desire to rule on my part, with the desire to gain more powers or impose a ready model. This model must evolve in Poland independently, just like in any normal country. There is no ready recipe for it.

[Palata] Are your proposals for the introduction of the presidential system not a response to the postcommunists wielding power in Poland?

[Walesa] No, I do not think in those categories. The important issue for me is not "who" but "what." It is precisely in the interest of reforms, for the fate of which I feel responsible, that I act so that we succeed in building a state that would be resistant to all of the adversities the future might bring.

[Palata] But are you not afraid that the introduction of the presidential system might strengthen the positions of postcommunists, who stand a good chance of winning the presidential elections?

[Walesa] I am afraid of that, of course. However, we are not going to abandon democracy. Democracy can make mistakes; that happens from time to time. But when a mistake occurs, it is set right in the next elections or in the elections after that. Who knows whether the postcommunists' overwhelming victory in the last parliamentary elections will not change into their defeat on the next occasion or whether it will not make the next winners exert efforts to carry out changes even in those areas in which the post-Solidarity parties formerly lacked the courage to assume the burden of reforms?

[Palata] Marshal Pilsudski curtailed democracy to save Poland's independence. Would you be ready to do something similar?

[Walesa] Marshal Pilsudski lived in a different epoch. Poland was struggling for its existence then. He had to act the way he did because the country was faced with a permanent danger, mainly from Russia. I am not in such a situation today. But if such a danger existed, I would act in the same way.

[Palata] According to public opinion polls, the majority of Poles share a fear of Russia. Does Moscow still pose a threat to Warsaw?

[Walesa] We live at a turning point of epochs. The preceding epoch was one of totalitarianism and brute force; the future is one of democracy and freedom. From this point of view, Russia does not pose a threat to us in terms of the future. But the problem is that we are now at the turning point of epochs, and the danger exists that the preceding one might come back in Russia. But this is chiefly a threat for Russia itself. I hope, however, that even for Moscow there no longer exists the road back from democracy to new totalitarianism.

[Palata] Is Poland satisfied with the process of integration into NATO and the European Union thus far?

[Walesa] Our membership in these organizations is in the interest not only of Poland but also of Europe and the world at large. I believe that the Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and also Slovaks are, to a large degree, prepared for entry. The sooner we join the European Union and NATO, the better not only for us but also for Europe.

The important thing is that the process of Poland's integration into these organizations is already under way. We are engaged in joint exercises with NATO countries and in increasingly closer political and economic cooperation with the European Union. Of course, our flag has not yet been hoisted in Brussels; the final documents have not been signed. However, it does not matter that much whether the national anthems are played at the beginning or at the end of our path into NATO and the European Union. Despite appearances, this is not a one-off act but a process. We must know that the integration processes have started and are in progress. That is the most important thing. The formalities can be processed at last.

Kwasniewski on Power Struggle, NATO Membership

BR1901161895 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jan 95 p 8

[Article on interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, by Aasmund Willersrud in Warsaw; no date given: "The Conflict Is Part of Polish Style"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—"This is not chaos. The divisive political conflict is part of Polish style," said Aleksander Kwasniewski, who is in the lead in the opinion polls in the run-up to the presidential elections.

The left-wing SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] has not formally decided who should challenge Lech Walesa. But the Social Democrats' party chairman has kept out of the work of the government coalition with the Peasants' Party and ignored Walesa's call to take over as prime minister. It is one of the jobs that it is difficult to win popularity from in Poland at the moment. The office of president is another.

Aleksander Kwasniewski told AFTENPOSTEN that it is not so dramatic if Poland is without a defense and a foreign minister for a period. "It is worse that we do not have any effective cooperation between the government and the president. As things are now, with more or less the same amount of power on both sides, it is difficult to tackle Poland's problems," he said.

Polish history is depressing reading in many ways, but especially because the grandees' inclination to work against the kings, each other, and later the work of the Sejm led to a split that left the nation open to its neighbors' greedy conquests. Poland's history as a united independent nation is so short that the danger of a split is clear.

Many people are speaking harsh words about today's violent power struggle between President Walesa and government head Waldemar Pawlak.

"No, it is not chaos," Kwasniewski said. "It is part of the Polish style, not as stable and clear as in more experienced democracies like Germany and Norway. A functioning democracy ought to be free of such tensions and conflicts."

[Willersrud] But does not Poland really need a strong man, as Walesa has said?

"What Poland needs, above all, is clear lines between the presidency, the government, and the parliament. As things are at present, the president can block every law and the budget. A two-thirds majority is needed to lift his veto. What government in Europe today can muster such a majority in its national assembly?

"The weakness of today's Polish president depends unfortunately on Mr. Walesa himself. Today he has no political base any more," Kwasniewski claimed. Walesa was Solidarity's man, but after the election he did everything to split the movement. Such a "nonparty" man can very well be president, but he remains merely a ceremonial figure.

[Willersrud] Before he resigned as foreign minister, Andrej Olechowski criticized the government for dawdling intentionally with its NATO plans and keeping too much of an wary eye on the East. Are you personally convinced that NATO is the best solution to Poland's security problems?

[Kwasniewski] Immediately after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, many people in my party wanted to concentrate on the CSCE instead, but experience shows that NATO is the only security system that works in today's Europe. When Poland becomes a member, NATO will also be changed, and it will become an even more effective security organization.

[Willersrud] The problem now is Russia's negative reactions. Do you see anything at all legitimate in the great power's objections?

[Kwasniewski] There is no justification for them. If Yeltsin talks about zones, buffer zones or gray zones, it is a completely different problem. Russia is undergoing transformation, and we see two scenarios. Either democratic developments will succeed, and Poland wants to have the best possible relations with Moscow. The other possibility ends in undemocratic conditions and chaos. In both cases, Polish NATO membership is necessary, not only for us but also for the whole of the European security system.

[Willersrud] Your party has nominated a candidate for the post of defense minister who is known for his critical attacks on NATO. Is this not likely to weaken the Western powers' faith in this government's honesty?

[Kwasniewski] It is not true that Pastusiak is an opponent of NATO. Perhaps he did write critical articles, but that was in the days of the Cold War. They were different times.

[Willersrud] The label "former communist" is used both of your yourself and your party. Is this a burden?

[Kwasniewski] Of course it is difficult for us. It is a stereotype, but it has its effect. "Communist" is bad, and "former communist" is almost just as bad. But our activities are democratic, and we are trying to be at the center of reforms.

[Willersrud] You personally were a communist?

[Kwasniewski] Ideologically I was not a communist at all. I joined the party under Eduard Gierek in the late 1970's. The dream for us was to change the system from inside, but I realize now that that was naive. The majority of my generation nevertheless joined the party with the same dream, while the minority went to the opposition, which wanted to change everything. Today I think that both sides were right. I greatly value the role my colleagues, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron, played in breaking the system, but we so-called reformers within the party helped to see to it that the changes could happen without bloodshed.

[Willersrud] Now you call yourself a social democrat. What does that mean?

[Kwasniewski] My personal model is Felipe Gonzalez and Spain. The transitional period and the reconciliation after Franco have many points of similarity with today's Poland. We have been accepted as observers by the Socialist International and hope to become a full member in 1996. The Norwegian social democrats were very positive toward us, and I know Thorbjorn Jagland to be a very open person.

Kroll on Silesian German Minority's Status

MM1301125095 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 2 Jan 95 p 9

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Henryk Kroll, chairman of the German Minority Parliamentary Circle and deputy chairman of the Sejm Commission for National and Ethnic Minorities, by correspondent Andrzej Kotula; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kotula] You and other politicians often cite the words of Bishop of Opole Alfons Nossol, who said: "It is not enough for the majority of the population merely to show tolerance toward the minorities; it is the ability to open up to these minorities that will enrich a modern state." So how do you rate the ability of the Polish state and society to open up to its minorities today?

[Kroll] Unfortunately, it is still absent. But I understand that. The problem is still too fresh today: It only emerged in practical terms in the years 1989-90. Politicians are now beginning to understand it better and better, but, for the general public, the past 45 years of being raised in a homogeneous, ethnically uniform state, with a one-sided view of its historical self-awareness, have produced a strong impression on people's minds. We will need at least another whole generation before this impression can change....

[Kotula] When we read GAZETA GORNOSLASKA/ OBERSCHLESISCHE ZEITUNG, we can sense an atmosphere suggesting life in a citadel that is besieged by intolerance....

[Kroll] No, it is not as simple as that. We have not fallen here from the moon! We have lived within the same ethnic mix throughout the whole postwar period. And there are no problems with those with whom we live side by side: our neighbors in the same localities, the same parishes. Problems arise only in contacts with people who come here from other parts of the country and ask: "But is Polish still spoken here?" They are incapable of understanding the specific nature of Silesia's reality in all its complexity.

[Kotula] Utterances by representatives of ethnic minorities often contain the following phrases: "semiofficial campaign against the German minority," "sparks flying between the minority and the administration," or even the outright view that "the positive impulses sent from Warsaw are being blocked from inside the voivodship"....

[Kroll] Several weeks ago there finally took place the long-awaited meeting with the voivoda and other representatives of local administration devoted to economic cooperation and related problems. After some six months of calm, when there were no attacks on us, the time has come to seek a way of joint action, and such an intention was expressed by myself and the voivoda alike. However, as usual, when it is too calm for some, certain local politicians have started making contentious noises.

There was a time when the source of some hostile action against us was none other than Warsaw. Unfortunately, it often happens that some politicians try to further their career at the expense of ethnic minorities.

[Kotula] Regardless of political demagoguery, what genuine contentious matters do you still see existing today?

[Kroll] There is one particularly difficult question, that of finally telling the full truth about the German minority's past. I do not see a genuine willingness to do that yet. Too often we encounter half-truths directed against us.... In addition, there are some simple, formal matters that should be sorted out at last: The legal status of ethnic minorities is nonexistent in Poland. Polish internal legislation contains virtually no regulation of that question, except perhaps for the electoral law. There are attempts to introduce legal regulation of the question of education for ethnic minorities, but this is being done at the level of [Council of Ministers] ordinances. Nevertheless, I take an optimistic view of the future: Five out of the seven existing drafts of the new constitution contain relevant provisions concerning the status of ethnic minorities.

[Kotula] One issue that generates great emotions here is the question of bilingual place-names. In Europe, this problem is regulated in a variety of ways. For example, the Lusatian Serbian minority [southeast Germany] has the use of bilingual names guaranteed by law, but in their case that is often the only visible proof of their existence. On the other hand, the German minority in Denmark does not feel the need for such declaration at all. Why should it be so important here in Poland?

[Kroll] It is important for reasons that are purely emotional and for which the political subtext is only an underlying justification. This question should be regulated formally, but I do not believe it will create a problem in the future. I do not see a conflict-generating element here. On the other hand, a real source of conflict is to be found in the fact that, to this day, no representative of the German minority—that is, of one-third of the residents of our voivodship—has been formally appointed at the Voivodship Office.

[Kotula] This issue involves a question of national loyalty. Many members of your minority group—that is, Silesians of ethnic German origin—carry German passports in their pockets. Do you not believe that dual citizenship could constitute a real obstacle to a political or public service career? After all, there is always a lurking doubt: Which state would come uppermost for a person with dual nationality if there is a conflict of loyalties?

[Kroll] You must always ask yourself the question: What do I understand by loyalty? Most often people interpret loyalty in terms of nurturing their traditions, culture, and language.... Nevertheless, the term should be given a precise definition: Loyalty amounts to nothing more or less than compliance with the requirements of the law currently in force in Poland. And there is no doubt at all that our particular community complies 100 percent with the law in force. Let me give you examples: In the 1980's, virtually all of Poland was on strike—except for our region. We were actually taken to task for it later: Why did you not strike? Well, we did not strike because strikes were outlawed! Our community chose to be loyal even to a fault. In more recent times, I forbade our farmers to participate in the protests consisting in setting up roadblocks. This was done deliberately, lest a new charge be leveled against us: It is the Krauts that break our Polish laws. Loyalty means obeying the law!

The whole issue of dual citizenship reminds me somewhat of the Sejm affair involving Ms. Anastazja P. [self-styled correspondent briefly famous for exposure of alleged sex scandals in parliament]. I refer to the announcement made by the then deputy speaker as he defended himself against rape charges: "I carry the rape tool with me at all times, sure. But that does not make me a rapist!"

Those people are entitled to German citizenship. But it is up to them whether they decide to make use of their entitlement.

[Kotula] The cases of young people demanding exemption from military service in Poland on the strength of the argument that they have already done their service in...the Bundeswehr have gained notoriety here.

[Kroll] Perhaps there have been such isolated cases, but history is not made of individual occurrences.

[Kotula] But there have also been complaints that dual citizenship is in fact associated with a chance of securing a privileged position in relation to other Polish citizens. For example, cases are cited in which people exploit their German citizenship to claim social welfare benefits while at the same time running commercial firms in Poland. Or, in other instances, of people who take advantage of their electoral rights in both countries....

[Kroll] In the first place, membership in the German minority in Poland is in absolutely no way connected with an entitlement to German citizenship. Second, it is simply impossible to successfully claim, say, the unemployment benefit in Germany without justification. Responsible German officials check all claims methodically and scrupulously, making it impossible for anyone to cheat the German state. Finally, the regulations of the German electoral law in practice rule out the possibility of foreigners taking part in German elections. I have never heard of any case of someone from Poland voting in a Bundestag election.

[Kotula] Are you pleased with the support extended to your minority by the German and Polish states, considering, of course, each state's proportional means and capacities?

[Kroll] Support from the Polish side is practically nonexistent. Each year our Sejm Commission for National and Ethnic Minorities directs an appeal to parliamentary budget commissions to give this matter some serious consideration at last. On the other hand, we record absolutely no attempts at interference on the part of the Polish authorities: They never try to dictate to us what we can and cannot do. We do, however, occasionally register such attempts at controlling our affairs—never, of course, in any negative sense—on the part of certain German authorities. We treat them as interference in our own internal affairs. These are not positive signs. There are attempts at telling us: This is what you can and cannot do—and, in fact, it would be best if you did nothing at all.

[Kotula] Is the phenomenon whereby young people of German origin emigrate from Poland still continuing at the same steady rate today?

[Kroll] The rate at which young people emigrate to Germany has already stabilized. The phenomenon itself is connected with those people's right to take advantage of their dual citizenship. And that is why it is so very essential for us that this right be upheld. It is better if a young man who cannot find employment in Poland leaves this country to live and work in Germany. Perhaps he will earn good money there, and perhaps he will learn something. And perhaps he will one day come back with his money and his experience and use both to set up something here, on his home ground. In addition, dual citizenship is a form of psychological safety net. It so happened that, in the past, members of our community usually came up against tremendous difficulties, worse than anyone else, whenever they tried to travel to Germany in order, say, to visit their relatives. In other parts of Poland, it was much easier to get a passport. Here, it was virtually impossible.

[Kotula] Many people resent and criticize you for your close ties to the German Expellees' Union, an organization that is viewed critically also by many German politicians.

[Kroll] The worst mistake from the perspective of a proposed regulation of Polish-German relations was the rejection of the community of German expellees. Please consider the German visitors to Poland nowadays. If you take a good look at the passengers on all of these tourist coaches, you will see that more than 90 percent of them come from these parts and these communities. And it is only these Germans who are interested in cooperation with Poland. It is not true that they are predominantly interested in revisionism, revanchism, and so on. And, unless both sides come to realize this and act on it, there is no way in which the Germans will be prepared to involve themselves fully in any serious economic undertakings. And as regards our close ties to the expellees.... It is in our tradition to cultivate contacts with our families and neighbors. After all, these people are our blood relations, our friends, acquaintances, and neighbors! And we will continue to keep up these contacts even if we are accused of disloyalty! I cannot even begin to imagine that we could do otherwise! But we also talk and cultivate contacts with all other important milieus in Germany and Poland.... Although it will in all probability be quite difficult to talk with the extreme wings, both Right and Left (and I have serious doubts whether such talks will ever take place).

[Kotula] There was a time a while ago when our press reacted very nervously indeed to the arrival in Silesia of extreme neo-Nazi organizations from Germany. You could have said that the radical Right was doing all in its power to invest in the German minority in Poland.

[Kroll] That is not true! At the time the incident took place and was being reported in the news, I spoke with the media and explained that the three young people involved sought no contacts with the German minority at all. And today we have evidence that they actually collaborated with an extreme-right Polish organization called the Aryan National Front. I believe that at the time we succeeded in defusing a potentially explosive situation. Today things on that front are quiet, and I hope that they will remain so....

'Terrorist Organization' Noted in Bucharest

AU1901144595 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 16 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Cristian Rautu: "A Left-Wing Terrorist Organization Advertises Itself in Bucharest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The areas around the North Railway Station and the center of the city are full of the stickers of the Kurdistan National Liberation Front, a left-wing terrorist organization the members of which are continuously "hunted down" in Turkey and Kurdistan. This is their second propaganda campaign in our capital city, the first having taken place during spring and summer last year, when the members of the front put up posters calling for a boycott of tourism in Turkey.

It is not accidental that the Kurdistan National Liberation Front is active in our country (Let us not forget the success of other fronts, such as the former Socialist Unity front or the National Salvation Front). The Kurds purchase their weapons from the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Moldova) and use Romania as a transit country, as well as a base to obtain funds. It would be interesting to know how many of the Arab companies doing business in our country also finance the Kurdistan National Liberation Front.

UDMR Establishes Mayors, Councillors Council

AU1901144895 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 16 Jan 95 p 8

[Report by Silviu Achim: "UDMR Has Set Up the Council of Mayors and Local Councillors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Saturday [14 January] in the town of Sfantu Gheorghe, the nation-wide conference of the mayors and local councillors elected on the lists of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] was held (Two hundred thirty mayors and vice mayors, as well as over 3,300 local councillors belong to this association).

The operating regulations of that body were passed, and the leadership of the Council of UDMR Mayors and Local Councillors was elected. Pal Vilmos Santa, chairman of the Harghita County Council, was elected leader.

The Council's first task is to draw up a platform for the self-administration of the ethnic Hungarian communities. The platform is to be included as a separate chapter in the UDMR program, which is to be passed by the May 1995 party convention.

From the Sfantu Gheorghe debates, it followed that several stipulations of the platform are intended to provide for the association of various local ethnic Hungarian communities within a federation having special rights and attributions, which, after all, would be tantamount to a certain kind of regional autonomy.

The other fundamental task of the Council is to make preparations with a view to next year's local elections.

The Council is to draw up electoral programs that are better adapted to local needs and possibilities, and to supervise the candidate lists. Further tasks of the Council are to be determined by the UDMR mini-parliament, the CRU [expansion unknown], to which the newly established Council is subordinate.

PSM Elects Replacements to Party Posts

AU2001100895 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 16 Jan 95 p 3

[Report signed "C.H.": "'Ceausescu Two' Has Become PSM Secretary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Meeting in Bucharest, the Committee of PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] Executive Bodies has elected two members of the National Committee members, 10 Steering Committee members, five secretaries, and a deputy chairman. They elected Constantin Chitimian deputy chairman of the party; and elected Popa Ion (formerly first secretary of the Romanian Communist Party in Hunedoara County, nicknamed "Ceausescu Two"), Gheorghe Cret, Cornel Balaur, Petre Patruta (deputy rector of the Construction Institute), and Eugen Florescu (head of the PSM press office) secretaries These newly elected persons will thus replace the current PSM leaders—that is, the three deputy chairmen and four secretaries who resigned and left the PSM last week.

Daily Urges CDR To End 'Party Jostling'

AU1901202195 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 16 Jan 95 p 1

[Editorial by Petre Mihai Bacanu: "Now!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Emil Constantinescu [president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, CDR] finally wants to stop the domestic disputes within the CDR, which have turned into classical balancing acts. The discussions on the CDR's organization put at risk the efforts for change and for an effective program capable of pulling the country out of the crisis at a time when the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], with its populist and social-sounding promises, has disappointed in general, eroded its credibility, and is enmeshed in ambiguities. From now on, not even Ion Iliescu can indefinitely claim that "laments are good in the sphere of art, not economics." The reason for that is that some five years were lost in the very sphere of economics to which he referred, while the artists have not been brooding but, on the contrary, are going about their jobs and even bringing us some international accomplishments at times.

As for the likes of Iliescu, Vacaroiu, and Nastase, wherever they go they meet with financial blockages and corruption (Why do they not take the example of China, which is suing its corrupt people?).

The PDSR is absorbing everything. What is more, it has begun sending professional image-makers and electoral managers like Miron Mitrea [former Fratia-National Council of Free Trade Unions leader and current PDSR vice president] into the field to make fiery speeches, while the CDR is still reorganizing itself at the top. The opposition leaders should be out in the field combating the PDSR envoys, who are again trying to fool the electorate. The opposition must rehabilitate the processess of privatization and reform—which are compromised in the eyes of the electorate—and must take the people out of the political confusion in which they find themselves. It is very difficult to convince those suffering of hunger and cold that it is not the fault of democracy and the market economy. It seems that certain CDR leaders have failed to understand that the struggle should not be waged among partners, but against the government, which did not manage to get the country out of the dramatic situation that is affecting both the economy and society as a whole. This is not the right moment for the opposition leaders to fight each other, at a time when one can notice the ideological radicalization of the ruling red quartet [the PDSR, the Romanian National Unity Party, the Socialist Party of Labor, and the Greater Romania Party].

The CDR candidate was appointed pretty late for the 1992 elections. Nevertheless, Emil Constantinescu won the trust of 5,000,000 voters—that is, 40 percent of the electorate.

Constantinescu's announcement on 13 January [date on which Constantinescu announced his presidential candidacy] has taken the CDR out of its state of paralysis. One can only remedy things if one comes to power, but in order to do that one needs organization at the local level, something that keeps being postponed because one has not yet finished organizing at the top, where energy is consumed in interminable discussions and delayed decisions.

The fusion of the liberal parties in the Convention is no longer a sure thing; the liberal boat is risking sinking, rather than face the storm. The pride of some of its leaders is so great that no one can accept a new party leader. Some time may yet pass before they can prove their unity, before the merger takes place!

The position of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC], which does not want to leave the CDR, seems quite reasonable. The PAC has realized that all energies should be consumed within the CDR, and that the liberal merger is no longer such a topical issue, particularly since it has begun to squeak as of now.

I would like to ask the "secessionists": If they still want separate lists, what are they still doing in the CDR? If they want another candidate, why do they not propose him, so as to put an end to the hullabaloo? And who might that candidate be, when it was decided at the last elections that the president should be a totally objective person who should give up his parliament seat? But all the names that are currently ventilated belong to the sphere of the parliament. All right, let them be announced openly! As a matter of fact, it does not matter whether they are in parliament or not. The important thing is that the candidate should be a figure with a greater political clout than Professor Constantinescu, if such a thing is possible. I can already foresee the various groupings boycotting the CDR meetings because they have not yet consulted with the local branches, or because they have not yet appointed their candidate for the presidency (although they have been demanding that all along)—or saying that one should still wait for a while, and so forth. Why should one still wait, when Nastase, Vacaroiu, and Iliescu are going from one enterprise to another doing electoral campaigning while the trade unions keep quiet about it all. If the opposition leaders were to go to the factories, they would be accused of wanting to make political capital out of it! What did Ion Iliescu do at Electroprecizia factory in Sacele [Brasov County, on 13 January] other than try to strike political capital?

The robot portrait of a candidate to our electorate's taste looks like this: modest, reasonable, professionally accomplished, possessing a good reputation, honest, just, not too young and not too old, possessing integrity, patriotic, devoted, resolute, altruist, perseverant, pragmatic, a good family man, moral, faithful, a man of character, wise, humane, patient, cautious, healthy, nice, restrained, firm, hardworking, well-behaved, dignified, energetic, and grateful. Let us see what figure from the CDR "entourage"—aside from Professor Constantinescu, who has already announced his candidacy—comes close enough to this portrait . The more candidates the better, since the dispute will be out in the open.

There should be no party jostling in an alliance like the CDR—at least not for the moment. Otherwise, gentlemen, you will witness a perpetual struggle of the opposition, which may come to power about 50 years from now.

PNL Leader Views Liberal Movement's Prospects

AU1901130495 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 10-17 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with PNL President Mircea Ionescu-Quintus by Ileana Lucaciu; place and date not given: "There Is No More Room for Jokes!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

We Are Center-Right Oriented

[Lucaciu] Recently, the press has been circulating rumors about the possible appearance of a third force on the political scene, apart from the government coalition and the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]. In your capacity as leader of the PNL [National Liberal Party], a party that has recently joined the Convention and is a signatory to the protocol of the Civic-Liberal Alliance, how do you view such a possibility?

[Ionescu-Quintus] I have also heard about such ideas—which, in fact, were denied by those whom the press claimed were the initiators of the idea. The third force should be placed between the "left" and the "right". There is no other place for it. And as Mr. Horia Rusu [executive president of the Liberal Party '93] said, regardless of whether it is the first, second, or third force, this place—the center-left—is firmly held by the Civic-Liberal Alliance. I do not know any other force that could claim this position. We have a more-or-less defined leftist orientation, and we have the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], which represents a well-defined moderate right orientation and occupies that respective place together with other, less important forces. The Democratic Party will remain of a party with a center-left orientation.

[Lucaciu] The Civic-Liberal Alliance gathers four parties with a view to uniting the liberal movement. However, the same liberal orientation is being claimed by Mr. Radu Campeanu's grouping [a dissident PNL grouping]. In your opinion, what proportion would this grouping represent among the liberals?

[Ionescu-Quintus] First of all, there is something I would like to mention: In fact, this alliance includes five parties. The PNL merged at the Brasov congress with the New Liberal Party, a political force rated with 1 percent at the last elections. The Civic-Liberal Alliance now comprises the majority of the liberals in Romania. So far, the Campeanu grouping has no legal or political legitimacy whatsoever. However, it represents reality. I do not want to risk making statements that might be considered subjective; nonetheless, I can affirm that the persons who have joined Radu Campeanu do not account for more than 10 percent of the liberals in Romania. In fact, his faction represents...less than ten percent, maybe 5 or 6 percent of the PNL force.

[Lucaciu] Does this mean much or little?

[Ionescu-Quintus] It would be much, had this proportion included valuable PNL members. But it seems to me that they do not have these valuable people. There are a number of dissatisfied people from local organizations and the central leadership who gathered around Radu Campeanu. Dissatisfaction cannot be a connecting link. However, dissatisfied people can also appear in our new regrouping formula....

[Lucaciu] Do you intend to attract Mr. Campeanu's grouping into the liberal union as well?

[Ionescu-Quintus] In principle, yes. However, it should first spend a term in the alliance and then join the party that is going to be set up. However, I believe that in these five to six months that are needed for the establishment of the new Liberal Party, it might be difficult to reach an understanding with our former liberal colleagues. This is because we can only talk with a political force. Thus, it would be necessary for this grouping—through an absurd turn of events—to reestablish itself into a new political formation. We have nothing to discuss with groups or factions. They should better clarify their own legal situation. And there is another, very important aspect here. Namely: We cannot forget that the respective four parties are members of the CDR and Mr. Campeanu made a few offensive remarks about the CDR, saying that it is an "asylum for handicapped people." The party that is going to emerge from this alliance will function within the CDR. Mr. Campeanu has departed very much from the CDR and this is the major impediment for a possible merger of his grouping with our alliance.

Let Us Discard Vanity

[Lucaciu] The PNL has recently been accepted into the CDR. It is known that certain sensitive situations have emerged within the CDR. Even the expulsion of the PL '93, your ally, was suggested at one point. In case dissensions do not subside, and the PL '93 is excluded from the CDR, what attitude will the PNL adopt?

[Ionescu-Quintus] One should also discuss this possibility, which is however very unlikely. Let us not forget that an exclusion from the CDR can take place only with a majority of votes—something that I fail to see how it can be achieved. You should not forget that now four parties—those included in the alliance—will be against such measures. And I also believe that both UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] and the PDSR [Social- Democratic Party of Romania] would be against the exclusion. If, against all reason, such an exclusion were to take place, it would have serious consequences. It could take place before the alliance is formed into a party and it would mean that a part of the alliance is no longer accepted by the Convention. We will seriously call the attention of those who vote to the fact that we have a signed protocol, through which we have united our forces and political intentions, in order to work within the CDR. However, it is difficult to imagine that one can reach the situation of excluding such an important party as the PL '93 from the CDR. Such an exclusion would mean a first sign of the Convention's disintegration, something that would not be beneficial for the opposition in general.

[Lucaciu] The issue of applying a hierarchy of parties is being considered in the CDR. How do you see this issue?

[Ionescu-Quintus] Applying hierarchy seems to me a natural thing, but the criteria according to which this has to be done must be discussed. If, for example, one of the criteria should be parliamentary representation, the PNL would be at the bottom of the list, although it has about 1,000 local organizations throughout the country. This is a figure of which not many parties can boast. No doubt that there are differences in value between the seven and eight parties included in the Convention. There are first-, second-, and third-rank parties. After these ranks are established, the places for the electoral lists can also be established.

[Lucaciu] Will you support the PNTCD proposal to run on joint lists for elections, or the PL '93's idea of running on separate lists according to parties?

[Ionescu-Quintus] The decision is ruled by two aspects. The first is connected with the investments that are made in the electorate. If it is believed that the opposition will obtain more votes on two lists—let us say one a liberal orientation list and the other a national peasant Christian democratic or social democratic orientation list, this is the way it will be done. If not, it would be a mistake to proceed in this way.

Another aspect is connected with the distribution of places within the CDR. I have heard about an idea that they should be divided between liberals and the other forces. One should examine whether such a move is right. Negotiations will be necessary on this issue, but they can take place only after the modification of the electoral law. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] Through the four parties that comprise it, the Civic-Liberal Alliance gathers a number of important leaders in our political life. In the second stage of the establishment of the new liberal party, a sole leadership, a president will be needed. How do you think this sole leadership will be solved, considering the problem of natural vanity that characterizes leaders?

[Ionescu-Quintus] This is a very difficult question. We will have to be wise enough to discard our vanity and bring to the helm of the new party persons with the largest political credit. Certainly, it will not be easy, because each of the four parties has its own number of leaders. We will have to find a formula for the statute of the leading body that would suit a normal vanity and work in favor of the general interest. We need people who can attract, and not push away, the electorate. This is one of the most thorny issues we have to face. And I have to mention something else as well: I will be the first person to give up in favor of the interests of the new liberal party. The PNL will not try to force its installation in the leadership because of the vanity of its leaders. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] If Ion Iliescu decides to reopen the discussion on setting up a national unity government, would the alliance accept the proposal to join the government?

[Ionescu-Quintus] We have suggested a national union for some time now. Unfortunately, the current parliament is different from the former one, and it is very difficult to assume responsibility with the current majority, which can obstruct every intention that is beneficial for the country. Our participation in the government with this parliament is very unlikely, although I believe that such a formula would be beneficial for the country.

[Lucaciu] If Mr. Iliescu runs again for the presidency, will he have any chance of again winning the state's top office?

[Ionescu-Quintus] Elections are going to be held in about two years....

[Lucaciu] Don't you believe in early elections?

[Ionescu-Quintus] No, because the seats are too warm and too cozy, and nobody wants to leave them and display such a patriotic spirit as to give them up when he sees that things are not working properly. Currently, the president is in a favorable situation. He has consolidated his foreign relations; he has had some convincing appearances on television—even if it is said that they were not very precise; and probably he enjoys sympathy. I do not have any statistics, thus it is difficult for me to tell what his chances will be in two years, especially since I do not know who his opponents will be. If they are of value, then he might lose the elections. [passage omitted]

Ljubijankic Reports on SDA's Position on Issues

AU1901163195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Report by Mehmedalija Sisic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following the session of the Main Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], the party held a news conference in Sarajevo today. The main topics were the functioning of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a (?projection) of the tasks of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state bodies this year, and current issues concerning the peace negotiations. Journalists were addressed by Irfan Ljubijankic, president of the party's Main Committee. Journalists were also addressed by (?Nebib) Sacirbegovic, [word indistinct] Selagic, and Semso Tankovic, heads of the SDA branches in the United States, Austria, and Croatia respectively. Mehmedalija Sisic has the story:

[Sisic] In his introductory address, Irfan Ljubijankic, president of the SDA's Main Committee, presented the party's positions on these topics in the form of a resume of yesterday's session.

[Ljubijankic] We decided to adopt all the (?memoranda) on the failure to implement the Washington Agreements and expressed a firm commitment to the urgent and complete implementation of the Washington Agreement, the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Vienna Agreement.

Point two, [word indistinct] must be fully used as an instrument to start and accelerate the implementation of the Federation Constitution and the signed agreements with the help of influential people, especially the signatories of the Washington and Vienna Agreements.

Regarding the point two on the agenda, which was supposed to establish the strategy for future negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina, we concluded that the precondition for the continuation of the negotiations is the acceptance of the Contact Group's plan by Karadzic's Serbs. We will be very firm on this and will not start negotiations before Karadzic says a clear yes to the Contact Group's plan.

If this precondition is met, negotiations will be held by a republican delegation that will include members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The delegation will be appointed by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As regards the venue, we would prefer it to be Sarajevo Airport, or some other place if we cannot agree on that. The platform for these talks will be as follows:

Number one, the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders must the basis of any agreement.

Point two, territorial delineation, as proposed by the Contact Group, is possible if a mutually acceptable agreement is reached on the 51:49 ratio.

Point three, as regards Sarajevo, we are striving for an undivided city under a two-year UN administration, (?until) some (?better) solution is found.

Point four, the Main Committee opposes further lifting of sanctions introduced on Serbia and Montenegro until Bosnia-Herzegovina is recognized within its internationally recognized borders.

Point five, if the Contact Group's plan is not accepted by 30 April 1995, we will ask that the arms embargo be lifted. Therefore, we adhere to our position that the arms embargo should be lifted.

As regards point three of the agenda at yesterday's session of the Main Committee, which was entitled Projections of Tasks for State Bodies as Envisaged by the SDA, the Main Committee concluded that the speech by President Izetbegovic, points one to 12, be adopted as conclusions of the Main Committee.

[Sisic] Irfan Ljubijankic also briefed journalists on two further conclusions that were reached at yesterday's session.

[Ljubijankic] We conclude with regret that the position of the Bosniak people in Serbia and Montenegro continues to deteriorate. The Bosniaks in Sandzak, who are an inseparable part of the Bosniak nation, are being persecuted, arrested, and ill-treated. The SDA has warned the international community about this on several occasions. However, the latest events in Sandzak are disturbing the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and throughout the world. Rigged trials that are conducted after the Stalinist fashion, bans on political, religious, and even humanitarian (?work), the dismissal of prominent Bosniaks from work and social posts, and other forms of ill-treatment show that our constant involvement to protect their rights and survival is needed.

Therefore, we appeal to the international community finally to take energetic steps better to protect the Bosniaks in Sandzak. At the same time we appeal to the Bosniak people in Sandzak to strengthen their unity (?through) resistance against Serbian fascism in order to survive in their [word indistinct].

The Main Committee has also adopted a brief statement of support to the Chechen people. At today's session of the Main Committee, the SDA has extended support to the people of Chechnya to persevere in the difficult and unfair struggle for survival [word indistinct].

[Sisic] One of the first journalists' questions referred to the conclusions on the work of state bodies in the year ahead. Ljubijankic said that after some 70 speeches yesterday, the 12 conclusions on this issue were born out of the wish to introduce several systems in the work of state bodies. Asked about the head of the Federation and whose initiative [words indistinct], Ljubijankic said that this was part of the (?concept), and that this, too, will be resolved. He said this:

[Ljubijankic] A six-month rotation has been agreed upon. All of the reasons that existed when we reached the agreement are still valid. There was no request from the Bosniak side. On the contrary, there was a request from the Croatian side, namely that Kresimir Zubak's mandate be extended. [passage omitted]

Silajdzic on Foreign, Diplomatic Strategy

AU1701142395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1121 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Address by Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and Federation Government, at the session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed deputies! Prior to addressing the issues pertaining to economic measures, I would like to dedicate a few words to what we have just been discussing:

Numerous questions have been raised regarding our diplomatic activity and negotiations. This simply is not on the agenda today. It is the military part of negotiations that is on the agenda and not the political part of talks with the Contact Group, and so forth. To my knowledge, the majority of questions are aimed in this direction. I would say [changes thought], bearing in mind that I am also cold I will try to be brief as I have a statement to read, therefore, I view this matter as follows: I believe that regardless of some fears, like those by deputy, I believe it was Mr. Susic, who feared that we should not have signed this truce and that we should [word indistinct] cease-fire and cessation of hostilities [changes thought], I mean we know that little will come of it, but on our part we had to do it, and I, as prime minister, fully support it. This had to be done. Our fears originate from the enemy's strategy which is well known to us. This strategy has three directions and all three of them are active. First, to maintain frozen status on the ground; therefore, what there is should be kept by force and genocide. Secondly, parallel to this, to make sure to legalize what has been conquered forcefully and finally, to lift sanctions against Serbia. Therefore, these are the three strategic directions and all of them are more or less active. You know that in practice they are being implemented in waves. We are often faced with attempts to legalize something. We thwart such attempts but they come back again; for example, like the issue of confederation of the Serbian entity, as this is called, with Serbia. There was an attempt, they wanted to see our reaction; however, our reaction was correct, it seems to me, and this attempt did not pass. However, attempts of legalization will continue.

Regarding sanctions against Serbia, sanctions against Serbia have practically been suspended, to a small degree but nevertheless suspended. This direction is, therefore, also working. All these three strategic directions are functioning and for this reason we fear that all this might become frozen, that is, that one day the international community will simply turn to us and say, all right, to avoid war and in the name of peace, accept the situation on the ground. Naturally, we cannot accept this and rest assured that the negotiators in the military sphere and those who will negotiate in the political sphere—and these two delegations have been appointed by the assembly—are aware of this fact.

What sort of a policy, a political and diplomatic offensive, are we talking about? What we can do and what always attracts attention is the fact that a [word indistinct] injustice has been done to us. Namely, we have been prevented from defending ourselves. We represent the legal authorities and we are a victim of fascist aggression, therefore, we should be allowed to defend ourselves. We were not. I hope that the assembly will always support us in this and that we will demand forever that this embargo be lifted. I will not speak in terms of morality, but we consider this embargo unlawful.

First of all, this embargo has not accomplished anything. You see, it has been in force for three years. Those in the international community who advocate the embargo refuse to see the fact that nothing has been accomplished by it and that this operation must simply be altered after three years because it has been unsuccessful. We shall tell those in the international community who do not advocate lifting of the embargo—and this is the direction our diplomatic offensive will take—we will tell them: Gentlemen, you simply do not have a reply to Pale's no, or rather, you knew very well what to do if they would have said yes. However, when they said no you did not know what to do.

Others who favor lifting the embargo have an answer and for this reason we have officially endorsed the initiative by the U.S. Senate and Congress to lift the embargo, precisely because this is a sort of response to Pale's no. Naturally, there will always be objections such as, there will be a catastrophe, withdrawal of the UN Protection Force, attacks of the people from Pale, and so forth. Well, we have a catastrophe even without this, we have a humanitarian catastrophe and a cataclysm even without it.

Nothing has been accomplished with the embargo. Therefore, we will demand from the international community to change its course drastically. Four months are sufficient—among other things, this is one of the reasons why this cease-fire was signed—for any side to decide whether it wants peace or war. We accepted peace. They, if they want it, have the time; if not, we can no longer tolerate the position which the international community maintains toward us, which is, more of the same stuff, namely, come on, let us prolong the talks, probably until there is none of us left.

Those who do not want the lifting of the embargo have two options: one, to continue these unproductive talks; second—unfortunately they do not what this—to say it has been enough, we are going back to the UN resolutions, which we never lose from our sight, we are returning back to the beginning, we have tried everything and now it is up to you. Therefore, the UN Security Concil and the international community must implement all resolutions concerning Bosnia because the talks have failed and the talks cannot succeed if one of the sides does not want peace, and this side are the people from Pale, it is they who do not want peace.

I believe that our diplomatic offensive should move in this direction and that we do not have much choice. Our fundamental and natural right is to defend ourselves, by lifting the arms embargo. I think that we must work in this direction and that you should support us, too.

Prime Minister Silajdzic Addresses Assembly

AU1801102395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1130 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Speech by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo on 17 January—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed deputies, respected guests, for the first time since the beginning of the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina we are adopting a complete program of measures and activities in the sphere of economic policy. We are a country at war and it is obvious that we cannot count on long-term economic plans of economic and social development. Therefore, only a program of economic policy measures on a one-year time frame can provide a valid basis in defining the ambience for economic activity. With this document we begin to create a practical system of planning in war conditions on devastated resources, and destroyed or damaged business facilities.

Therefore, in preparing the program of measures and activities, the government was in the position of identifying the aims and tasks in the sphere of economic policy, and, before these are verified, to propose measures for their realization.

The bases on which this document was prepared were the results achieved in all spheres of social life in 1994, the experience and knowledge acquired in the previous two years of wars, and the expected trends in 1995. I hope that these provide realistic bases.

Allow me to brief you on some results achieved in 1994. The electricity-energy system has been established in the areas under the control of the legal organs of the republic. The system produced 1,300 GW of power. Mines have produced 1.5 million tonnes of coal, which is considerable more than in 1993. Production in the special purpose industry was twice the size of that in 1993. I would also like to say that new products have been mastered for the needs of conducting a defensive war. The results achieved in the primary agricultural production of wheat, meat, fruit, vegetables, eggs, and milk are encouraging, as we have managed to meet 25 percent of the populations's food needs even under the present conditions.

With the modest funds that have been especially selected for some firms, we have given an impulse to the revival of industrial production.

Other government measures have also helped business entities to revive production, such as the exemption of duty on the import of equipment, spare parts, raw and other production materials, tools, and so forth. [words indistinct] the priority distribution of energy resources, electricity, fuel, and natural gas.

The government's program of humanitarian production and (?stimulating) business activities with precise (?guidelines) and conclusions represent a systematic approach to the revival of production. The initial financial funds for the realization of this program amounted to $50 million. The implementation of the program is under way. Some 200 specific projects have been announced so far. Companies are expected to announce another 150 projects, which will also include information relevant for making decisions on financing.

The (?government) has also prepared a program of rebuilding the electrical-energy system. This program also envisaged the consolidation of coal mines, which we consider very important. In general, last year, the government took measures in the sphere of payments transactions and the fiscal policy. These measures played an important part in the setting up and the relative stabilization of the domestic currency. [words indistinct] in mending the broken down communication links, a system of payments transactions could be established in the free parts of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The system of payments transactions became fully operational also owing to the introduction of a two-currency system of payments. At the same time this eliminated all money substitutes and reactivated the BiH dinar.

Starting with 1994, the fixed exchange rate of the dinar has been set and confidence is gradually growing in the domestic currency in our country. The dinar is being exchanged for German marks in many parts of the country at the same rate as the official rate of exchange, the one that is set by the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or close to that exchange rate. Occasional fluctuations in the dinar's rate of exchange are almost inevitable considering the conditions under which we live, but these represent only limited distortions that have not escaped our control.

In order to develop a new customs system, we have prepared a number of laws in this field. These will round off the [word indistinct] customs system at both the federal level, which was done at yesterday's session of the Federal Parliament, and at the Republic level.

We have made important steps in consolidating the system of public financing, in terms of more adequate distribution of the public expenditure funds, and in terms of reinforcing the taxation system appropriate for the existing general economic, social, and political conditions. This primarily refers to the fiscal sphere as a whole, which has definitely been separated from the monetary sphere. This will enable the monetary policy to efficiently perform its tasks, taking into account the need to preserve the value of the national currency. In this way we have finally stopped the old practice of the two coffers being connected to each other. In other words, when the budget lacked money to meet the needs of the state and the rest of the public sectors, money used to be printed to pay for this expenditure.

The Republic budget has played an active and stabilizing role regarding both the volume and allocation of the budget funds. Most funds were allocated for defense requirements and the creation of conditions for starting the process of production.

The government has also proposed a number of laws in the fields of accounting, the system of payments transactions, and auditing. These laws propose solutions that will facilitate market type business operations. They are based on modern international ideas. The normative completion of the aforementioned systems has been carried out at both the federal and the republican levels. In our view, this removes all obstacles that have appeared so far in the implementation of some laws. At the same time, it constitutes a basis for a true economic and political integration of all regions of the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The changes proposed in the fiscal, customs, and accounting systems will facilitate further shaping of [word indistinct] macroeconomic policy. One should stress that regarding both aims and instruments, this policy is based on the market economy, while at the same time it takes into account war conditions and the role of the state and its institutions, especially the role of the governments of both the Republic and the Federation as the creator of that policy.

In 1994, we also established economic cooperation with the countries—such as Iran, Libya, Malaysia, and so forth—with which our firms have concluded contracts to carry out investment projects.

In the sphere of defense, last year, the mobilization of military conscripts and material goods was significantly improved. Checks are being performed on how justified are the exemptions given to persons of special importance for the defense of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the districts, cantons, and municipalities, as well as how justified are work orders that were introduced on the basis of the results of [word indistinct]. This secures continuous work in production and further adjustments, initiation, and maintaining of production in war conditions and real [word indistinct].

On the basis of our experience hitherto, we have introduced control of movement of military conscripts and strict application of rules concerning trips abroad. The results of this are already evident.

As regards the logistical needs of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have made a significant change in order to set up a unified system whose aim is to properly and promptly protect all members of the Army and their families. One of the main conditions for this system to begin functioning as soon as possible is to link and harmonize all [words indistinct] for the needs of defense.

With this, we wish to achieve full legitimacy, control, and responsibility in securing and administering the funds, find in time the sources for the funds that are lacking and adequately look after every fighter and his family. This also means an equal distribution of the war burden on every individual, which is particularly difficult, on every firm, which is even more difficult, and on all municipalities in the free parts of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last year, the aggressor continued expelling our (?citizens) from the occupied regions. About 30,000 of them have been expelled from the Bosnian Krajina and Podrinje. They have all been found temporary accommodation. In cooperation with UNHCR and humanitarian organizations, we have secured for them food, clothing, blankets and so forth. In addition, the government took care of and took measures to accommodate other refugees and displaced persons.

In cooperation with humanitarian organizations, we have made possible the organized return of some 15,000 refugees from Croatia, Slovenia, Libya, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], France, and Austria. Preconditions have also been created to facilitate the individual return of some 30,000 refugees. The government is constantly investing efforts to find a way to help the so-called critical groups of the population, especially children without one or both parents, the families of the fighters killed, civil and war-disabled, elderly people without family care, and pensioners. The war conditions have had a catastrophic effect on these categories of population. The war has virtually made it impossible for children's social institutions to work, and to find funds to pay those who [words indistinct] salaries.

Therefore, we are constantly working on the inclusion and involvement of a large number of foreign humanitarian organizations in the process of repairing, reconstructing, and equipping social institutions, providing financial aid to the children of the killed fighters and the civilian victims of the war, the elderly, and so forth. We are trying to help through additional humanitarian aid, through the organization of shared kitchens, finding accommodation for children without parents with other families and institutions for social protection, finding foster parents, and so forth.

The difficult position of our children without (?guardians abroad) is becoming increasingly evident. We are taking measures to prevent the adoption of these children by foreign nationals, and to secure a safe stay for them in other countries until they return home.

The government has tried to make the difficult social situation of the majority of the Republic's citizens easier by certain intervention measures. As you know, we have secured funds for [words indistinct] help to workers in education and [word indistinct] professors. In addition, the government has secured [word indistinct] help in [word indistinct] form to the pensioners, members of the armed forces and other persons who are receive their income from the budget. The distribution of this help has been more or less completed, except Sarajevo, where, owing to the blockade, this help has only been partially distributed. We expect this to be completed there, too.

The main task in the sphere of medical care has been to look after the wounded and injured, [words indistinct] armed forces and citizens. So far 8,297 persons have been (?hospitalized). Of these [words indistinct] 1,058 are children. Beside this, we had to find [words indistinct] as well as acute infectious diseases. [passage omitted] must give credit to the medical workers who have indeed done much for such results to be achieved.

In the sphere of education, much was done last year on school concepts, schools for special education, primary schools, and all types of secondary schools. Appropriate teaching plans and programs were prepared, printed, and distributed. On the basis of these, 52 new textbooks for primary and secondary schools have been published, 1.5 million copies in total. These teaching plans and programs, as well as textbooks have also been sent to the countries in which there is a large number of our refugees.

We have also carried out partial repair on school buildings in order to secure minimum conditions for schools to function. In addition, in October last year, tenders were invited for the publishing of 250 other textbooks. This is under way.

Cultural life is one of the phenomena of this war. A large number of exhibitions, concerts, and presentations of literary and drama works have been organized. Many of our artists have promoted cultural achievement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and received major prizes abroad, that is international recognition.

In the media, certain results are also evident. Despite the extremely difficult conditions, a large number of new daily papers and periodicals have emerge. So have radio and even television stations of local and wider importance and influence. This confirms our commitment to developing the freedom of the media as one of the basic postulates of democracy, despite the state of war. In this context, we (?consciously) stress the fact that we have not introduced state censorship, even though there have been suggestions and arguments for such a move. One should nevertheless say that there are some tendencies to put the media under control according to the taste and standards of certain circles, most often informal and yet powerful and influential circles.

Some circumstances suit these trends. The majority of the media are not able to finance themselves in the war conditions. The donators and [word indistinct] often ask for something in return for the aid that they have given. The possibility of similar manipulations is not ruled out concerning the distribution of electricity, staff, and so forth. In the period ahead we must rapidly work on systemic solutions that will confer a certain status on the media and reduce room for pressure and abuse.

The freedom of public speech is an essential condition for democracy. A democratic atmosphere, on the other hand, is indispensable also for the functioning of the economic system the foundations of which we are currently setting.

It goes without saying that the basic aims of the program of measures and activities in the sphere of economic policy in 1995 should be to ensure basic living conditions for the population and to strengthen the country's defense capability. In order to reach these aims, it is necessary to increase the primary production of food, to increase industrial production, and to ensure necessary power.

Directly connected to the realization of this (?aim) is the realization of the already mentioned program of humanitarian production and encouraging economic activities. (?As regards) the defense of the country, one of the priority tasks is further to encourage the arms and military equipment industries.

For all this, one would have to ensure financial resources. The repair of mines and power plants will be done mainly from the budget, while as regards the realization of the humanitarian production program and the encouragement of economic operations, we expect the economic aid offered by friendly countries actually to be delivered. In this way, we expect the substantial volume of production in 1995 not only to maintain the level it had in 1994, but to increase noticeably. There are realistic (?prerequisites) for that. With such a volume, the most important aims that we have mentioned here would be reached.

However, the starting [word indistinct] in realizing the planned aims is to ensure energy, that is, energy sources. Nothing can be done without that. In order to realize the production of electricity on the territory of the Federation totalling 4,050 Gw that is, on the territory controlled by [word indistinct] totalling [word indistinct] Gw it will be necessary to bring the electrical power system into a unified whole.

Apart from repairing mines and [word indistinct] capacities [word indistinct] thermoelectric and hydroelectric power plants, one should also repair power lines. [words indistinct] economic activities under existing conditions, the establishment of road and railroad traffic, as well as [word indistinct] communications and communications [word indistinct] belongs to basic prerequisites.

An equally important [word indistinct] is to declare the B-H dinar as the legal tender over the entire territory of (?the republic). By distributing all foreign exchange inflow through the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one would ensure the stability of the B-H dinar exchange rate, the collecting of our enterprises' assets abroad, and deferring the servicing of our debts abroad. As regards the sphere of public revenue, we must clearly establish problems and deficiencies in the existing taxation system and ensure a corresponding control of commodity and financial currents.

Only with our [word indistinct] increasing the volume of production, is it possible to increase the volume of revenue, to increase motivation for work, and open room for the development of entrepreneurship. Without this, we cannot overcome accumulated problems in realizing public revenue and public expenditure, balance commodity funds and purchase funds, and exert efficient influence on (?global) reproduction currents.

Therefore, the government decided to take decisive steps in controlling and collecting revenue, equalizing taxation rates and unified prices, particularly in the case of high-tariff products.

Starting from these orientations, a group of laws pertaining to the taxation system was drafted and submitted to the Republic and Federation assemblies to be adopted. Solutions proposed by these laws result from the above-mentioned orientations. They basically regard regulating sales tax for [word indistinct] products, ensuring efficient tax collection, regulating distribution of revenue between the republic and the districts, additional taxation of trade with certain products, and the like.

As is known, the government already performed significant activities on drafting laws. In 1995, we are to build the economic system through additional legal regulations. Among these activities is the planned project of privatizing social property, in which case, as you can see, one should adopt more than 20 laws and ordinances.

Therefore, I have listed here only some of the basic aims and tasks, not neglecting other, equally important ones. Here I mean above all the problem of the return of refugees, improving social protection of the families of fighters killed in war, military and civilian war disabled, pensioners, and all other categories that the state must care for.

Esteemed deputies, the program of economic policy measures that the government has defined for 1995 is very ambitious considering the war conditions. On several occasions the government carried out evaluations of how realistic the program on the whole or some of its segments are. In our opinion, the aims that we have set are nevertheless accessible and the program is feasible.

It goes without saying that economic policy this year is conditioned by the military, political, economic, and social situation in the country. Therefore, the scope and intensity of the government's activity in organizing economic currents will to a great extent depend on the development of this situation. This is what one must constantly keep in mind.

The realization of the goals set will above all depend on whether the peace process will take a positive direction, or whether we will be forced to continue the war of defense against aggression. It is also of decisive importance to see the direction and dynamism in which the Washington Agreement will be realized, that is, whether the Federation will begin to function at all levels of organization this year.

With its engagement to date in the peace process and in the realization of the Washington Agreement, the government has demonstrated and confirmed its readiness for constructive activity. It will be the same in the coming period as well. We can appraise the future development of events and influence these events, but we must not exclude even those variants we desire the least, because in such conditions any omission can cost us dearly.

It is exactly for these reasons that the government decided in favor of a flexible concept of economic policy that enables swift reaction to changes and prompt correction of goals and measures. We made a particular effort to make this program be stimulating and adjustable to the process of establishing the Federation. We were very careful in choosing goals and measures and tried not to obstruct integrational currents in any way. I am sure that we shall retain that attitude in realizing this program as well.

Finally, I must say that there are some significant questions for which we are still seeking adequate answers. Namely, conditions that the aggression imposed on us are essentially limiting the possibility of finding optimum solutions. This is particularly the case with wages. Wages [words indistinct] distribution of able-bodied population between the needs of the Armed Forces and the needs of the economy, the ratio between investing in special purpose and other kinds of production, as [word indistinct] not enough. There is also the issue of the territorial organization of authority in the interim period until cantons are established, as well as some other equally complex issues. There are alternative solutions for all these issues, but the choice is very difficult as any answer bears considerably negative consequences.

Some of the possible [word indistinct] are of such a nature that they exceed the government's constitutional powers. This is one of the reasons that we are submitting to the assembly a program that the government itself should be endorsing. Therefore, we are asking you for support. We are also holding consultations with the republican presidency. The debate we expect to be held will enable the government to reexamine and possibly redefine some of the prerequisites in the economic policy for 1995 and to establish the scope within which the government may act. This is why I am addressing this parliament in the role of prime minister and asking for support for the program of economic policy measures this year, albeit at the same time expecting a (?critical) evaluation of the program, as well as new [word indistinct] proposals, reckoning that we are united regarding the [words indistinct] regarding the basic goals, and above all [words indistinct] that this assembly has established and in ensuring conditions for the survival of the population that the aggression has brought to the brink of survival. I hope that (?you will) extend that support to us. Thank you very much.

Army Criticizes Serbs For Not Honoring Agreement

AU1901201795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Under the mediation of General Briquemont, chief of the General Staff of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the representatives of the Army and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the representatives of the Serbian aggressor have today continued talks at Sarajevo Airport on the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities that was reached on 31 December last year and the documents for the implementation of certain tasks agreed on 11 January 1995.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was represented by Brigadier Gen. Enver Hadzihasanovic, chief of the General Staff, and Brigadier Generals Mustafa Hajrulahovic and Vahid Karavelic. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was represented by Amir Hadziomeragic, deputy minister in charge of relations with the United Nations.

At the beginning of the talks, the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state and military bodies demanded an analysis of how the documents of 11 January this year had been implemented, especially the binding provisions, and on the basis of that analysis to establish whether there had been any progress. They pointed out that the Serbian aggressor was not honoring the obligations that it had assumed with the signing of the agreement, it was refusing to halt combat activitues in the Bihac region, and it was obstructing the opening of the blue routes.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army representatives also noted that the meeting between UNPROFOR and the chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian aggressor had not taken place. The aim of the meeting was to appoint liaison officers, establish points where lines could be crossed, points of separation, and the method of work of the regional mixed commission, which, according to the agreement, was UNPROFOR's duty. This would have created the mechanism for the implementation of the agreement on ending the hostilities.

At the same time, the representatives of the Army and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina pointed out that the plan for implementing the agreement on the cessation of hostilities could go ahead according to schedule if the implementation of the agreement were regularly monitored. For instance, the blue routes should have been opened by 14 January at the latest, but they remain closed and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina has still not started. It was concluded that as regards the obligations in the military domain, the provision on the demilitarization zone of Mt. Igman had been fully complied with. But the evacuation of the wounded and sick has not started, nor has the exchange of prisoners, the bodies of the killed, or information on missing persons.

The current situation concerning the implementation of the cease-fire agreement shows that further talks make no sense unless the already defined obligations are carried out. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is ready to implement the agreement, provided that the schedule for this is strictly respected.

The date for the next round of talks will be decided on later. This was stated by the Press Center of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Muslims Fail To Attend Sarajevo Airport Meeting

LD1901192595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1747 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 19 Jan (SRNA)—A meeting of the Central Commission for the Implementation of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was not held in Sarajevo Airport today because the Muslim side failed to turn up, a SRNA airport correspondent has reported.

Although all sides agreed in principle to attend the meeting today, and Muslim representatives even came to the airport, they did not attend the meeting, on the grounds that there are still problems in connection with the opening of blue routes.

After the Muslim delegation failed to attend, the Croat representatives also refused to continue negotiations; they made the resumption of negotiations conditional on a cease-fire in the regions of Livno, Grahovo, and Glamoc.

Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero, head of the Srpska republic delegation to the negotiations today, said such behavior by the Croat and Muslim delegations amounted to "obstruction of the implementation of the peace agreement."

"The Serb delegation came to the meeting fully prepared, with maps on which separation lines, observation points, and places where UN troops are to be interposed should have been determined," Gen. Gvero told SRNA.

After the obstruction by Croat and Muslim representatives and their failure to attend the meeting, the Serb delegation had talks with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] about future cooperation.

The Serb delegation was made up of Gen. Milan Gvero and Major General Zdravko Tolimir, assistant commander of the Srpska republic army. [passage omitted]

UN Reports Heavy Clashes Around Velika Kladusa

AU1901154895 Paris AFP in English 1524 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 19 (AFP)—Heavy fighting erupted Thursday [19 January] around the northwestern Bosnian town of Velika Kladusa, where United Nations monitors recorded 436 detonations and intense small arms fire.

UN spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon described the clashes, which began Thursday morning, as a "significant increase in military activity" east and southeast of the town. [passage omitted]

Another UN spokesman, Paul Risley, earlier in the day said Croatian Serbs were moving heavy weapons south from Velika Kladusa toward the confrontation lines.

Reports of Truce Violations

AU2001122595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, in the theater of operations of the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Headquarters of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] for Bihac, the joint aggressors are intensively violating the agreement on the cease-fire and the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and they using all kinds of weapons to do so. Around the protected zone of Bihac, which was twice exposed to the enemy's operations antiaircraft-gun fire on [word indistinct] town regions, defense lines held by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO have been exposed to fire from 82-mm and 120-mm mortars [words indistinct] and (Vedro Polje) as well as to [word indistinct] fire [passage indistinct].

Martic's chetniks and Fikret Abdic's gang have been attacking the 5th Corps' defense lines for days, particularly those in the Johovica region, where they attempted two breakthrough the defense lines twice, but were met with our fighters' fierce resistance [words indistinct] withdraw to original positions. The cease-fire agreement has been violated on the Bosanska Krupa and Bosanska Otoka fronts, as well as the Grmusko-Srbljanski Plateau and the Grabez Height. Fire from the enemy's mortars, [word indistinct], and small-arms fire have been registered on these sections of the front.

POW Exchange Delayed, Serbs Celebrate Holiday

AU1901200395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Even though it signed an agreement on 12 January this year, which was confirmed in the presence of International Red Cross officials on several occasions and was definitely endorsed on 16 January, the [Serbian] aggressor has again shown no readiness today to carry out the agreed exchange of 50 soldiers.

The aggressor's representatives explained today's failure to exchange prisoners with the fact that it was a Serbian holiday and a non-working day. The state commission found this view absolutely unacceptable. The families of captured aggressor's men should ask themselves who the people in the aggressor's commission are when they celebrate holidays instead of representing their interests.

Despite the aggressor's obstructions, the state commission will persevere in its efforts to carry through what was agreed and signed on 31 December 1994. The representatives of the International Red Cross and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] are expected to use every possible instrument of pressure to force the aggressor finally to do what they promised.

This was stated in a communique of the State Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War.

Efforts For Warring Sides To Honor Cease-Fire

AU1901142695 Paris AFP in English 1342 GMT 19 Jan 95

[by Nathaniel Harrison]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 19 (AFP)—Senior UN officers on Thursday will mount another effort to get Bosnian Government and Serb counterparts to honor the details of a ceasefire their political leaders signed on New Year's eve.

Dutch General Jan Willem Brinkman, UN chief of staff in Bosnia, will confer at Sarajevo Airport with senior military officers from the warring sides to discuss the planned separation of forces as called for in their four-month cessation of hostilities accord, UN spokesman Paul Risley announced.

UN officials had earlier said the gathering would take place at the highest military level, with the participation of UN Bosnia commander General Michael Rose and the Bosnian Government and Serb commanders-in-chief. The UN spokesman did not immediately explain the change in the level of representation.

While the talks will deal with observation posts and checkpoints along confrontation lines, UN sources said other difficulties—notably a disputed demilitarized zone above Sarajevo—were also likely to be raised.

The meeting comes as the UN-brokered truce accord is under severe strain, with both warring armies having recently advanced their positions in two different sectors of the war.

Government troops outside Bihac in the northwest seized two villages last week, while Serbs have encroached on a UN-designated Moslem safe area in Srebrenica, in the east, according to the UN.

Retaliatory Serb shelling into Bihac town last weekend killed seven people while here in Sarajevo a youth was shot and wounded Tuesday by sniper fire, which according to the United Nations appeared to come from Serb lines.

Elsewhere in the Bihac pocket the Government Army is battling dissident Moslems and rebel Serbs from neighboring Croatia. The latter two parties are not signatories to the four-month truce and UN negotiators have made little headway persuading them to at least respect the spirit of the accord.

UN military sources reported early Thursday that more than 100 detonations had been recorded in the Bihac region in the previous 24 hours. Risley in addition said Croatian Serbs were continuing to move heavy weapons from Velika Kladusa, in the north of the pocket, south toward the confrontation line.

In Sarajevo, UN officials have been hampered by delays in a Bosnian Army pullout from a demilitarized zone on Mount Igman and the failure of the parties to agree on reopening critical supply and escape routes for this war-weary capital. UN inspection teams on Tuesday determined that mainly Moslem Bosnian troops had left the zone—in compliance with the cease-fire but nearly two weeks after they had pledged to evacuate the sector.

The United Nations tried to arrange a reconnaissance flight on Wednesday with officers from both sides, in a bid to verify to everyone's satisfaction that the DMZ was clear. But the mission had to be cancelled when the Serbs demanded that positions outside the zone also be inspected.

Of more immediate concern to the people of Sarajevo is the lingering conflict over the type of humanitarian traffic to be allowed on roads running south of here that link the capital to the outside world.

The routes, closed since July, were to be reopened under the ceasefire. But while the Serbs are insisting that use be restricted to eight UN-related agencies, the government is demanding authorization for commercial trucks carrying food and other essential items.

Rose, whose one-year mandate here ends on January 24, has characterized such snags as "minor problems" when compared to the violence that prevailed before the truce. He described them as "the consequences of the new security environment," but noted: "Before, the problems we faced were people being killed in large numbers and trying to get aid through to people who hadn't got it."

Karadzic: Serbs To Unite Despite World's Fears

AU1901185595 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Serbs and Americans Are Stopping War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic has assessed that "the introduction of former U.S. President Carter into the peace process represents the greatest diplomatic breakthrough for the Srpska republic."

"In this entire war only two sides have been making the decisions—the Serbs and the Americans," the SRNA agency reports. "A solution could not be found because of the lack of contact between the Serbs and the Americans, but a solution to the Bosnian crisis can be expected now that Carter has entered the peace process," the president of the Srpska republic has stated.

Dr. Karadzic assessed the sanctions introduced by the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] against the Srpska republic as "catastrophic for both the Srpska republic and the FRY," and expressed his hope that they would be lifted sometime in January.

"Carter promised that he would seek their lifting, and send a letter to the Yugoslav Government, because we agreed to rejoin the negotiations on the basis of the agreement with him," Dr. Karadzic has said.

The Srpska republic president stressed that "the Serbian lands will unite despite the various obstructions to this, particularly from the international community," which—according to him—"fears a stable and strong Serbian state in the Balkans."

"I do not see any internal barriers to unification," Radovan Karadzic said, adding that "the ideological differences cannot be a reason for not unifying or for possible misunderstandings among the leaderships of the Serbian lands."

Krajisnik: Contact Group Shows Understanding

LD1601231595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2212 GMT 16 Jan 95

[Received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 16 Jan (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president [speaker] of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic [RS] said today that nobody in the RS leadership "will ever give up the idea of a Serb Sarajevo, and that swapping any of its part for Muslim enclaves is out of the question."

Addressing Ilijas [Serb-controlled Sarajevo suburb] municipal assembly deputies, Krajisnik specified that Ilijas, Vogosca, and other northwestern parts of the city would remain Serb and added that "there has been an obvious shift in the Contact Group's mood in relation to the resolution of this issue."

"The members of the Contact Group—especially the American representative—are showing growing understanding for our arguments concerning the status of Sarajevo, and I believe we will soon have a solution acceptable to all the interested parties," Krajisnik concluded.

Croat Official: 'Republic No Longer Exists'

AU1801134695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 95 p 8

[Interview with Ivan Bender, chairman of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, by Jozo Pavkovic; place and date not given: "The Federal Constitution Is Clear!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The crisis in establishing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation culminated at the last Constituent Assembly session, held three weeks ago in Zenica. The Croats and Muslims did not manage to agree on the choice of president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. We asked Ivan Bender, chairman of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna and president of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Club of Representatives, whether this and other issues would be resolved at the next session, which is to be held in Sarajevo on 16 January.

[Bender] We, the Croats, will have coordinated our positions by then. We will try to do the same with the Muslim side. On Thursday, there will be a meeting of the representatives of the HDZ and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]. I hope that at the next assembly session, the agenda of which will be the same as the last one in Zenica, we will find just solutions.

[Pavkovic] Does that mean there could be compromises on disputable issues?

[Bender] It is necessary to abide by the Constitution, which says everything. As far as the election of the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is concerned, it was arranged that he be a Croat in the transitory period. Since almost nothing has been done in the anticipated six months of this period, both the transitory period and President Zubak's mandate will be extended.

If the Muslims want to raise that issue again, we will not be completely inflexible. There is a possibility that we will demand the position of prime minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. At any rate, a Croat must be at one of the leading positions. We will not give up on that, and there can be no compromise on that.

Candidates for Ambassadors

[Pavkovic] Are the Croats interested in the head positions at the level of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina too?

[Bender] We undertook to build the Federation. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is only a fiction, although the Muslim leaders want to place the Republic above the federation. However, the reactions there are clear. Only federal bodies are competent on the territory of the Federation, not the republican ones. We are therefore less interested in the positions at the level of the Republic.

[Pavkovic] What are you going to do to improve the personnel structure in Sarajevo? There are few Croats in the federal bodies, and almost none in the consulates and embassies.

[Bender] Yes, there is not a single candidate nominated by the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the consulates and embassies. We are just preparing the list of candidates for the positions of ambassadors and other diplomatic positions. They will be federal ambassadors, regardless of the fact that the federation is not an internationally recognized entity. If the Muslims create obstructions there, we will ask the international community, which created the federation, to help, on the basis of facts, by judging who it is that obstructs the implementation of the Washington Agreement.

[Pavkovic] Among other things, it is noticeable that the Croat representatives in the Constituent Assembly are reluctant to attend its sessions.

[Bender] I must admit that there were only 16 of us in Zenica. There were many subjective and objective problems, especially since it was not known where the session would be held. This time, apart from the representatives, the Assembly session will be attended by a delegation of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Herceg-Bosna.

Herceg-Bosna as Guarantor

[Pavkovic] Are you satisfied with the work of the Chamber of Representatives of Herceg-Bosna?

[Bender] We are going to try to improve the situation regarding the operation of the Chamber by including new experts in its bodies, which will help our Chamber of Representatives to perform all the jobs it has to do as the highest legislative and representative body of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

[Pavkovic] Lately, there have been many accusations that the Croats, and the Herzegovinian ones in particular, do not support the implementation of the Washington Agreement.

[Pavkovic] None of us is against the Federation as agreed upon in Washington. However, the Muslim leadership wants to renew the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the help of the Federation. This republic no longer exists, and I hope it will not exist as we knew it. The Federation Government has not adopted a single law on local self-management that the representatives in the Assembly could decide upon. This means that the work of the Federation Government and all its bodies is blocked in the most direct way. I am against the federation as wished and conceived by the Muslims. There will be no such federation! We want a federation leading in the other direction, toward confederation with the Republic of Croatia. I hope there will be no problems in that sense.

[Pavkovic] What if there are?

[Bender] This time, we have several options. There should be no problems regarding the confederation with Croatia, because Croatia also cannot survive within the present borders without the territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina that belong to the Croats and Muslims.

[Pavkovic] What is the future of Herceg-Bosna?

[Bender] The only guarantor of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Our firm organization will not only guarantee our existence, but also advise the Serbs and Muslims that we have everything we need. Moreover, everyone will appreciate us insofar as we are strong and unified. We must not allow ourselves to be divided on any basis. We need unity now more than we ever have.

We Do Not Want To Be Part of Someone Else's Country

[Pavkovic] How do you see the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bender] Three civilizations are in conflict in it, and there will certainly be great problems in coordinating the situation. I am sure that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not survive in its earlier form. There will be divisions, and how this will be implemented will be up to the three peoples living in it, and to the combination of international interests. If Bosnia-Herzegovina survives, which I do not believe in very much, then it could survive as a loose union, in which one part will become part of "Greater Serbia," while the other will connect confederally with the Republic of Croatia.

[Pavkovic] The Muslims will not accept this?

[Bender] They want to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina within the existing borders at all costs. We know that this state no longer exists, because the Serbs broke it. If the Muslims do not manage to preserve the integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, they will try to organize their own Islamic-type state at the territory under the control of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Naturally, the Croats will not allow that. We no longer want to live in someone else's country. It is therefore necessary to establish a strong Herceg-Bosna that will be a constituent part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. If the Croats and Muslims are well organized, then there should be no doubts about its establishment. This is why Herceg-Bosna will stay after the federation is established, since the Federation consists of two parts, the Croat part of which is called Herceg-Bosna.

I would also like to point out that, at this moment, there are no possibilities of dissolving Herceg-Bosna before some new form that will guarantee the Croats' existence is established.

[Box, page 8]

Personnel Changes

During this period, we will work more on mending the personnel structure in Herceg-Bosna. The HDZ has brought this up, and there will therefore be certain changes in the Chamber of Representatives, the government, and the Presidential Council of Herceg-Bosna, too. I believe that we will appoint the best people, who will be able to implement the HDZ policies.

Izetbegovic Looks Back on Causes of War

AU1701202595 Sarajevo LJILJAN (Ljubljana Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 14-21 Dec 94 pp 4-6

[Interview with President Alija Izetbegovic by Dzemaludin Latic and Selim Arnaut; place and date not given: "Thousands of People Carry Our Flag, and Will Continue to Do So"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [LJILJAN] Mr. President, the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is today linked to the latest peace solution proposed by the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Judging from the latest Serbian offensive against Bihac and the political goals behind it, the end of the war is far away from Bosnia again. Has the offensive against Bihac buried the last illusions about an early end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] That is the first impression that prevails. However, any war and this one in particular is full of unexpected twists. Sometimes it is precisely escalation that clears the way toward a solution, that speeds up the making of decisions. Now the decisive thing is to endure in Bihac, where we are being attacked from all sides. It is real tussle, one that has already lasted for 40 days. They have forced us into exhausting fighting. We are now concentrating on helping the 5th Corps as much as we are able to. And we are doing this. At the moment, as you see, we are more preoccupied with the questions of war than peace. But this sequence of priorities has been forced upon us.

[LJILJAN] In the three years of aggression the Serbs have not fulfilled their Greater Serbian project in Bosnia, as is the case with Croatia, from where it was possible to transfer the war to Bosnia-Herzegovina after the bloodbath there. The current war situation in Bosnia suggests a new vigor on the part of the Serbian aggressor. Do you think that the Bosnian war threatens to spread further across the Balkans?

[Izetbegovic] I do not think so. The great powers, however indecisive about extinguishing the war in Bosnia, are decisive when it comes to prevent it spilling over the borders of our country. I think this is just about the only thing about which they are decisive and unanimous. Behind this attitude of theirs there is a philosophy quite unfavorable toward us.

[LJILJAN] The Bosnian war's victims are a great national tragedy, a heavy burden but great motive. When thinking about the onset of the aggression, the prewar climate in Bosnia with regard to political events, and the first clashes, you are frequently accused of failing to consider other solutions or to recognize some other possibilities. Even today in the Bosnian public there exist different political variations of the so-called Yugoslav option, the theory about a so-called historic agreement, or that we should have attacked the so-called Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] first, that we should not have started a war against the JNA, that you failed to arm the people, that (today) the war should be brought to an end.... What is your response to these accusations?

[Izetbegovic] In your question there are many subquestions. I shall answer them one by one.

First, Yugoslavia was not able to survive as it was for two basic reasons: Because of its political model, which had experienced a historic defeat throughout the world, and because of the Serbian hegemony that, so to speak, was genetically built into that state from the very beginning. That is to say, Yugoslavia had to be thoroughly reconstructed and our people and the entire world know how hard I and my political aides tried to reach an agreement on such a reconstruction. However, two crucial men at those negotiations were not people who could reach an agreement on anything at all. All the time they were pushing in entirely opposite directions until everything collapsed.

Second, the majority of our people were against any historic agreement. They were ready to stay in Yugoslavia, but not in a rump Yugoslavia, which means just with Serbia and Montenegro.

Third, we were not ready to attack the JNA. We had been postponing the war for 10 months, and only when it was imposed on us did we take up arms. In history one cannot experiment. There are no rehearsals or repeats. If we had attacked the JNA and suffered defeat, our people could have said that we had dragged them into an adventure and they would have been right.

Fourth, they say that two people are needed for peace, while for war even a single person will do. I refer thereby to choice. Imagine you are walking down the street with your wife and children, and some hooligans attack you. If you are a man of honor, you have no other choice but to defend your family, even though you are weaker and will be beaten up. That is the situation that we were in.

Fifth, the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] held a large meeting of responsible people from throughout Bosnia on 10 June 1991, that is, on the eve of the war in Slovenia and Croatia, and 10 months before the war in Bosnia. At that meeting the Council of National Defense was formed. That was the famous meeting in the Police Hall in Sarajevo. The Council managed the activities of the Patriotic League and preparations among the people for defense, including its arming. If there had not been such activities, Bosnia would have fallen silently, whereas now the thunder of our resistance can be heard all the way up to the skies.

Sixth, how to terminate the war? One cannot terminate the war as simply as that, except by surrender. And we do not want or have any reason to surrender. You know how much effort we have made so far to accomplish a just peace; I think that it is well-known throughout the world. We have accepted all the peace proposals so far. The Serbs have regularly rejected them. There is a limit beyond which we cannot and will not go.

[LJILJAN] Throughout the war Bosnia-Herzegovina has been caught between Serbian and Croatian jaws and endangered by both the Serbian and Croatian greater national projects, as much for its territory as for its culture, religion, national being, and state. The Croatian attitude toward Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniaks has passed through different phases and today it is shaped as the Bosniak-Croatian Federation. In these three years of negotiations Bosnia has frequently had to choose the lesser evil. This may be the case with the Federation. We would like to hear your opinion on this Bosniak-Croatian project, whose implementation in the free territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina is causing great contradictions. How far has it gone? Will it succeed? On whom does it depend? What is to be done with the Serbs, those in the Federation and outside it?

[Izetbegovic] The Federation agreement has actually been reduced to a peace agreement between the Bosniaks and the Croats. That is the only thing accomplished. Of course, alongside the cessation of clashes there came the opening of communications, which is of vital importance for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everything else is in stagnation or is moving forward somewhat slowly. We unconditionally support the implementation of the Federal Constitution. On the Croatian side there are influential people and groups who are against it, because of a strange mixture of convictions and interests. In several days in Zenica the Federation and Republic Assemblies will convene. I would rather not make any forecasts. We shall see what is achieved. Nevertheless, even if the end to the bloody conflict between the Bosniaks and the Croats were the only thing achieved by the agreement on the Federation, it would have been worth our efforts. Moreover, it opens up many other possibilities that have not been exploited so far, but nothing is lost yet.

[LJILJAN] Let us continue this topic by reviewing the plans for the confederation, which is in linguistic terms a euphemism for a Serb-Croat partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today those demands for confederation are being given an additional impulse by the open international support. Bosnia, situated between Serbia and Croatia, is at one moment a matter of dispute between them, the next moment a motive for partnership. What is the Bosniak political attitude toward the demands for confederation, the various conditions and blackmail?

[Izetbegovic] As for the relationship with Croatia, the confederation is in the phase of preliminary contract, which is a little more than a letter of intent. I think that this is a question for the future, and according to both ours and the Croatian Constitution, popular acceptance through a referendum is necessary for the establishment of a confederation, and I do not see that it will be possible to hold such referenda in the near future. As far as I know, the Croatian public, however supportive of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is quite ill-disposed toward the idea of a confederation. Such is my knowledge of the issue.

This other confederation I do not want to talk about, because Serbia is the aggressor. We have had certain problems with Croatia as well, but we are overcoming them or shall overcome them. With the Serbian side this will be a long, very long process. [passage omitted]

[LJILJAN] In analyzing the Bosnian war crisis, the domestic and foreign media quite often imply that there is an international conspiracy against the Bosniaks, which can be explained by antiIslamic interests. Is this all about political paranoia or are there any realistic contours of that conspiracy, and if so, what is the answer to it? Could it be radicalism, the lack of which is considered to be a great shortcoming in all-out efforts to settle the Bosnian war?

[Izetbegovic] I cannot confirm that there is any active conspiracy against Bosnia and its people, but a sort of passive conspiracy is almost obvious. Which is to say, there is a conspiracy of inaction, passivity, and a reluctance to take measures which would be normally taken. The international institutions, if they think, then they do so in a confused way; if they act at all, then they act as if they were spellbound. Something is paralyzing them. One thing is certain: If it had not been about a Muslim nation, if the issue had been about a Christian nation, both Europe and America would have shown a greater degree of resolve.

However, we must not exclude the moral weakness of the Western world, being the result of comfortable living, wealth, and enjoyment. Those countries are not ready to take a risk and die for truth and justice. Wealth and ideals, as a rule, do not go together. Through history one and the same story repeats itself: Nations that were ready to die win over the nations that were not ready to. The latter were customarily richer and ostensibly stronger. I say ostensibly, because strength and weakness are to be found in people's hearts.

As for radicalism, if we have the same thing in mind, it would not lead anywhere in our case. Bosnia is at the crossroad of worlds, and in addition, it is surrounded on all sides. In such a geopolitical position, in such a situation, radicalism would lead to isolation. Challenge and response would not be in proportion, so radicalism would boil down to verbiage and slogans. And finally, is not our armed resistance a radical enough answer? Compare it with the ethnic Albanians' passive resistance in Kosovo and you will understand the difference.

[LJILJAN] Is a pan-Islamic idea possible? Where is a harbor for Bosniaks to be found if Europe's inimical attitude proves to be true, inspired by the simple fact that Bosniaks are Muslims?

[Izetbegovic] The war in Bosnia, being obviously a war against the Bosnian Muslims, has induced significant processes in the Islamic world. It is a motley and rather inert world. It is difficult to activate that huge mass that is divided by different ideas, influences and interests, and turn it in one direction. But the process is under way, and Bosnia, or rather the suffering of Bosnia, is a catalyst of that process. [passage omitted]

Silajdzic Views Nation's Right to Independence

AU1701203095 Sarajevo LJILJAN (Ljubljana Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 14-21 Dec 94 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Hadzem Hajdarevic and Mustafa Spahic: place and date not given: "Bosnia Is Always a Step Ahead of the Enemy's Plans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [passage omitted] [LJILJAN] As a former foreign minister and currently prime minister, you have been in direct contact with those who should be far more concerned with the Bosnian drama than they are. We would like to hear from you firsthand information about the practice of international disregard, pretenses, and indifference that is becoming a more and more open complicity in the bestial fascist aggression against our state.

[Silajdzic] The fact is that before the recognition of Bosnia, Badenter's commission was formed, and that quite openly told us that we had a right to independence. In all this truth is a very powerful weapon. It is sometimes quite difficult to explain the truth—for instance, the genocide in Bosnia. For many people it is a TV series. By their very nature, people ignore what disturbs or bothers them. We used the truth as much as we were able to. However, people were interested in what kind of country we should be, what path we should tread, whether communism would be restored, whether we should be a democratic country, and so forth. Of course, our argument was that Bosnia is in itself a pluralistic country and that justice and democracy are inherent in its being. If there exists a society with inborn democracy, it is the Bosnian society. In order to obtain recognition for Bosnia, we had to go begging from house to house. I sometimes happened to be visiting three European capitals in one day. Then there was the introductory phase, because you would not believe how many educated people are ignorant of basic geographical terms. After that, we were expected to state what we wanted. At the end of that journey, before the EC recognized us, I was in Luxembourg with EC Chairman Pose for a whole day. As you know, Luxembourg, like Bosnia, is a small country surrounded by other countries. A particular mentality developed in these two civilizations and cultures. In Bosnia there is the democratic determination to be independent because there exists the danger of Greater Serbia. People are ready to die, but they do not want to live in Greater Serbia. What is offered by the so-called Yugoslavia is Greater Serbia. A greater, firmer, more compact one, where in our conviction there is no place for non-Serbs. We are a country with a thousand year-long tradition. We are Bosnia. We are known as such, people refer to us as such, and for a thousand years we have been denoted as such. We simply want to be independent. Our determination is to have a democratic republic, a market economy, human rights, freedoms, and so forth. I told this to Pose, and he had nothing to add. He told me he would see what he could do. Together with [Hans Dietrich] Genscher and some other politicians, he was one of those who insisted on the recognition of Bosnia as an independent state. "Why are you not happy with the recognition of Bosnia?" Mirko Klarin asked me. "I cannot be happy because I have heard some news from the country that a horrible massacre is being prepared, and it is already happening in Bijeljina," I told him. However, I think that I experienced the real recognition in a symbolic way on 14 April, when I met James Baker, the then U.S. secretary of state, a brilliant politician. At his office entrance, I saw the American flag on one side and the Bosnian flag on the opposite side. I knew then that the United States and the entire world, except for unrecognized Yugoslavia, recognized Bosnia and its flag with lilies. This was the first time that a representative of the new-old independent Bosnian state had addressed them. Baker stood next to me. It was the first public performance that, as early as then, was in a way critical about the attitude of the international community toward the newborn state. I spoke about the massacre in Bijeljina. Then Baker asked me what he could do. We agreed that a message should be sent—military aircraft.

[LJILJAN] Since the events in Bijeljina up until today, things have not changed considerably. There was a massacre in Bijeljina, while today Bihac is under attack. How are we supposed to organize ourselves in a more mobile way to resist fascism and reconstruct the country, even under the most difficult conditions?

[Silajdzic] It is very difficult to improve the interior organization because a lack of communication, events, ghettoization, and so forth have pushed us into a corner and because communication of a particular kind has been established. It is frequently horizontal rather than vertical, as they should normally be. Unfortunately, it suits some people, who are trying to maintain such a system, which can be called a system of concentric circles, which communicate among themselves, and are quite often characterized by private connections. This is what we are trying to suppress, and to make a system, because without a system there is no state.

[LJILJAN] What more can the Bosnian leadership do to make life a little better?

[Silajdzic] The Army is our priority. It is our duty. Problems come about alongside with discrepancies. There are people who do not want to comply with any system, while at the same time they want to have a state. These two things are not independent of each other. With regard to the previous question, I have to add that it was very difficult to pass our demand through the United Nations bureaucracy and procedures. We had to find a way to the secretary general by various means in order to make possible our recognition by UN member states simultaneously with the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. We submitted the demand for recognition somewhat later than these two countries, but we were admitted into the United Nations on the same day thanks to our friends. That was a great success. We fought against the Yugoslav diplomats who used their connections and contacts in the United Nations to hinder our recognition. Not only them, but also their friends and supporters were against it. If Bosnia had not been recognized, Greater Serbia would have been internationally legalized. That is not possible today because we are a legally, internationally recognized state within its borders. This has been certified. No matter whether someone likes it or not, it is a fact. The Baltic countries waited 50 years to free themselves. I do not know how long we will wait, but everyone should know, particularly our enemies, that we have gone a step ahead of their plans. I faced objective problems many times in my job. I also met with Yugoslav Serbian diplomats, and for me that was a normal struggle against the enemy, which is an objective fact. I often made reservations for a destination, while actually travelling to some other destination. I often slept at airports. This is all the result of some objective facts. However, what I dislike in this job are the subjective problems, fabrications, vanities, petty interests, inconsiderate behavior on the part of some individuals, and dissipation of strength on unimportant matters.

[LJILJAN] There are attempts aimed at causing an inter-Bosniak breach, say, between President Izetbegovic and you, the prime minister?

[Silajdzic] Yes. It appears that for some of our people, the most important thing in this war is to sow dissension. Such is their contribution to our struggle. I simply do not understand their behavior when chetniks are standing some 400-500 meters away from us. Everything else is secondary in comparison with that problem. We have to make a state, organize our defense, rescue ourselves, defend our people and the state, and only then all those who feel the need to state their opinion of certain things should do so. I can understand more intensive partisan activities, but we are under attack now! Right now the main policy is our defense.

[LJILJAN] Still, the existing policy, particularly within the frame of the Bosniak-Croatian Federation, is felt to be the promotion of a partisan policy in the first place. We could recall the political organizing of Bosniaks four or five years ago, as well as our behavior at the time. Your leaving the Executive Board of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] was interpreted many ways....

[Silajdzic] For me, the partisan struggle was important at the beginning. At the time, we struggled to overthrow communism. As for myself, I have always been in the party of my people, no matter how it is called. I became a member of that party by my very birth. It may be called this or that. It is the party of Bosnia, of my people. Therefore, I have never thought it necessary to particularly emphasize that. It has never occurred to me that I should be a member of any other party. That was out of the question. Sometimes I dislike overstated rhetorics that remind me of a partisan syndrome. Perhaps it is necessary, but I do not know whether it is good. One should be moderate in everything.

[LJILJAN] When speaking of moderateness, we would like to review the attitudes of any party or political stream toward the government.... We would like you to draw your own line between loyalty and servility. People whose aspirations are higher than their real capabilities are prone to servility....

[Silajdzic] If we have selected the government, then we should let it do its job. If the government has a sort of government superior to it, then it is considered to be a mere technical service that is expected to do the work that other people or institutions are not interested in. No state can be built without a government. The government must have a system; it is a personification of the system and we need such a system more than anyone else, particularly the state. We do not have a reserve state. I pointed to some irregularities in the SDA, and I have a right to a personal attitude. As a member of a body, if I disagree with its work, I have the right to withdraw from it. I would like very much if this was understood and accepted by our society as a normal thing. We are used to living in a system where holding different attitudes is considered to be a treachery, heresy.

[LJILJAN] How satisfied are you with the Federation? One does not have to be very perceptive to see that something is not functioning. Are the politicians of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] putting monkey wrenches in the wheels of the state system of both the federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] I am a lot less satisfied than I expected I would be. It is good that clashes have ceased. Unquestionably, it is a success that must never be underestimated. On the other hand, we could have done it even better. I know many Croats who know that; in any case, Greater Serbia is threatening from the east. It is only a question of time, geo-political position, and situation whether it will threaten more Croats or Bosniaks. Bosniaks, with regard to their position, are certainly much more exposed to this threat, while Croats are not in a much better position either, if the Greater Serbs decide so. I guess this is quite clear, and it is clear to many people. Unfortunately, many people do not see this. Some think that by bargaining over Bosnia they could achieve much more for the so-called greater Croatia. You will notice that whenever we have difficulties, when Serbs launch a great offensive, voices can be heard supporting the partition of Bosnia.

[LJILJAN] In that context, one could assess the chetnik offensive against Bihac and the Zagreb-Knin agreement precisely as "to be or not to be" for the Bihac region....

[Silajdzic] Whenever they think we are weak, they want to make good use of that and partition Bosnia. We know that, and it is so. This is what is happening behind the offensive against Bihac: Some mass trends regarding the partitioning of Bosnia are appearing again, and even outside it. As if Bosnia were their property! They are making some plans on partition, confederation, they are talking about the rights of Serbs in Bosnia, while those same people deny rights to Serbs in Croatia. Many troubles started when Serbs were deprived of rights in Croatia—or let us be quite clear and honest, when they were left out from the Constitution. One should have been much wiser at the time. However, when they speak about the conflict in Bosnia, the Serbs should be given all the rights, as though we have never offered to the leadership from Pale to join in the Federation. It is well known that they do not need any federation or equality. If they had been for equality, we would have reached peace a long time ago.

[LJILJAN] Even though other people are devastating our state and endangering the very biological substance—the Bosniaks, as is often said—like to denounce one another. That is also a matter of democracy and tolerance. But in Bosnia, particularly in Sarajevo, a particular sort of mentality is present, which is explained in terms of this or that kind of humor or this or that sort of independence.

[Silajdzic] The chetniks are no surprise to me. Of course, they do their job, they are our enemy. It is our people who surprise me, because they are looking for a sense of life in hollow speculations, thinking that it is a contribution to the struggle against the enemy. Those people compensate their own inabilities in such a way. Some people are thereby also protecting their state functions. Thus, a particular sort of man was born called cesenak [not further specified], who pretends not to understand anything, while, in fact, he understands everything. Such people want to remain on a margin of everything. A particular mentality was born. That mentality is embodied in people who are living a limited life and inventing thousands of intrigues. I wonder how those people have so much time and energy to invent various conflicts, plots, troubles, and conflicts. I just do not understand it, and that is our misfortune. Our first and basic task is to raise a man without complexes, without fear, a man who is proud of what he is, who knows his place on the earth, who can look up into space and into the future and say: "I am a Bosniak, I am a Muslim. I belong to Bosnia and this is my country, my fatherland, my history." We have to be better, and we have to be what we are.

[LJILJAN] So the matter is about cadres. Many Bosnian cadres had to quickly mature in politics. We are afraid that a great difference exists between the Bosniak political front team and the so-called back team....

[Silajdzic] Izetbegovic is a true intellectual and visionary. He differs from a classical politician only in being an authentic thinker. Not everyone is capable of being that—let me make that clear. And a man should not endeavor to be one if God did not create him for that. We should understand once and for all that people are not the same. In the job we are performing now, there comes into prominence what President Izetbegovic and I are able to do, which is to find some space....

[LJILJAN] The problem of Muslims in Europe, and even of Bosniaks, has a much longer history. It is a lasting problem that is based on the exaggerated, invented fear of Islamic fundamentalism. Before you took up politics and diplomacy, you had been quite active as a scientist in this field....

[Silajdzic] I have to say that what is happening to the Muslims in the Balkans is obviously the result of a centuries-long negative attitude. Look at the early 1980's: The situation in Bulgaria, the persecution and forceful changing of the names of Bulgarian Muslims, after which there is the situation in Kosovo in the early 1990's. I witnessed those events. I was teaching at Pristina University at the time and I knew what was happening and what the Belgrade press was writing about Kosovo. Since then, I have been aware of how much the media contribute to the spreading of misinformation among people, particularly in a war. I read the Belgrade newspapers and I observed what was really going on in Pristina. A campaign was planned to make possible the overthrow of Kosovo's autonomy and the establishment of a greater Serbian regime. After that, it was Bosnia's turn, and with it the question of Sandzak was to be settled. More than 50 villages in Sandzak along the Bosnian border with Serbia and Montenegro were cleansed of the Muslim population in order to break up the physical communication between the Bosnian Bosniaks and the Sandzak Bosniaks. This has been openly done ever since, even until Bihac. This has to do with the ghettoization of the Muslims. Kosovo is like a huge concentration camp. Sandzak as well. This also applies to Zepa, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Bihac—which is to say that the greater Serbs are allowed to drive the Muslims into a ghetto, and since they cannot kill all of them, they are forcing them to accept such a political solution that actually suits the greater Serbs and makes possible the gradual disposal of Muslims. The greatest favor done to the greater Serbs is the arms embargo that the international community imposed on us. Thus, if we take into account Kosovo, Sandzak, and Bosnia, the ghettoization of Muslims has been carried out for 15 years now, and there has been no response to that. When talking about human rights in Europe, one does not refer to the rights of Muslims. However, a high price will be paid for all this one day. The fact is that hundreds of millions of Muslims throughout the world are observing what is happening in Bosnia today, and that will create a certain atmosphere that will make the architects of the Bosnian drama pay a high price. If a tolerant Islam cannot survive in this and such a Europe, then what can survive there?

[Box, Page 9]

[LJILJAN] What is the role of the local Bosnian media in informing the public, and what in your opinion should it be like in the future?

[Silajdzic] I consider it to be an honor that I was one of those who launched MUSLIMANSKI GLAS [MUSLIM VOICE]. As for LJILJAN, I would like, even at my own risk, that your editorial policy is more inquisitive rather than complaisant. I never trust avant garde that fosters the mentality of leveling. People are not the same. The avant garde must not be complaisant. It must move forward. If a journalist writes, let him do that, but do not let him be subservient to the people. One has to take on responsibility rather than to be complaisant. The easiest thing is to tell the readers or the public what they want to hear. However, it is a question of responsibility. It is not about denunciation but rather about objective criticism. Our people are able to read between the lines, and they know what is analysis. It is important to adopt as little sensationalism and emotional approach as possible.

[Box, page 9]

[LJILJAN] How would you assess the foreign media in comparison with our media?

[Silajdzic] Before the war, I met three times with the editorial board at THE NEW YORK TIMES. I explained to them three times the situation in Bosnia, each time for an hour and a half. Of course, they listened to me. First they listened to the victim, then they listened to the accused, the second one, and then the third one. I was explaining the situation to the people who are influential, who lead editorial policy. Of course, they did not take information only from me. But once they adopted a certain policy by the article in which they called Milosevic the Balkan butcher, THE NEW YORK

TIMES has not abandoned it until today. That is a serious approach to work. I can help our journalists get practice in a modern newspaper. When basic attitudes are taken, everything is much easier, and one should think about long-term effects. As for LJILJAN, it is our most popular newspaper, and in that fact lies its great responsibility.

Silajdzic Receives Regional Government Officials

AU1901205595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received the heads of the Sarajevo and Mostar regions, Mustafa Pamuk and Ismail Klaric respectively, as well as the head of the Travnik region, (?Zbignija) Aganovic. The meeting was also attended by Energy and Industry Minister Faruk Smailbegovic.

The talks focused on how to enable the regions to carry out their duties, especially those concerning the implementation of the economic policy measures for this year. They concluded that there are a number contentious issues in relations between municipalities, regions, and the Republic, and that the duties of the organs at these levels should urgently be separated.

They also spoke about the need to establish a more efficient control of financial transactions, which requires a better organization of certain services and inspections.

They called on the Ministry of Finance to produce precise instructions for a unified application of financial regulations in all regions. They also discussed some issues concerning organization in the transitional period until cantons have been set up. The prime minister stressed that the work on setting up cantonal bodies should be speeded up, as the cantonal model represented a simpler and more efficient model of organization of authority in the Federation. Until the cantonal organs have been set up, the regions should play an important role and must be able to carry out the tasks for which they have been set, Prime Minister Silajdzic said.

Izetbegovic Receives British Party Leader

AU1701201195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, received Paddy Ashdown, leader of the British Liberal Democratic Party, and British Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Peter Barnett.

The guests were interested in the situation in the free territories following the signing of the agreement on cessation of hostilities, prospects for the peace process following the Contact Group's recent visit to Sarajevo, the possible lifting of the arms embargo on the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, changeover in the command of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], and other topical issues.

This is Paddy Ashdown's seventh visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This British politician, respected in Parliament's House of Commons and among the British public, has consistently supported our side since the very beginning of the aggression.

This was stated in a communique issued by the president of the presidency's office.

EU Administrator Views Crime, UNPROFOR

AU1301164295 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0710 GMT 13 Jan 95

[Interview with Hans Koschnick, EU administrator of Mostar, by Volker Wagner in Bonn; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Hans Koschnick briefed the public in Bonn yesterday on developments in Mostar in the past six months. My colleague Volker Wagner used the opportunity to conduct an interview with Hans Koschnick, in which he asked the former Bremen mayor how the process of growing together in the two parts of the town is proceeding.

[Koschnick] I believe that it will take some time. One must not forget that people were still firing guns at each other as recently as March. The bad thing about civil wars is that neighbors and relatives usually fire at neighbors and relatives. The wounds that have been caused are more painful and need more time to heal than in normal wars when one can blame the enemy. Thus, more time is required. However, I can really say that since I arrived and after we organized cooperation in numerous processes, the hatred that was still noticeable in May no longer exists. It is true that there is still mistrust. The president of the Federation, Zubak, has made it clear that whenever problems occur between the two ethnic groups among the leadership, this can automatically be felt at all levels. Whenever there are problems in Sarajevo concerning the expansion of the Federation, we feel that in our practical work. This does not apply to the construction of schools and roads, to the area of water, electricity, and other spheres but to the sensitive issues where the coexistence of the people—not only in formal but in real terms—is affected. We are facing big difficulties there. We will have to continue our efforts. You are naturally right on one point. People expect solutions from the person that was sent there by Europe. Thus, my presence is necessary there.

[Wagner] The biggest problem of your work seems to be organized crime. How do you handle it?

[Koschnick] The biggest problem is that, unfortunately, the Croatians are not yet ready to establish a joint police that would enable us to fight against crime. Criminals simply ignore borders. Croatian, Muslim, and Serb rascals cooperate already at this point. The answer can only be cooperation among the police. We wanted a common police. This was agreed in the memorandum of understanding. Both sides—Muslim and Croats—wanted that. I am facing problems in Mostar simply because the Federation has problems and has not yet established a joint police. We have quite a high crime rate in the western part of the town, which is gradually spreading to the east, the Muslim part. I am urgently suggesting—I have asked the EU [European Union] foreign ministers to support me—that the head of government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic, and Zubak, and the head of government and president of Croatia, Tudjman, get together and tell everybody that a joint fight against crime in Mostar is required. Otherwise developments will become problematic there—not so much for us Europeans but for those who have to live there every day, for the inhabitants of Mostar, for the children and women, and for the adults. Crime must rigorously combated. Thus, one needs a loyal police that acts on the basis of the rule of law. I want to establish such a police, and the European police officers will help me to do so. However, they cannot act. That must be done by the citizens of Mostar. Scoundrels must be arrested by people from Mostar, and not by British, French, German, or Netherlands officers.

[Wagner] Is crime not closely linked with the funds that are now flowing into Mostar? Humanitarian relief organizations from all kinds of countries are providing aid. At the same time, there are enormous sums coming from Brussels. Is money not being diverted?

[Koschnick] I do not think so. The relief organizations, the nongovernmental organizations, including the Technical Assistance Organization, and organizations of the European national states that are working there are not providing cash. Material is being provided, work is being organized. The organizations are jointly working with the inhabitants of Mostar to rebuild the town. Thus, we do not often see cash. When we receive money for these organizational tasks, including the reconstruction of schools and kindergartens, it may naturally happen that minor sums are paid when orders are placed. However, this does not only happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are experiencing similar things in Germany. The real problem is that money is circulating in western Mostar that was earned in the embezzlement of weapons and—as we fear—in drug deals. It is not that people in Mostar are dealing with drugs, but we are afraid that something like money laundering is taking place in Mostar. This entails a real danger of crime. We are not living in a criminal environment like Chicago. Things are not yet that bad. However, the danger exists, and therefore we need a good police. For this reason, I urge the Croats to give up their blockade and to establish a police together with the Muslims, who have expressed this wish.

[Wagner] You seem to be gaining another problem, too. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman announced this week that he plans to cancel the agreement with the United Nations, which expires at the end of this month. This would mean that as of 1 February the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] would no longer have a mandate in Croatia, and that it would have to withdraw. This could mean new Croatian-Serbian hostilities over Krajina. This would also have consequences for you in Mostar.

[Koschnick] That is right. Yet I do not believe that the Croatian leadership is interested in another armed conflict. Actually, it would like to induce the United Nations and the European governments to exert greater pressure so that a solution is found for Croatia, a solution that would involve restoration of Croatia's sovereignty and of the state's integrity. Contrary to views expressed in the past, the large ethnic groups should then be given an opportunity in Krajina—at least for cultural and local autonomy, but within the framework of the Croatian Republic. Thus, this is an instrument designed to exert pressure on the United Nations. I am not so skeptical, and I do not believe that we will be facing a war in February or March.

[Wagner] Deutschlandfunk radio has launched a collection campaign for Mostar, in close coordination with you. Our listeners are raising funds for a school in the eastern part of the town and for a kindergarten in the west. Can you tell our listeners what the situation is like and what progress has been achieved concerning the construction?

[Koschnick] The construction will be in full swing at the end of January. Progress has been achieved concerning the planning. Pupils—seven-, eight-, nine-, and 10-year-olds—participated in the preparatory work. This was fantastic. The work of the Technical Assistance Organization is also remarkable. The same applies to the kindergarten. I ensure you that the school and the kindergarten will be finished by the middle of the year. This is a sign that people are aware that they have not been forgotten. Young people, pupils are working for pupils and young people here. It is so incredibly decisive for people to realize that they are really part of Europe, and that Europe supports them. My administration alone would not be able to achieve that.

Parties React to UN Mandate Termination

AU1901201895 Zagreb NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 95 pp 2, 3

[Report by Snjezana Pavic: "Support Given—Doubts Remain"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Silvije Degen, Social Democratic Action of Croatia: Responsibility Lies With the President

Following the Bosnia-Herzegovina cease-fire agreement and the undisputed progress in the talks between Zagreb and Knin, there were more reasons in support of extending the peace troops' mandate, with constant insistence on their greater efficiency, than in support of its cancellation. The information available shows that there is little understanding in the world, and even less support, for canceling the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate, which will no doubt reflect negatively on Croatia's relations with the international community. We hope that the cancellation does not open the door to a new conflict, although realistically one should consider such a possibility and its devastating political and military consequences for Croatia. The Croatian president, who on the basis of his constitutional powers made this decision, bears full responsibility before the Croatian and international community for all consequences resulting from the mandate cancellation .

Josip Pankertic, Croatian Peasants Party: Now It Is Known That We Are Strong

The cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate merely reiterates an earlier decision made by the Sabor. The president probably knows better than the rest of us how to carry out a peaceful reintegration, and I believe it will be implemented without the use of force. This would be the best solution, although it would probably take a little longer. Canceling the UNPROFOR mandate is a good move because we will show to the enemy that we are nevertheless strong and ready to resolve the reintegration issue without talks, although we want to negotiate first. By begging on our knees, they thought we were weak, and for this reason I believe that this is a good decision. They will take us more seriously now. I believe the talks will proceed more smoothly now.

Anto Djapic, Croatian Rights Party: Set Deadlines for the Peaceful Reintegration

We hail the president's decision and believe it to be prudent, powerful, and decisive. What next? I personally do not believe in a peaceful reintegration, although I would be happiest if this did happen. Perhaps it is precisely this decisive, offensive move by the Croatian authorities that will, conditionally speaking, force the rebel side to start thinking. However, we should not wait to see how they react. We must be ready for the worst, as well as a military solution, because further postponing the reintegration is not possible. The next step is for the president and the Sabor to set deadlines for peaceful integration, and after they run out, we must use all other means permitted by law. I believe that the complete reintegration of Croatian territory without any bargaining on the sovereignty can only be accomplished by force. Naturally, we must also guarantee human rights; however, all those who have turned arms against Croatia have no business here.

Slavko Degoricija, Croatian Independent Democrats: No Dilemma About Peace

A peaceful reintegration is definitely our wish. There is no dilemma in Croatia about this. What next, after the termination of UNPROFOR's stay? We have another three months, and things could change a lot during this time. We would like the UNPROFOR mandate to change in order to incorporate greater authority. The current mandate proved its inefficiency with no results. The same goes for the negotiations. Just as we have seen to it that Thornberry no longer conducts the negotiations, the same request should be put forth regarding Lord Owen. Because of the bias and the ideas that are not in the function of the UN Security Council, Croatia must offer its own program, not just an economic one but also for a political solution. The Serbian issue in Croatia cannot be resolved by anyone but the Serbs and the Croats in Croatia. We must influence the people in the occupied parts of Croatia politically. As long as the extremists like Martic, Mikelic, and Babic are in power, nothing can be achieved. We can sit down at the negotiating table without them.

Ivica Racan, Social Democratic Party of Croatia: This Is Not a Decision for War

The Social Democratic Party advocated that the problem of reintegrating the Croatian occupied territories, if possible, should be resolved by peaceful means. However, a precondition for this is precisely a more active and firmer policy by Croatian authorities. It is precisely the continuation of the bargaining policy by the Croatian side that would increase the danger of a new war. We regret that such firm actions were not taken sooner because Croatia would compel the world to finally admit that besides the Bosnian problem, there is also a Croatian problem.

In our opinion, the decision to cancel UNPROFOR's mandate is not a decision for war. In merely makes Croatia's desire to finally resolve the problem of its occupied territories more serious in everyone's eyes, as well as the rebel Serbs. It is now up to the others, especially the influential international factors, to help Croatia search for a peaceful solution. Until the decision on UNPROFOR's departure is realized, one would hope that the Serbian side will also demonstrate the same resolve, because Croatia's determination alone is not sufficient. Political firmness and a diplomatic offensive should also characterize the Croatian state leadership in the next few months, because the decision to cancel the mandate does not mean anything.

Milan Djukic, Serbian National Party: Will Butrus-Ghali Say No?

We hope that the UN secretary general and the UN Security Council will make a decision independent of the Croatian authorities to unilaterally cancel the UNPROFOR mandate, keeping in mind the consequences and UNPROFOR's role so far, not just to find a peaceful solution but also to prevent conflicts of a greater dimension. The peace processes on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia are maintained by the UN forces and, therefore, their contribution to a final resolution is necessary. With a possible UNPROFOR departure, all peace efforts undertaken so far would have fallen through. I believe that the UN secretary general and the UN Security Council will take into account not only the efforts, but also the expenses—material and human—that have been invested in preserving the cease-fire, as well as the attempts to find a lasting solution.

Bozo Kovacevic, Croatian Social Liberal Party: When Is UNPROFOR Leaving?

I support the decision by President Tudjman; however, I would be more satisfied if it were in accordance with the Sabor's conclusions of September last year. It is still unclear when UNPROFOR will actually leave Croatia, and the president's statement leaves grounds for various ambiguities. I hope that the decision on the cancellation is definitive because there are no indications that the UNPROFOR mandate could change and that UNPROFOR could, for example, be compelled to use force against paramilitary formations in the occupied territories. The president's statement does not state an exact date for UNPROFOR's departure, thus I believe that the Sabor, which is about to meet soon, will debate all aspects of this decision.

Damir Kajin, Istrian Democratic Congress [IDS]: High Risk Policy

I believe that those of us involved in politics, as well as the citizens, do not have enough information but firmly believe that if Croatia lacks sufficient positive and firm guarantees for a peaceful solution, as President Tudjman anticipates, then the IDS must voice its objections to the termination decision. This is an extremely high risk and we must examine carefully what it brings to Istria and Croatia and what we will discuss with foreign representatives. The question arises whether we will move closer or farther away from the Council of Europe, whether in tourism we will accomplish the results from 1994 or 1992, whether foreign investors will be more careful in investing capital, and finally, whether the reintegration of the occupied Croatian territories will take place peacefully or through a war option. Time will judge the validity of this decision, IDS Vice President Damir Kajin said at a news conference in Opatija yesterday. He also pointed out that the party had learned about Tudjman's decision from the Austrian press three days earlier.

Radimir Cacic, Croatian People's Party: Merely Implementation of the Sabor's Decision

The decision to cancel UNPROFOR's mandate merely represents the implementation of a decision by Sabor. We demand from the Croatian authorities to accompany UNPROFOR's expulsion with a clear and public strategy of peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories and prevention of all forms of greater Serbian aspirations for the Croatian territory, either by amputation and exchange of territories or by demands for a special status of certain territories. We remain opposed to a war option; however, if it transpires that it is inevitable, we believe that Croatia can resort to it only with a sufficient support of the centers of power. We warn that the international mediation in the Yugoslav crisis will not end before a new security structure with the prospects of longevity is established on the former Yugoslav territory. Croatia should not expect that the problem of the reintegration of the occupied territories could be solved by Belgrade's recognition of our country, without Serbia in principle abandoning the implementation of the memorandum policy [based on the 1988 Memorandum by Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences] on the Croatian state territory.

Seks Reaffirms Decision on UN Mandate

LD1901211695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Seks, vice president of the assembly, spoke about Croatia's determination to stick to its decision to terminate the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate and about Croatia's policy toward the Serbs in the UN-protected areas, in the aftermath of that decision, at a news conference held today, ahead of the assembly session. Darko Herceg reports.

[Herceg] Speaking about the belief that Croatia's decision to cancel the UN forces' mandate was not imperative, Vladimir Seks stressed:

[Begin Seks recording] I would like to deny that form of political thinking, political (?process), and say that the Republic of Croatia is firm and determined in its stance that after 31 March UNPROFOR must start abandoning—over the period of the next three months—its fundamental, basic role in the Republic of Croatia. That is an irrevocable decision of the Republic of Croatia and any speculation as to the possibility of extending or renewing the UNPROFOR mandate in some other form beyond 31 March has no foundation. [end recording]

[Herceg] Stressing that the Serb population in the area under UN protection is under a certain media blockade, Vladimir Seks sent a direct message to them:

[Begin Seks recording] We would like the Serbs in the occupied areas to know that this decision does not mean preparation for war, but is a political alarm bell calling for peaceful economic and political reintegration into the constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia. [end recording]

[Herceg] Speaking about the proclamation of the Serb People's Party, which claims that 300,000 citizens of Serb nationality have left Croatia, Vladimir Seks denied the claim by citing official figures of the 1991 census, the figures of the Croatian office for refugees and displaced persons and the Red Cross of Serbia and Montenegro. There were 571,633 Serbs in Croatia—312,900 in what are now the UN-protected areas and 270,000 in other parts of Croatia. [figures as heard] Since the beginning of the conflict 198,819 Serbs have left the UN-protected areas, and 53,800 have left other parts of Croatia, most of them military personnel and civilians who worked for the then Yugoslav Army.

[Begin Seks recording] I would like to say that the claim that 300,000 persons of Serb nationality were evicted from the area under the control of the Croatian authorities is simply untrue. It is very dangerous to brandish these figures which have only a political role, and if they were true would mean that all Serbs from the free parts of Croatia have left. [end recording]

Majority Supports Use of Force To Recover Land

AU2001110295

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian in its 20 January edition on page 7 publishes the results of an opinion poll about President Tudjman's decision "to withdraw hospitality to the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR]." According to the paper, the telephone opinion poll, which was carried out in the areas of Rijeka, Split, Osijek, and Zagreb, and in Istria on 14 and 15 January, involved 700 pollees.

Asked whether they support President Tudjman's decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate, 65.6 percent replied positively, 18.5 percent negatively, and 15.9 percent were undecided.

Asked whether they support this move even if it means the "reemergence of war in Croatia," 55.7 percent still support it, 22.9 oppose it, and 21.4 are undecided.

Almost half of those polled, 48.1 percent, believe that this decision will result in the reemergence of war, 23.3 percent think this will not happen, and 28.6 percent do not know.

The majority of pollees, 53.9 percent, believe that the reintegration of the occupied territories will be accomplished with a military action, and 55.8 percent of pollees would also support the use of force in this process. On the other hand, 22 percent believe that the integration will be carried out peacefully and 23.6 percent of pollees do not endorse the use of force in the reintegration of the occupied territories.

UNPROFOR Examining Withdrawal Prospects

AU1901194895 Paris AFP in English 1930 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Jan 19 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force is urgently examining the prospects of a withdrawal of its troops from Croatia in line with an order by Zagreb that it pull out by the end of March, spokesman Michael Williams said here Thursday [19 January].

The withdrawal "clearly has to be looked at and it has been looked at as an urgent matter as we have less than two and a half months left," Williams said. [passage omitted]

Williams noted that UN officials were "concerned about the withdrawal's consequences and still hope that the Croatian Government ... might be prepared to reconsider a possibility of the mandate continuing." He admitted that it would be "politically difficult" for the UN to retain its headquarters for its operations in former Yugoslavia in Zagreb while it no longer held a mandate in Croatia." [passage omitted]

Williams said that keeping UN forces in Serb-controlled areas but not in areas controlled by Zagreb was "out of the question." [passage omitted]

UN Envoy Unhappy With Butrus-Ghali Report

LD1701003995 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2130 GMT 16 Jan 95

[From the "Picture Vs Picture" current affairs program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali today submitted a report on Croatia's decision to terminate UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate. The report was submitted to the UN Security Council. In it Butrus-Ghali expresses the hope that the Croatian Government will reconsider its stance before the current UNPROFOR mandate expires. Otherwise, Butrus-Ghali says, he will study in detail the practical consequences and financial implications of the withdrawal and will reconsider if the headquarters of the UN peacekeeping forces and their logistical base should remain in the capital of a state that has denied UNPROFOR its presence there. We have on the line from New York the permanent representative of the Republic of Croatia in the United Nations, Mario Nobilo. Mr. Nobilo, good evening. What can be read between the lines of the report?

[Nobilo] The report has appeared several days earlier than expected with an obvious aim of coinciding with the current debate in the UN Security Council on President Tudjman's letter and the presidential announcement expected tomorrow or the day after. My impression is that the secretary general did not take President Tudjman's letter sufficiently seriously and that is why he expressed the hope that Croatia's stance would be re-examined in continuing dialogue. In this light I think that our stand must be that there will be no further negotiations on the mandate in its present form and that we must use our political energy to find a political solution over the next two months and to see which mechanisms of supervising the process will be possible once the foreign armies leave.

Second, I think that Butrus-Ghali does not deny Croatia the right to take such a decision. This is implied in his readiness to carry out an analysis of the practical and financial implications of the withdrawal, but his personal view is that by this move Croatia has in fact raised the possibility of a new war and has jeopardized the economic agreement [with Krajina Serbs]. [passage omitted]

In my view the report lacks balance because in some way it minimizes the radicalism and the unacceptable policy of the Serb side while at the same time lists a whole series of shortcomings attributed to the Croatian side. The report can be said to be hyperbolized [hiperboliziran] and presented in a special light. Special attention can be drawn to the details of the agreement and the question raised over his claim that UNPROFOR is in Croatia to protect minorities while omitting to mention that the areas [under UNPROFOR control] have been ethnically cleansed or to refer to the responsibility of Belgrade and the militancy of the Knin Serbs for the failure of the mandate. [passage omitted: reiterates above points]

[Annoucer] Mr. Nobilo, are there any elements of threats in the report or any indication of the possibility of the United Nations imposing another UNPROFOR mandate?

[Nobilo] No. As I said before, Croatia is not being denied the right to make such a decision. This is her sovereign territory as confirmed by the UN Security Council resolutions. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Nobilo, what is Croatia's next diplomatic step going to be and how is Croatia going to respond to the report and the ensuing debate?

[Nobilo] We shall analyze the report in detail, criticize its bad points, and point to the good ones. However, it is not Croatia's intention to engage in an aggressive dialogue with the UN Secretariat. But we shall continue to stress and explain the definite nature of Croatia's decision as regards the current UNPROFOR mandate. In other words, we shall try to redirect our diplomatic and any other energy in the Security Council and elsewhere to completing the peace process rather than debating whether the decision was appropriate or not. [passage omitted]

Bobetko Warns of Serb 'Political Provocations'

LD1901180695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gojko Susak, defense minister of the Republic of Croatia, received in Zagreb today the former UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander in Croatia, Brigadier General Ghazi Tayib and the new commander, Eide al-Rodan. Corps General Janko Bobetko, chief of the Croatian Army General Staff, and Minister Susak together received John Fovarque, the new British military attache to Croatia. Albino Cehic has this report.

[Cehic] [Passage omitted] Speaking about military cooperation, Mr. Fovarque said that it is limited by the [arms] embargo, but that there are other potential fields of cooperation between the British Army and our country.

Gen. Bobetko stressed that the door to the General Staff will always be open to the British military attache so that he can obtain complete and objective information. Gen. Bobetko went on to stress:

[Begin Bobetko recording] I warned him especially that there will probably be political provocations from the other side which is not interested in a peaceful solution to the sensitive problem, and whose aim will be to prove that the only way out is for UNPROFOR to stay and search for a peaceful solution. [end recording]

[Cehic] Stressing that the final decision on the UNPROFOR mandate was made by the president of the Republic, and that that stance was nonnegotiable, Bobetko called on the Serbs in Croatia to accept a peaceful solution.

[Begin Bobetko recording] The Serb people must define their fate, and now is the time to do that. If they miss this opportunity, it means that they have not recognized Croatia as their homeland and have no peace-loving intentions toward that homeland. [end recording]

Deputy Foreign Minister Views Moscow Visit

AU1701103895 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Ivo Sanader by Ante Gugo; place and date not given: "We Have the Support of Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At the time of the Christmas holidays and in the absence of almost any diplomatic activity related to the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Ivo Sanader suddenly visited Moscow. Most of the diplomatic meetings between Zagreb and Moscow so far have taken place within the framework of various mediation missions and teams, but this meeting was primarily a bilateral one, which made it possible to discuss the direct relations and positions.*

[Gugo] The wider Croatian public was quite surprised by your sudden visit to Moscow. What was the reason for this visit?

[Sanader] I went to Moscow following the invitation of First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov, who proposed that we discuss the bilateral relations of Russia and Croatia, and the current crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the role of Russia in resolving the crisis. I gladly accepted the invitation because after the latest events, the Russian veto in the Security Council, and the events at the latest OSCE session, I thought it was time to clear up the positions and tell each other what the positions of Zagreb and Moscow were. In that sense, the invitation to come to Moscow arrived at the right time.

Support for Normalization

[Gugo] What are the current positions of Zagreb and Moscow, and what are their relations?

[Sanader] The most interesting thing is, as we were glad to establish, that the Russian Federation fully supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. This is the first and most important message from Moscow. Moreover, Russia supports the efforts of the Croatian leadership for the peaceful reintegration of the UNPA's [UN Protected Areas] into the full state and legal system, and also supports the recently signed economic agreement with the representatives of the local Serbs. The Russians not only support the signing of the agreement, but also its full implementation. I pointed out to them that, in accordance with what has been signed, we demand that this agreement be implemented within the given time frame, that is by 10 January. I also introduced them to the fact the president mentioned in his speech on the situation in the nation and the state, that we would cancel the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate if the economic agreement and the relevant Security Council resolutions are not implemented by 10 January. After all, this is what the parliament demanded of the Croatian Government. I told them there was no one in Croatia who did not support this position, and that the Security Council demanded of the UN secretary general to submit a report, between 10 and 20 January, on the work of the peace forces in Croatia, and that, therefore, this body also had in mind the resolution of our parliament. In that context, we said that we considered the normalization of the Croat-Serb relations, in which the mutual recognition of Croatia and the FRY is included, an important factor in resolving the crisis in these areas.

[Gugo] The Russians never questioned the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, but they supported federalization of the integral Croatia, which is unacceptable to us. Did you discuss this position?

[Sanader] Of course we did. I told them that any connection between the Serbs in Croatia and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Serbs in the FRY was out of the question. We agreed upon this fact, and I can say that we have the same positions on this issue. Croatian sovereignty and Croatian integrity remain without any tying of any entity, including the Serb, with anyone outside the Croatian borders. We agreed upon this topic, and emphasized that the priority was to start talks on the complete implementation of the economic agreement and some other issues, among which are the problems of the return of the refugees, the opening of the Zagreb-Split railroad, the Zagreb-Vinkovci railroad... We mainly discussed these things, and did not mention plans such as the one made by the Z-4 group, which best speaks about the reality of the plan.

Russians on Impartiality

[Gugo] Do you have the impression that the Russians are aware of how little time is left to implement the agreement on the one hand, and how broad the agreement is on the other? Pressed with these facts, do they intend to put additional pressure on Milosevic and Mikelic?

[Sanader] They were aware of how important it is that this agreement be implemented, of how important the normalization of Croat-Serb relations is, and how important the mutual recognition is in that context. I believe that there will soon be a follow-up of these talks, especially as they assured me several times that the opinion that prevails in Croatia and part of the international public, which is that the Russians support only one side, was completely untrue. They insisted that the Russian Federation wanted to play the role of an impartial peacemaker in resolving the crisis. Considering the fact that not only Mr. Ivanov said that, but also Mr. Rjurikov, President Yeltsin's special adviser, asking us to accept the good mediation role of the Russian Federation, which can be useful in view of the fact that this country is a permanent member of the Security Council, we gladly accepted these statements.

[Gugo] In contrast to these nice statements, there are certain recent Russian actions such as the veto in the Security Council to the benefit of the rebel Serbs, then the practical veto on the decisions of the last OSCE session condemning the Serb actions, and the recent visit of Russian Defense Minister General Grachev to the temporarily occupied Croatian territory, which was not previously announced to the Croatian authorities. What did they say about that?

[Sanader] We did not discuss these issues on this occasion, because this had been discussed at the level of ambassadors and other members of both foreign ministries. If I were to give you an overall impression of all the meetings, I could say that the Russians apologized for the incidents that the Russian members of the peace forces caused, and they said that Minister Grachev's visit had no connection with official Russian politics and the current Russian positions, so we can consider this his private initiative. We accepted these explanations and we consider these problems solved.

[Gugo] Were there any pressures in Moscow on Croatia to give up the discussion on cancelling the UNPROFOR mandate?

[Sanader] There were no pressures, but I was told that the Russian Federation was in favor of Croatia extending the mandate of the peace forces.

Large Orders

[Gugo] You discussed the development of bilateral relations. Does that mean that there will be certain improvements soon?

[Sanader] I hope so. The Russians emphasized that the contract for the construction of 12 ships for their merchant navy in Croatian shipyards was the largest contract in the shipbuilding sector that they have with any foreign partner. There is a problem of debts of companies from the former Soviet Union to some Croatian companies, and we will have some more talks on that, which the Russian side did not refuse. At the level of foreign ministries a protocol on cooperation will be made, and we will also agree upon the cooperation of the OSCE ambassadors and the representatives in some other organizations. They kept stressing that they wanted to have good cooperation with us, and the Republic of Croatia wants to have good relations with all the countries in the world, for which it will show readiness.

[Gugo] How do the Russians see the peace initiative of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter?

[Sanader] In their opinion, Carter has pulled the Bosnian Serbs, that is, Karadzic, out of the isolation into which international diplomacy, primarily the Contact Group, had driven them. Namely, the Contact Group peace plan was presented to the sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina on a "take it or leave it" basis, and in that sense Karadzic should have accepted the plan unconditionally in order for them to continue to negotiate with him and talk to him. After this mission, this isolation no longer exists.

Gligorov Talks With Yugoslav Party Delegation

LD1901225495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2141 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 19 Jan (TANJUG)—Kiro Gligorov, president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], today received a parliamentary delegation of the [Yugoslav] Democratic Party, led by party leader Zoran Djindjic, which is paying a two-day visit to Skopje, a statement from the FYROM president's office says.

According to the statement, Gligorov said that the FYROM is interested in goodneighborly relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that the first step toward that goal should be mutual recognition. There are no essential obstacles to this, the Macedonian president believes. This would contribute to greater stability in the entire Balkans.

Macedonian Assembly Speaker Stojan Andov, the host of the Yugoslav opposition delegation, stressed after the talks the necessity of such contacts which are conductive to improving relations between the two neighbors.

The delegation of Yugoslav parliamentarians also had talks today with Macedonian Trade Minister Risto Ivanov and Transport Minister Dimitar Buzlevski. [passage omitted]

Interior Minister on Intelligence Agency Plans

AU1901183895 Skopje MIC in English 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Skopje 18 Jan—At yesterday's press conference, Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Minister of the Interior Ljubomir Frckovski discussed the proposals for laws determined by the government, from the domain of internal affairs, which also include the law for internal affairs, the Intelligence Agency, I.D. cards, registry books, personal name, and public gatherings.

In relation to the Intelligence Agency, the minister said that no new staff would be employed in the ministry upon the formation of this agency, and that it would be comprised of the personnel that has worked in the Interior Ministry so far, mainly in the State Security Service. The minister said that after a systematization, the Interior Ministry is expected to have 11,000 employees, while there are 8,500 at the moment. Of these, some 200-300 people are expected to be transferred to the Intelligence Agency. He added that the police would still consist of classical police in uniform, and there are 5,500 such employees, and the law enforcement police in civilian clothes.

The Intelligence Agency will be physically separated from the Interior Ministry, and the director of the agency will be appointed by the President of the Republic. The director of the Intelligence Agency will not be a member of the ministers' staff, such as the other under ministers, but will cooperate personally with the minister. He can be called to account for his work to the Government or the President of the Republic. According to the minister, the agency will have 2-3 "centers" throughout the republic.

The employees in the Intelligence Agency will not have police authorization, which was not the case with the State Security Service. Their activities will be directed toward the gathering of information, their analysis, and pointing the analyses toward prognoses. If some kind of police work has to be done, the Agency will have to carry that out in cooperation with the rest of the Interior Ministry.

A separate office for protection of the state system and counter- intelligence will also exist within the Interior Ministry. The director of this office will be appointed by the Government, at the suggestion of the minister.

"This system of organization of the Interior Ministry," the minister stated, "is taken over from the security services in Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain, and adapted to Macedonian needs."

As for control of the Intelligence Agency and the office for counter-intelligence, the minister said that it has been left up to parliament to form a parliamentary commission for their control, or two commissions for every organ separately.

As regards the law for personal identity card, the minister said that the Macedonian citizens have up to two years to obtain new I.D. cards, while, if the name of the owner, provided he is a member of the nationalities in Macedonia, beside being written in Cyrillic and the Macedonian letter, will also be written in the letter of his language, without transcription. The languages that will be used for this purpose are the Albanian, Turkish, Romany, Vlach and Serbian, with their letters. The names of the members of the nationalities, in their language and letter, will be written in the I.D. card at their request.

In regards to the law for public gatherings, the minister said that they could be reported beforehand, however, that is not compulsory. He emphasized that the strikes are not regarded as public gatherings, and spoke of the modalities in paying for any eventual damages that could be caused as a result of the public gathering. [passage omitted]

Authorities Charge Tetovo University Officials

AU2001111395 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 534 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Tetovo department of FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Ministry of Interior has instituted proceedings against at least a dozen Albanian political activists and intellectuals from several towns of FYROM, as well as against the leadership of the Albanian University in Tetovo, today's BUJKU reports.

Proceedings have been instituted against the Rector of the University of Tetovo, Dr. Fadil Sulejmani; Sali Ramadani, an MP [member of parlisment] to the FYROM Parliament from (Kkrgova); Ilaz Halimi, chairman of the Tetovo-based Party Peoples Democratic (PPD); Menduh Thaqi, Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP] vice-chairman; Myftar Zymberi from Tetovo; Zeqir Kadriu, a PDP MP from Tetovo, Xhevahir Xhamaili, Ruhi Bakiu, Shazim Mehmeti, and other Albanian political activists and intellectuals.

Albanians from FYROM are to face charges in connection with their election campaigns to the FYROM parliament as well as for their involvement in founding the Albanian University in Tetovo.

OSCE Official Discusses Education in Albanian

AU2001094595 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 95

[Report by Ibadete Hajrullahu from Skopje]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Copenhagen document written in 1990, Albanians have the right to education at all levels in the mother tongue, but this should be regulated with the laws and constitution of Macedonia [The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. Proper ways should be found to avoid all legal obstacles that run against the will and needs of citizens, and there should be more understanding and tolerance by the Macedonian side, that is what the OSCE high commissioner, Max van der Stoel, stated at a meeting with Tetovo University Rector Dr. Fadil Sulejmani and his associates.

Dr. Sulejmani declared that the Tetovo University delegation briefed the high-level guest on the university's current activity and its teaching activity, as well as on the police obstacles that the university is facing. At the same time, Sulejmani said, we asked Mr. van der Stoel, using his authority, to intervene with the Macedonian Government—so that the question of the Tetovo University will fall under the prerogatives of the Education Ministry and not the police, allowing dialogue with the relevant bodies and not their hinderance of our activities—to avoid the undesirable consequences that may arise in the region, responsibility for which would also be borne by the Macedonian Government.

Representatives of the Popular Democratic Party also held talks with Mr. Van der Stoel. Iljaz Halimi put forward the need and urgency for Albanians to receive education in Albanian, their degrading position, etc.

Mr. van der Stoel agreed that the arguments put forward are valid, but the issue should be resolved in the framework of the current legal conditions.

At a meeting with Arber Xhaferri, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP], Mr. Van der Stoel emphasised the 1990 Copenhagen document. Xhaferri said that the university does not destabilize Macedonia; on the contrary, Macedonia is being destabilized by the single-nation state concept.

Mr. Van der Stoel left Skopje today with a clearer view of the position of the education of Albanians in Macedonia.

Federal

Kontic Hopes for Good Relations With Iran

LD1901221695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2024 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 19 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic on Thursday said in a talk with new Iranian Charge d'Affaires Seyyed Ahmad Hedayat that he hoped the earlier, successful Yugoslav-Iranian political and economic relations would be renewed.

Kontic said Iran and some other countries had misconceptions about the causes of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and underscored Yugoslavia's efforts for a peaceful solution to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav prime minister and the new Iranian charge d'affaires discussed some aspects of Yugoslav-Iranian bilateral cooperation. The total annual value of economic cooperation between the former Yugoslav federation and Iran had stood at about 500 million dollars.

Defense Minister Views Army, Goals, Needs

AU1001135995 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 31 December 94-3 January 95 p 3

[Interview with Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic by unidentified DNEVNIK reporter; place and date not given: "FRY's Defense is a Token of Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Peace in former Yugoslavia, for which the FRY has been striving since the beginning of the conflict, is the most important task, but its accomplishment does not depend only on Yugoslavia. Peace initiatives by the international community are encouraging, but we must not be deceived by them. It is necessary to strengthen the defense system of the country. We discuss these and other issues important for the security of the country and the development of the Yugoslav Army with federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic.*

Ready To Preserve Freedom

[DNEVNIK] Our country happens to be extremely close to the war-torn regions, it is under the sanctions and threatened. How is the concept of defense of the FRY being implemented in such conditions? Is our security endangered, and if so, to what extent?

[Bulatovic] Our country is close to war-torn regions and for four years already there has been a civil war going on at our borders. Never has such or so great a military force been concentrated at our borders in recent history, and never have we been exposed to such an extent to various forms and methods of warfare. This fact demands careful analysis of economic, political, and military aspects important for the survival of our state. It is also clear that those who are responsible for the disintegration of former Yugoslavia have still not sated their appetites, and they are waiting for an opportunity to crush our state as well. Peace initiatives by the international community are encouraging, but we must not be deceived by them. Regardless of all the danger that the war in our neighborhood poses and internal difficulties, the defense system of the FRY is successfully developing, and it is a token of peace and security for our citizens. Our peoples, from the historic point of view, have always been a hard nut to crack for any enemy. Those who threaten us know that very well, and they will not dare to experiment with force and fire. Our citizens should not be concerned, because the Army, together with our people, is capable of efficiently carrying out all their constitutional duties regarding the preservation of freedom and integrity of our fatherland.

The Contact Group Plan—Basis for Peace

[DNEVNIK] What is the destiny of peace in the Balkans in your opinion, and in whose hands is it to be found?

[Bulatovic] The destiny of peace is always in the hands of the people in those regions, but it also depends on the political situation and economic and political relations between the great powers. Throughout history the Balkans has always been exposed to influences, being an intersection of routes and interests. These regions have always been attractive for the strategic interests of the European and overseas powers. From this point of view, in all the wars, in the Balkan wars, World War I and II, decisive battles were waged in the corridor of the valley formed by the Morava and Vardar rivers. It is a gate, more a strategic than a natural one, between Europe and Asia. Much time will pass before the great powers give up their interests in the Balkans. It is a politically always sensitive region, where certain conflicts may escalate at any time in a way that least suits the peoples there, while most suiting those who generate those conflicts.

As for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and everything regarding the situation there and the international community's efforts to achieve a peace solution, the Contact Group's peace plan is a solid basis for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, although it does not satisfy the interests of the Serbian people in the Srpska republic. I say this because the great powers, which are actually responsible for the outbreak of the conflict, must endeavor to bring it to an end. Because, if it further escalates, then the prospects of keeping it under control will be quite limited, and it will probably spread beyond the borders of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the FRY or even farther. Such warfare, I dare say, would go beyond the control of the international organizations, which would pose a great danger not only for peace in Europe, but also in the world.

[DNEVNIK] The Western media are still speculating about the alleged involvement of the Yugoslav Army in the war in Bosnia. How are those lies to be denied? Are not those the same troublemakers who accused the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] for the collapse of the SFRY? How will the Yugoslav Army get rid of the imposed legacy?

[Bulatovic] The fact is that the former JNA was positioned throughout all the former republics. With the dissolution of the state it had to move to the regions where people recognized and accepted it as their army. The secessionist republics, and even certain political parties and international organizations, interpreted certain soldiers' and officers' decision to stay in the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina or of the Srpska republic as the participation of the former JNA in the civil war. I think that it should not be particularly emphasized that such assessments are more about political speculation, rather than about factual state.

It is quite normal that the people from those regions remained in those newly formed states and their armies. For instance, the question why the Croatian, Slovene, or Macedonian officers and soldiers remained in their states has never been raised, while the right of Serbs from the Serbian Republic to stay in their homeland and organize defense is constantly being denied. This issue was much manipulated with, allowing some people to accuse the FRY of being involved in the war, of being a direct or indirect accomplice to the armed conflict in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. As soon as the international community reversed its attitude and understood that mistakes had been made regarding that issue, this argument was no longer so frequently used. It was no longer sustainable enough to force the UN Security Council into adopting new resolutions on tightening the sanctions against the FRY.

Budget According to Capacity

[DNEVNIK] For the FRY's defense system in 1995 1.6 billion dinars have been apportioned from the Federal budget. Are those means sufficient to maintain and improve the combat-readiness of the Yugoslav Army, and to improve the standard of living of its staff, which is one of the demands made by the Supreme Defense Council? To what extent does this influence the combat morale of the Yugoslav Army's officers and soldiers?

[Bulatovic] The fact is that the federal budget for 1995 is small. But the definitive determination that the state functions cannot be financed from the primary issue of money requires that the size of consumption be reduced to the limits that can possibly be covered by real revenues. It has been estimated that it is not possible to plan more than 1.6 billion dinars for the FRY's defense system on the basis of real revenues. That is not much, but it is necessary, and it compels us to accommodate our needs to the means available. That will not be easy. The fact is that there are 18,000 members of the Yugoslav Army whose housing problems have not been solved, and 8,000 more with inadequately solved housing problems, which cannot but affect the motivation of Army staff. Devotion to the officer's profession and patriotism are factors that allow the efficient functioning of the army, much more than other material factors or status symbols. However, we have to raise a human question: Can our professional soldiers be expected to live for the profession, without being able to make their living on it?

The percentage that has been apportioned to the army from the budget may confuse, or make one draw the wrong conclusions. However, when we see what it means in its absolute amount, then we can get a clearer picture. If we compare our Army's budget with those of other countries, we are still on a level that can be tolerated or endured, but we are quite behind the countries that we can be realistically compared with. Economic circumstances create such conditions that the state is not able to allot more for the defense system.

[DNEVNIK] In your expose in the Federal Assembly you warned that, because of such a bad financial situation, some of the most promising staff are leaving the Yugoslav Army. Knowing that the restrictive budget does not offer any bright prospect of settling the problem, what measures are being planned by the federal Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army to slow down that process?

[Bulatovic] The erosion of staff is not happening only in the Yugoslav Army. The fact is that in the past three to four years the brain drain from our country is quite large. This applies to all professions. By the nature of things an officer's profession is not flexible in the sense that officers may change employment. However, needs must, so because of the low standard of living officers have been forced to seek another employment, and even to go abroad.

The fact is also that considerable means are being invested in order to obtain high-quality experts for the needs of the Yugoslav Army, who will be capable of answering the demands of modern science and technology. Their departure would undoubtedly mean a standstill in both the applied and the fundamental research in the army, while at the same time it would require much greater means to obtain an expert cadre again, when conditions for that are recreated. It will take time and a stronger financial injection to resolve those problems. The sooner they are resolved, the smaller the effects of the brain-drain on the army and the economy will be.

How To Revive Special Purpose Production

[DNEVNIK] You emphasized several times how necessary it is to transform the military-political complex. What concrete steps did you have in mind, and what are the chances for the revival of special purpose production?

[Bulatovic] Before, in former Yugoslavia, our special purpose production used to have a high rating, not only on the European, but also on the world market. Now that industrial complex must share the destiny of other industrial capacities, in view of the lack of imported raw materials, diminished market and other restrictions.

Which is to say, the military production must accommodate itself to the new conditions as well. It is important that, regardless of the blockade, the rating of the military industry on the market has been maintained, and one should expect that as soon as the embargo is lifted, the Yugoslav special purpose production will be what it used to be earlier. I think also that the firms engaged in special purpose production will draw certain morals from this situation regarding the revision of their production lines to meet the market demands. In addition, legal preconditions must be created for special purpose production to be restructured both in proprietary and organizational terms, which will make possible profitable business activities. The Yugoslav Army will not be able for a long time to invest in new technology and developmental capacities of the military industry. The army is in the position to buy, depending on available financial means, and in such a frame the firms engaged in special purpose production must develop a new business policy. One should expect legal conditions to be created soon for that, since the Bill on Companies and the Bill on Proprietary Transformation are being discussed in the Assembly right now. Those acts will enable special purpose production to reorganize itself on new foundations.

Diplomatic Initiatives

[DNEVNIK] You have recently visited Armenia. Tell us some more about your diplomatic activities and initiatives.

[Bulatovic] I assess that visit as successful, not only from the point of view of cooperation between the two defense ministries, but also from the point of view of the creation of new room for cooperation between the Armenian and Yugoslav military industries, as well as in other branches of the economy. The FRY is still internationally not recognized, while the acceptance of official visits implies the recognition of our state. The states that are not ready for that avoid such contacts and it is much easier to contact them on the level of republican governments, rather than on the federal level. The federal Defense Ministry does not lead any particular or independent policy from the federal government of the FRY. We, as a state, are ready to cooperate with all countries that observe the principles of equality and mutual respect. As far as we are concerned, there are no limitations in that respect. The FRY's policy is dedicated to peace, and one of our most important tasks in 1995 must be the establishment of as intensive a cooperation with our neighbors as possible, without neglecting other countries that are ready for cooperation. That cooperation will be pursued to benefit peace and overall prosperity.

[DNEVNIK] Housing problems are certainly among the most topical problems in the Yugoslav Army. What is being done to provide apartments for as many people as possible?

[Bulatovic] Former Yugoslavia had about 150,000 army flats, and most of them had been built within a period of 50 years. With the disintegration of the country that number halved as well. Today in Serbia and Montenegro there are 75,000 Army apartments. Considering the fact that 18,000 officers are without an apartment of their own and the probable dynamic of building in the next 50 years, one can calculate how much time we need to provide flats for those army staff. Some estimates show that we would need 2 billion German marks to bring that housing investment program to a conclusion, which is absolutely impossible in the current circumstances. We are trying to create an initial capital fund from which that project would be financed. We have engaged some scientific institutions to help us with defining plans and measures in order to ease the housing problem at least to a degree. We are considering making a proposal to the Federal Assembly through the Government to adopt a special law that would provide resources for the construction of apartments for professional army staff. We shall make the greatest efforts to ease this problem, step by step.

[Box, page 3]

[DNEVNIK] What is the status of the members of the Yugoslav Army who do not have Yugoslav citizenship?

[Bulatovic] The issue is quite clear, although our army has been accused, particularly by some foreign media, of being Serbian-Montenegrin, completely cleansed of the members of other nations and national minorities. This is not true at all. The Yugoslav Army is open for all the citizens of the FRY, which is true both for the schools for officers and for the admission of civilians. However, certain problems have come about because the Law on Citizenship has not been passed yet, while there is no country in the world whose army takes in officers who are not its citizens. In that respect we are more than flexible, as lawyers would put it, regarding the application of our laws. All those who have fulfilled professional and other criteria are still to be found in our army, even though they have not obtained Yugoslav citizenship. We expect that law to be passed, and then all the members of the Yugoslav Army will settle their statuses in accordance with the law. True, the Law on Citizenship should have been passed much earlier, but its current nonexistence does not endanger the rights of the Yugoslav Army members who have not obtained Yugoslav citizenship according to the existing legal regulations.

[Box, page 3]

[DNEVNIK] The rich military and freedom-loving traditions of the Serbian and Montenegrin people were neglected for a long time. However, now it is precisely those traditions that have been taken as a basis for organizing new arms and forces in the Yugoslav Army. What do these traditions mean for the young generations of the Yugoslav Army?

[Bulatovic] In the postwar development of the Yugoslav Army and the use of history and other data and facts to promote the traditions of the Serbian and Montenegrin people, many mistakes were made. The outcome of World War II was made into a fetish, while some very important periods of our history were forgotten, as much for their being in direct connection with this people as for the territory we are living in. Now those mistakes have to be corrected, but without making new ones. History has its continuity, even though it does not comply with some sociological theories. From the examples of warriors and generals from the past wars—the battle of Kosovo, hajduks and uskoks [outlaws in the Middle Ages who fought against occupying forces, particularly Turks], Grahovac and King Lazar, the First and Second Serbian Uprising, World Wars I and II—we can learn many things and values; about human, patriotic, and an officer's honor.... We lived through a long period during which one felt shame to mention the names of Stepa Stepanovic, Duke Misic, Janko Vukotic [great generals from the Serbian past], Skadar, Mojkovac, Kolubara [places of historic battles]... and all those were great events in the history of our people. Those dates, those great historic events sustain the morale and patriotism of our Army. Now, when we are forming an army that is ideologically quite neutral, it is a good opportunity to form a moral and military doctrine that does not depend on daily politics, but rather has a lasting value. It is the right moment to lay the foundations of a military doctrine that will have lasting historic value, and I hope we are wise enough to achieve that.

[Box, page 3]

[DNEVNIK] Please, allow us to wish a very happy New Year to you and all the members of the Yugoslav Army and the Federal Defense Ministry, and to ask you for your New Year's wish.

[Bulatovic] Thank you for your wishes. I wish peace for all the citizens of our country. May our soldiers and officers, as well as other members of the FRY's defense system live and work in peace. May the current hardships be overcome by our joint efforts, creative energy, reason and wisdom. May we live in freedom. This is not much to ask, as we do deserve it.

NASA BORBA Daily Registers With Ministry

LD1901184895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1824 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 19 (TANJUG)—New Yugoslav daily NASA BORBA has been entered into the register of the mass media of the Serbian Information Ministry, TANJUG learns on Thursday.

The registration decision was made by the Serbian Information Ministry.

The founder and publisher of the new daily is the Fininvest private enterprise for marketing, trade and engineering in Novi Sad, the capital of the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina. The paper's main offices are also in Novi Sad.

By founding a new daily, a dispute ended between the state and the stock corporation Borba over the property rights. The Belgrade commercial court in mid-December ruled invalid the 1991 decision on the founding of the stock corporation Borba due to administrative shortcomings in registering the firm. The court sustained the state's request to have the daily BORBA returned into its ownership.

In accordance with this ruling, the Yugoslav Government late last month appointed Yugoslav Information Minister Brcin as director and editor-in-chief of the daily BORBA.

The paper's former management and most of its journalists in the editorial staff have launched a new daily due to disagreements with the court rulings. The new daily's editor-in-chief is Gordana Logar who had held the same post in the BORBA.

Industrial Output Up 1.2 Percent in 1994

LD1901181395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1304 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 19 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Institute for Statistics said Thursday Yugoslav industrial production in 1994 went up 1.2 percent against 1993, despite the economic sanctions.

The institute said that it was the first rise in industrial production after a three-year constant decline due to the economic blockade. The total economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in late May 1992 damaged the Yugoslav economy by at least 45 billion dollars. The 1994 industrial production was still by about 50 percent smaller than in 1991, before the sanctions.

Yugoslav statistics experts hailed the increase in industrial production in 1994 as a big success. The country's economy had been heading for collapse in December 1993 when the monthly inflation rate soared over 300 million percent.

The Yugoslav government took measures in January 1994 and adopted a special program of monetary reconstruction and economic recovery. The program pegged the new yugoslav dinar to the German mark reducing the inflation rate to practically zero.

The program secured basic economic conditions and industrial production increased by 63 percent from January until December 1994.

The statistics experts said that the production increase in 1994, compared to 1993, had been achieved in all industrial branches except in the electrical power, metal and lumber industries. The highest increase was in the chemical and paper industries (14.6 percent) and the production of non-metals and building materials (11 percent). An increase at a slightly smaller level was in the following industries: power (1.6 percent), metallurgy (2.8 percent), textile, leather and rubber (1.9 percent), food and tobacco (1.7 percent).

The production increase in Serbia in 1994 was 1.5 percent, while in Montenegro it marked a decline of 8.5 percent against 1993. The decrease was due mostly to the fall in power production.

Statistics experts quoted that the average net salary in 1994 was 164 dinars (about 100 U.S. dollars), three times more than the previous year. When the program was introduced in January 1994 the average net salary was 26 dinars (about 2 U.S. dollars), and in December 1994 it stood at 283 dinars (about 180 U.S. dollars).

Average December salaries in production industries amounted to 281 dinars (about 180 U.S. dollars) and in public services 291 dinars (about 185 U.S. dollars).

Article Views State of Belgrade Economy, Mafia

BR1201122095 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD (Saturday Supplement) in Dutch 7 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Marjon Van Royen: "The Serb Consumer State"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The UN embargo against rump Yugoslavia has been effective for two and a half years now. Officially, Belgrade says the Serb population is living in poverty and deprivation. Is this really true? Report on the silent prosperity in a stricken country, where bullets are whistling.

With her nose pressed against the shop window, her face covered with makeup and with shiny eyes, the girl points her finger at a leather jacket—175 [German] marks [DM]. Yes, she can afford that. When asked for her expectations for the new year, she says: "That I may look well. That is the most important thing." Apparently, she is not fascinated by the war, the sanctions, Serbia's future. Irritated, she throws her bleached hair backwards and pushes the shop's glass door wide open. "War," she says while she dreamily passes her hands over the leather jacket. "I have nothing to do with it. That is politics."

Dry slices of bread, worn-out winter coats, half-frozen paupers at empty kitchen tables. That was the picture the official at the Serb Embassy in The Hague had drawn of his country. A moribund population which has been the victim of suffocating sanctions for more than three years and which has now entered yet another winter of hardship. He had warned me: "Beware, you will be shocked by the things you will see."

Men in snow white shoes are passing by. They wear Nikes and Reeboks, and Armani jeans, as if the attire were state-imposed. Women dressed in the latest fashion walk by, from shop to shop. The streets of Belgrade overflow with life. Where has the deprivation, the great Serb suffering gone? Dresses from Paris, shoes from Italy. They are even for sale in the state shops. Perfume, bananas, and contact lenses to imitate blue eyes. "Imported," says the owner of Boutique 2000 while money continues to flow in. And how about the sanctions? "No problem," he says, while he receives DM90 for a pair of Versace jeans.

In the Carpe Diem bar, we try to understand the miracle which has hit this country. Three quarters of the factories in Serbia and Montenegro have been shut down. The treasury is empty. The average income is DM250. Half of the labor force has been sent home. And yet the streets of Belgrade are a consumer paradise which outshines the chic Via Condotti in Rome or the PC Hooftstraat in Amsterdam. Young people are sipping cocktails. The walls are decorated with post modern broken mirrors. On upholstered chairs, Zoran Petronovic has his office. He has a big pile of banknotes in his pockets and is wearing a watch made of gold bullet cartridges, in the latest Serb fashion. Petronovic is a money changer. Today, he offers 1.7 Yugoslav dinar for DM1. Inflation is slightly rising. However, the days when you had to give a higher pile of banknotes for a pile of toilet paper are forever gone, Petronovic says. "Father Abraham" is the pet name of Dragoslav Avramovic, the 75-year-old governor of the Central Bank. He is the man who "saved" the economy when he equated the dinar and the mark last June.

For a black market money dealer such as Petronovic, this intervention must not have been a good thing. "But it was," the black market money dealer nods fiercely. "This is the future," he says solemnly, while removing the dandruff from his shoulders. A slight inflation. An economically unstable situation. This is ideal for trade. When inflation was still galloping, trade threatened to collapse at any moment.

Now he can afford to walk around with 20,000 dinars or so in his pockets, without being afraid of losing them. "The world is trying to drive Yugoslavia together by military means and blackmail," Petronovic says with his eyes closed. "But we, the traders, are the ones who really keep it together." Of course he is a nationalist. Muslims and Croats must never live with Serbs again. "However, one should control one's nationalism," he says. "A nationalist must be rational."

The fingers of his hairy hands, with which he used to tighten screws, are now counting banknotes. Before the war, he used to be a metalworker in an engineering factory. However, his factory was shut down, too. When his savings were gone, he became a money changer. He did not like it at first. "Suddenly, you must give up your honest and quiet life and start lying, dealing, and running hard." He had to change his whole personality, he says pensively. Sometimes he spends the night in jail. He then wraps his shoes in his coat and goes quietly to sleep. He pays the police the "right price."

Anyway, where are they: the poor, the needy, and the elderly? Somebody here must foot the bill. What happened to the "sacrifices" for the Bosnian brothers, to the Greater-Serb martyrdom?

"Money talks, bullshit walks," says Vesna Bosic, a cheerful American of Serb descent. She works with the British relief organization OXFAM. We are on our way to see her friends Dragan and Dragana, in one of Belgrade's poorer suburbs. Above the brand-new Serb license plates, I notice stickers referring to "Dik's car company Utrecht" and "Renault dealer Meidoorn Badhoevedorp." There are fuel dealers like exotic whores on every street corner. Their yellow and red lemonade bottles filled with fuel light up underneath their small lanterns. "Everyone is trading," Vesna says. "Nationalism, ethnic nonsense, the real Serbian folk songs, and dancing. Everything is negotiable." Serbia is back in business. Bosnia has been banished to another planet. No more ideology, no more war screams. But no resistance, no criticism, either. "This is total destruction," Vesna says, while her fingers brush the misted windows clean. "In this country, a true smuggler's revolution is taking place."

That night at Dragan and Dragana's place, I learned what that means. The whole family is sitting around one candle. The power company has cut off the electricity again. Serbia has the lowest energy prices and the highest consumption in Europe. This situation has led to the disruption of the modern Serb power company. Repairs can no longer be carried out, supply is stalling. This is Milosevic's instant socialism: For hardly DM10 a month, entire families can heat their houses on electricity. Until power runs short. Without complaining, people light their candles and shrug their shoulders. "They will come up with a solution," Dragana says. "They always do."

The family spends no more than 350 dinars a month. A small, two-bedroom house. Dragan is the only one who is working: He is a gatekeeper in a factory which has been closed since the war. And even this family is not too badly off. Once a month, Dragana travels to the market in Budapest, where she buys sweaters and jeans which she sells in Belgrade at twice the price. They get chickens, eggs, and vegetables from their relatives in the village. And sometimes, Dragan manages to lay his hands on a batch of cigarettes.

And yet, something is wrong. Where are the reserves? Where does the money come from to run the entire society on parasitic trade?

Suddenly, there is a silence. The men who enter the restaurant give the customers a searching look. People are petrified and stop eating. Leather jackets, wide shoulders. Vesna begins to shuffle. "These are killers, psychopaths, murderers," she whispers. "Of the kind that wreaks havoc in Bosnia." She tries to keep as low a profile as possible, while the men sit down. The waiters startle, rush, and bow, and use small vacuum cleaners to clean the table for the mob gentlemen, as if the president himself had descended here. The men are wearing gold rings and chains and have beepers which go off all the time. Occasionally they get up to make a phone call. Except the one with a head like a monkey head. He is sitting quietly behind his Serbian bean soup. With small gestures and wordless orders, he commands his foot soldiers like a godfather.

"Business," he says when I draw up a chair and ask him in which field he is working. He raises his hand to restrain his bodyguards' protests and gestures them to search my pockets. No weapons, no tape recorder. I can stay. He introduces himself as "Goran." The business he is in, is probably not quite legal, we carefully suggest. "No," Goran says smilingly. "That would be impossible. The world forces us to find other ways." He "imports" cigarettes, coffee, and fuel through his "companies" in Germany and Switzerland, so that his people can get what they need. Including drugs, we wonder? "Anything people need," he repeats and he pours another brandy.

Goran talks about the sacrifices he is making for the "Serb cause." That he was one of the first men to fight with paramilitary units in Bosnia. That "his boys" are still going there to "help" the population, while he himself is also taking risks with his business.

He admits he benefits from it. The diamond rings on his fingers, his leather jacket with astrakhan lining. However, he does not feel guilty about it. "I have always been a supporter of capitalism."

How about President Milosevic? Surely he does not think highly of such an autocratic socialist? He slowly opens the zipper of this jacket. A magnum .44 handgun becomes visible in his belt. He actually shows some signs of agitation. "Listen up," Goran says. "Milosevic has kept this people together. He has restored Serb honor. Now he is making sure that sanctions will be lifted. This man is a genius."

But why is he carrying a gun? Who is he afraid of? The police, the criminal competition? Goran shrugs his shoulders. "I have already survived five attempts on my life. Corrupt policemen shot at me. I found a bomb in my car twice. In Germany, I had to shoot a man because he threatened me. I am not afraid. I have seven lives, just like a cat."

Leaning back, he talks about his financial successes, the opportunity he will have to "launder" everything when sanctions are lifted. He also talks about the Italian mob. "Toddlers, no real men," he says. Look at him or his bodyguards. "Are they real macho-guys or what?"

"Chop, chop, chop," one can suddenly hear in the restaurant. With a big Rambo knife, a red-haired bulldog chops up his banana. "He probably does this in order not to have a banana in his mouth like a woman," Vesna suggests cheerfully. Goran is amused. The red-haired bodyguard is not. "Let us meet the day after tomorrow," Goran says and he prompts the others to get up. "I will show you Belgrade's night life. Without saying goodbye, he disappears into the night with his retinue.

"That was Goran Vukovic," the policeman says. "Zemunac's murderer." Apparently, we sat at the table with one of the most important Serb mafia gangsters of the moment. Goran Vukovic spent five years in a German jail for murdering the Yugoslav mob leader Ljubomir Zemunac when he left a Frankfurt court. "The Germans probably let Vukovic do as he pleased, because they did not manage to convict Zemunac," the officer claims.

Since he was released in 1991, Goran Vukovic has been leading his own gang in Belgrade. Their main sources of income are blackmail, smuggling, robbery, and most importantly, drug trafficking. In addition, he has contacts with the Bosnian Serb authorities. In exchange for protection, he helps them to "ethnically cleanse" the conquered territories. Goran Vukovic's main bodyguard is an agent of the special units of the "Srpska republic" in Bosnia. "Like all major mafia gangsters, he also hides behind nationalism to cover up his criminal activities," the policeman says.

Then why don't they arrest Vukovic? Why is he free to travel as he pleases in Serbia, terrorizing people and enlarging his criminally acquired capital? The policeman smiles. "Why do you think?!" No names, no places, no references. That was the deal. I wanted this policeman to tell me how it is possible that Serbia has a 100,000-man strong police force for a population of hardly 10 million, while crime figures are among the highest in Europe. What are all these policemen doing when they are not protecting the population?

"Protecting Milosevic," the policeman replies. Almost half of the policemen in Serbia are working for the secret police. "Which means directly for Mr. Milosevic's ruling socialist party." His own unit was also incorporated into the secret police overnight. "We are no obstacle to Belgrade's mafia gangsters and criminals. Orders come from the top. And the government is solely responsible for controlling the police."

If Milosevic has concluded a pact with organized crime in order to bypass sanctions and if the mob is seeing to Serbia's economic wonder by bringing stolen currency, black market money, and drugs into the country, should Milosevic not be afraid that the enriched mob will turn against him, now that the end of international sanctions are at hand? "No," the policeman indicates. "No, Milosevic will never let that happen. You do not know him very well. I think he can have people like Vukovic eliminated whenever he wants. Would you like another drink?"

"You know who died?" Vesna shouts over the phone the next evening. "Guess, you will never guess!" Together, we go to the scene of the calamity. There are glass fragments, empty bullet cartridges, and curious people everywhere. Fifty bullets were fired at him. They came from the bushes in the park over there. They waited until he left the bar and had checked his car for bombs. And when he put the key in his white BMW's ignition—so he could not shoot back, you see—they opened fire. Two bullets in the head and several more in his heart. He died on the spot. They vanished in a fake cab. His Bosnian bodyguard died in the hospital later on, the onlookers tell me.

Poor Goran Vukovic. Instead of seven, he had only six lives. Another BMW is parked over the bloodstain. Someone nailed his portrait on a nearby tree. "My love, I will always grieve over your death," his wife wrote on a note. Candles are burning, the ground is covered with flowers. People continue to visit the makeshift monument all night.

"It seems we will have to discover night life without Goran Vukovic," Vesna says relieved. We visit several bars and discotheques, but it seems all life has been sucked out of the city. Where is this famous turbo folk music everyone is talking about? Dull songs are resounding from the loudspeakers. Nobody is dancing. Nobody is having fun. "That is because of the mourning," the owner of the Havana bar finally explains. "All bars are in mourning for three days for Goran Vukovic." [passage omitted]

The drum band is playing sad marching music. Thousands of people have come to the cemetery in order to bury Goran Vukovic. All of Belgrade's organized crime is here, as well as several politicians, members of parliament, and police officers. They respectfully look at the coffin which is being carried by sobbing bodyguards. The red-haired bulldog is also there. He keeps walking in circles, smoking one cigarette after the other.

Goran Vukovic's last journey goes past crying women in expensive fur coats and men who would not even leave their guns at home on this day. He is committed to the earth high in the mountains above the city. People roam about the marble graves to catch a last glimpse.

The orthodox priests sing: "God, bless him. God, rest his soul." The coffin is lowered into the grave while people push and jostle. His widow, a journalist at the state television, faints. "We got to know life through the eyes of Goran" are the words spoken at the graveyard, while salutes are being fired below in the city. "All of Belgrade is mourning, because their best friend has left them. Dear brother Goran, you have become a legend. You always gave an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. You never bowed to the enemy. This made you a warrior and a great Serb. A patriot this nation should be proud of."

Serbia

'Crisis' Results in Further Power Cuts

AU1901115695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Cold weather caused extreme a jump in the consumption of electricity for heating and, for this reason, additional power cuts have been introduced this morning, Radmilo Ivankovic, assistant director to the Administration for Management of the

Power Grid of the Serbian power industry, stated. He emphasized that the Djerdjap hydroelectric power plant produced 12 million kwh yesterday, which does not suffice for the current situation. Not even the extremely good work of the steam power plants could manage to satisfy the great consumption.

The consumption of electricity in Serbia increased to such an extent that the entire power system has reached a crisis situation, as a result of which the breakdown cuts have been introduced, Ivankovic said. This, naturally, does not mean that actual breakdowns have occurred at power plants. These measures were taken due to a great jump in consumption, Ivankovic explained.

Minister: Situation 'Critical'

AU1901202395 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Statement by Serbian Energy and Mining Minister Dragan Kostic in Belgrade on 19 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The headquarters for monitoring the energy situation has reviewed the reports from the Serbian Electricity Board and—bearing in mind the general situation—had to accept the suggestion made by the Electricity Board to continue the program of selective reductions in the electricity supplies during the next period.

Two tasks have been given to the Electricity Board. The first task is to organize the reduction program in such a way that the citizens are told in advance at what time the reductions will be introduced and when they will end so that they can organize their lives so as to diminish the effects that the reductions will have. The second task is that the reductions' program does not exceed the necessary level for a day, an hour, I would even say a minute. In that sense all the relevant factors have to participate in order to make the reductions' program as limited as possible. To make the reductions in electricity supplies as short as possible it is necessary that the Electricity Board do its part of the job—that is, that it maintain this level of electricity production. Also, the consumers have to be active participants in the consumption of electricity by observing the situation facing everyone, a situation that is really a state of emergency since—allow me to inform you—the situation with the production and consumption of electricity is very critical also in our neighborhood. Therefore, the citizens have to observe this situation and reduce their consumption of electricity to the limits of production—that is, by some 15-20 percent.

Further on Kostic Remarks

AU2001122695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The energy supply situation in Serbia is extremely grave, with a tendency to deteriorate further, the Serbian power industry [Elektroprivreda Srbije] reported last night. It was emphasized that consumption of electricity is not decreasing because alternative energy resources are not being used and because other heating systems are functioning poorly. The only way to salvage the energy supply system is to keep the consumption within the limits of production capacities, the power industry reports. For this reason, the Serbian power industry was compelled to extend power cuts and increase the number of groups of consumers who are being disconnected from the system.

Serbian Energy Minister Dragan Kostic stated that daily electricity restriction plans must be observed to the maximum. Minister Kostic favored the reactivation of, as he said, a contingent [kontingent] principle. These contingents would be determined by distribution centers and would, within the quantities determined in this way, establish the consumption capabilities.

Dragan Kostic reminded that the prognosis of a better heating season rested on a very realistic perspective that the import of natural gas would be allowed. Furthermore, two foreign ministers, namely Kozyrev and Christopher, provided such information and we, understanding this as a constant factor, planned that we would be able to secure a heating season that the citizens should have, objectively speaking, Minister Kostic emphasized.

We must also be realistic in the demands toward the heating stations, which, objectively speaking, can only use the energy resources that are available to them. These energy resources are not sufficient to safeguard the quality of heating that would cut down consumption and balance the entire energy supply situation in the country, Energy Minister Dragan Kostic added.

Belgrade-Moscow Economic Cooperation Accord

LD1901205695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1430 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 19 (TANJUG)—Belgrade Chamber of Commerce Chairman Branislav Vujinovic and Moscow Chamber of Commerce Deputy Manager Konstantin Polishchin signed Thursday an agreement on economic cooperation. The agreement envisiges cooperation in the civil engineering, textile and other industries.

Polishchin said that cooperation between the two countries must not be allowed to be hindered by the current United Nations sanctions against Yugoslavia. The chairman of the Belgrade Chamber of Commerce said that the economic cooperation between Belgrade and Moscow was necessary. He said that the Energoprojekt civil-engineering company of Belgrade would take part in building a business and trade fair center in Moscow.

Kosovo

Rugova Meets With UNESCO Delegation

AU2001090895 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Telephone report by Shaban Arifaj from Prishtina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosova President Ibrahim Rugova in Prishtina today received Thorsten Petre, adviser at the Swedish Embassy in Belgrade, and a UNESCO delegation led by (?Louis Karamayo), special adviser to the UNESCO general director. Shaban Arifaj reports from Prishtina:

[Arifaj] President Rugova briefed the Swedish diplomat on the current situation in Kosova, which is deteriorating as a result of the repression that has been intensified, particularly following the departure of the CSCE, currently OSCE, observer mission. He reiterated the demand for a larger international presence in Kosova. The implementation of an international civil administration, Rugova stressed, would help soothe the situation and normalize life, as well as create the preliminary conditions to resolve the question of Kosova through negotiations.

President Rugova also emphasized that a global approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is a more efficient way to resolve all crises in the area.

The adviser at the Swedish Embassy in Belgrade expressed an interest in various aspects of Kosova daily life.

Meanwhile, at a meeting with the UNESCO delegation, President Rugova presented the situation of education in Kosova, which continues to be grave. Education in Albanian is held outside school buildings and under extremely difficult conditions, confronted with the systematic repression of the Serbian regime, President Rugova said.

At the meeting, they talked about the possibilities of overcoming the situation and the assistance that UNESCO could offer.

Mr. Karamayo expressed UNESCO's readiness to assist Albanian education in Kosova.

The Kosova Information Center reports that the UNESCO delegation talked with educational representatives in Kosova—Dr. Xhavit Ahmeti, adviser to President Rugova on education affairs; Magistrate Abdyl Rama, chairman of the education sector of the Kosova Democratic Alliance Presidency; Rexhep Osmani, chairman of the Albanian Teachers League; Dr. Agim Hyseni, chairman of the Education Independent Trade Union; and Halim Hyseni, director of the Pedagogical Enterprise in Kosova.

Representatives of Albanian education in Kosova briefed the UNESCO delegation on the educational situation, and they talked about the ways to overcome the situation and the assistance that UNESCO could provide.

Pristina Rector Hails Strategies for Colonization

AU1901131695 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 533 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serb-installed Rector of the University of Prishtina, Radivoje Papovic, told today's Prishtina-based Serbian daily JEDINSTVO that he preferred the strategies of the Serbian King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic for the colonization of Kosova.

He regretted that such schemes had not been "entirely completed." "Nonetheless, what we (Serbs) are doing now is a return to an idea that is necessary and reasonable because it is based on the needs of the Serbian state," Papovic points out.

Commenting on remarks by foreign delegations on the colonization of Kosova, the Serbian rector says that no one from abroad should interfere with these matters as "Kosova is solely a Serbian issue, it is Serbian interests and Serbian tomorrow that are e". [sentence as published]

The Serbian ultra-nationalist "scholar" who is a Kosova settler himself, has many times called on university professors and students from Serbia to come to the usurped University of Prishtina, promising them accommodation and other benefactions. He o testifies that such schemes have already been performed. [sentence as received] "Over the past two and a half years, some 7,000 students and 348 professors have come to our University. We call on those who are willing to come here and our duty is to provide apartments to all of them," Mr. Papovic told the Belgrade-based NIN in its 30 September 1994 issue.

The Serbian regime has been widely advocating and performing campaigns for the colonization of Kosova and changing of its ethnic composition. Only last week the government of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) passed a statutory decree for the "realization of the Program for the settlement of 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosova."

Over the past two years, several settlements for Serbs have either been erected or are under construction in Kosova.

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